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ABSTRACT
Justifying the Plaintiffs Receipt 
of Punitive Damages
by
Marlisa Moschella
Dr. Craig Walton, Examination Committee Chair 
Emeritus Professor of Ethics and Policy Studies 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis addresses the punitive damages reform issue of whether or not the plaintiff 
should receive the award. Reformers argue the purposes of punitive damages would be 
better served with other distribution options; and prioritized societal gains, above the 
gains of the plaintiff. The various purposes of punitive damages show that receipt by the 
plaintiff is in accordance with original intentions of punitive damages and serves justice. 
The historical and modem purposes of punitive damages such as vengeance satisfaction, 
redeeming honor, repairing insult, and supporting ‘private attorneys general,’ are 
maintained by the plaintiff receiving damages. These purposes provide an important 
incentive to the plaintiff to pursue litigation. Incentive for this pursuit mitigates the 
inherent burden placed upon the plaintiff and serves justice since the plaintiff is 
procedurally the “least advantaged” participant. Therefore, the status quo should be 
maintained to provide incentive and to ensure justice in civil law.
Ill
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PREFACE
It all started on May 16, 2002,1 was having lunch with my father. He’s an attorney. 
As he sat down, he enthusiastically declared that his firm had won a case against Mobil 
Oil Guam and the jury awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages and $2.8 million in 
punitive damages. He was so excited. He called to the server for some water and was 
slapping the table and gesturing his fists in the air as if he had just won a title match. I 
questioned the amounts awarded; it seemed strange that a civil case spurred reactions 
similar to that of winning the lottery. My father explained that the compensatory 
damages equaled the amount stolen from the plaintiff and the punitive damages served to 
punish Mobil Oil for the fi-aud they had committed. I questioned the process because 
someone had become a millionaire from punishing a corporation. How is this at all like 
criminal punishment? Do criminal victims receive awards when the offender is 
punished? Last time I checked, murder victims and rape victims receive no such award. 
If anything, they receive the satisfaction that the offender is behind bars and will suffer 
the consequences of his or her actions. I suppose that ordering a corporation to pay a 
large amount of money would serve the same purpose, but why is the money going to the 
plaintiff? Would it not serve society better if it were donated to the University’s business 
school to teach future businessmen some ethics? My father’s explanation was, “That’s 
civil law.”
That day changed my life. About 5 months after that day, I moved to Las Vegas, and 
applied to UNLV’s Ethics and Policy Studies (EPS) Program. I had a Bachelors degree
vi
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in philosophy, but was raised by a lawyer. So the EPS Program was a good match.
When I began, I knew absolutely nothing about punitive damages. Now, all my questions 
about punitive damages have been answered. Thanks to EPS’s eclectic program. Dr. 
Craig Walton, Dr. Alan Zundel, and my Thesis Committee members UNLV Law 
Professor Robert Correales, and Criminal Justice Department Professor Dr. Hong Lu, I 
was able to accomplish not only a Master’s Degree, but also the satisfaction of knowing 
why plaintiffs receive punitive damages.
I humbly thank friend and colleague Cecilia Mun, whose intelligence, analytical 
skills, humor and alcohol tolerance has assisted me in pursuit of my degree. (Not to 
mention the argument diagrams in the bar and the discourse in the garage.) All the 
problems she has helped me solve over a glass of wine were just as beneficial as any 
graduate seminar; may the wine of friendship never run dry.
I thank my family whose encouragement has helped me achieve this degree. My 
older sister Christina -  attorney turned happy -  thank you for constantly building my 
confidence and for proofreading every paper I have ever written since my undergraduate 
upper division classes; I could not have done without your prose. And of course my 
father who has inspired me in all the ways he hoped not to. Although I may not have 
gone to law school, thank you for the capacity and the motivation to pursue what I love. 
And I cannot forget my son, Sebastian, who has been the most faithfiil and patient of all 
persons. As I typed and studied through the night, sacrificed time with him in order to 
get this degree, he has always been supportive, thank you.
V ll
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INTRODUCTION
In BMW o f North America, Inc. v. Gore^ (1996), an Alabama case, the plaintiff was 
awarded $4000 in compensatory damages. In addition, the jury awarded the plaintiff $4 
million in punitive damages.^ The punitive amount was based upon the total number of 
automobiles sold nation-wide that had been similarly damaged and fraudulently repaired. 
The repairs were found fraudulent since BMW had transported the repainted cars to the 
United States and did not disclose information regarding the repair to Alabama 
consumers. The entire damages amount was to be awarded to the single plaintiff. In 
1997, the punitive award was appealed twice and reduced by the Alabama Supreme Court 
and the U.S. Supreme Court to $50,000.
This case, and many similar to it, represent why punitive damages have been under 
scrutiny. Not only are the large amounts criticized, but also the process in which a single 
plaintiff has the possibility of receiving amounts calculated by assessing the harm to the 
plaintiff as well as the cumulative potential or actual social harm.
This thesis addresses the punitive damages reform issue of whether or not the plaintiff 
should receive the award, or if the purposes of punitive damages would be better served 
with other distribution options. In order to determine whether the policy process should 
be reformed, I examine the justice served by the different purposes of punitive damages
' BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
 ̂David E. Hogg, “Alabama Adopts De Novo Review for Punitive Damage Appeals: 
Another Landmeirk Decision or Much Ado About Nothing?,” Alabama Law Review 54 
(Fall 2002) : 223 n2.
viii
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as described by modem judicial literature as well as historical perspectives. I conclude 
that the status quo should be maintained.
I argue that certain purposes of punitive damages validate the plaintiff receiving the 
damages. These purposes include: vengeance satisfaction, honor redemption, insult 
reparation, and supporting ‘private attorneys general.’ These purposes provide an 
essential incentive to the plaintiff to bring civil wrong-doings to court. Incentive for this 
pursuit mitigates the inherent burden placed upon the plaintiff, and serves procedural 
justice since the plaintiff is the “least advantaged” participant in the proceedings.^ Thus 
in order to continue to fulfill these purposes, the status quo should be maintained. The 
plaintiff should continue to receive the punitive damages award in order to reinforce 
incentive to the plaintiff and to ensure justice in civil law. These purposes outweigh the 
counterarguments for reform.
Punitive damage awards and the process that surrounds them is not common 
knowledge. So I begin with a general description of the arena of civil law.
Civil Law
Civil law has three main branches: tort law, contract law, and property law.'  ̂ When 
an individual, or a company treated as an individual, has wronged or harmed another, 
justice calls for a corrective procedure. If the “harm is caused through the fault of 
another person(s) which calls for compensation or redress (tort law), or because of some
 ̂See pages 4 9 -5 1 , infra. Chapter 2 Serving Justice, ProceduralJustice, The Least 
Advantaged and the Difference Principle.
Jules Coleman, "Theories of Tort Law", The Stanford Encyclopedia o f Philosophy 
(Winter 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), [on-line]; http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/spr2004/entries/legal-punishment/; 1. accessed on 1 April 2004.
ix
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unfairness or other impropriety due to the processes of exchange or other voluntary 
agreements in society (contract law), the case is taken to civil c o u r t .C i v i l  law 
procedures deal with socially declared ‘wrongs,’ but they are treated as ‘private wrongs’ 
since the decision to pursue litigation is left to the party who claims they have been 
wronged.^ This ‘private wrong’ aspect is unique to civil law.^
Another aspect of civil law that characterizes it within the private law arena is the 
outcome: the damages are received by the plaintiff,* as opposed to the state. Remedies 
under civil law include restitution, monetary compensation, and punitive damages.^
 ̂Tom Campbell, Justice, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 21.
 ̂Antony Duff, "Legal Punishment", The Stanford Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy 
(Spring 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), [on-line]; http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/spr2004/entries/legal-punishment/; 4. Accessed on 16 April 2004. “Civil law 
deals in part with wrongs which are non-private in that they are legally and socially 
declared as wrongs — with the wrong constituted by libel, for instance: but they are still 
treated as ‘private’ wrongs in the sense that it is up to the person who was wronged to 
seek legal redress.” See also Marc S. Galanter and David Luban, “Poetic Justice: 
Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism,” The American University Law Review 42:1393 
(Summer 1993) : 2: “A civil wrong is an injury to a private party or to the state in the 
role of a private party.”
 ̂Duff, "Theories of Criminal Law", The Stanford Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy 
(Spring 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), [on-line]; http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/spr2004/entries/legal-punishment/; 4. Accessed on 16 April 2004. “Civil 
wrongs are typically viewed as ‘private’ matters because it is the victim’s burden to 
weigh what happened, to identify the alleged wrongdoer, and to bring a case against him. 
The law provides the institutions (such as the courts or arbitration services) through 
which that case can be brought.” ... All civil law requires “the injured party to decide 
whether to pursue, or to abandon a case, and whether to insist on extracting the damages 
the court awarded,” or to do without them.
* Ibid. 5. If a plaintiff wins a case, “the defendant may have to pay her damages, as 
compensation for the harm that she suffered, and for which she has sued.”
 ̂Steven H. Gifts, s.v. “punitive damages,” in Law Dictionary, 3d ed., (1991). 
Punitive damages, also known as exemplary damages, are defined as “monetary 
compensation in excess of actual damages; a form of punishment to the wrongdoer and 
excess enhancement to the injured; nominal or actual damages must exist before
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Thus, for further reference in this thesis, it is important to note that punitive damages 
processes work in a specialized arena of the legal system -  civil law. In this arena the 
transactions are between private parties, the burden to pursue litigation is on the plaintiff, 
and the result, if the defendant is found guilty, of civil law cases involves a monetary 
payment to the plaintiff. What is unique and distinguishes civil law from criminal is the 
private law aspect.
Summary o f  Chapters 
The academic and legal discourse regarding punitive damages involves the questions 
of whether or not the amounts of the award are excessive, and therefore possibly breach 
Constitutional Rights, whether this form of punishment is justified, and whether the 
public policies behind punitive damages may best be served by alternate forms of 
distribution. Chapter One presents the public discourse surrounding punitive damages. 
Reformers argue that punitive damages have reached proportions that are excessive and 
that the system provides too few guidelines for their calculation. In this chapter, after 
reviewing the different views for reform, the significant cases, and current punitive
exemplary damages are awarded.” Further specific conditions for the awarding of 
punitive damages are addressed in Chapter One regarding the discourse as well as in 
Chapter Three regarding the punishment purposes. Punitive damages in some states 
specifically require for tort law clear and convincing evidence that the defendant 
consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with 
regard to the plaintiff. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., “Symposium: Punitive Damages: Article: 
Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages,” Southern California Law 
Review, 56 (November 1982): 9. Malice is defined as “a state of mind; [which has] the 
desire to harm another that accompanies and provides a reason for intentional act.” 
Willful misconduct or reckless conduct is defined as “conduct involving a conscious 
choice of a course of action entailing a disproportionately great risk of harm to another 
relative to the utility of the conduct, and undertaken with knowledge of the danger or of 
facts that would disclose the danger to a reasonable person.”
xi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
damages policy; I conclude that although certain cases reflect large amounts of punitive 
damage awards, these large awards are rare, the amounts are usually reduced, and the 
appellate courts have constructively presented guidelines to address justified calculations.
But, however few, large punitive damage amounts have lead the debate further to the 
justice behind the distribution of awards. One of the most recent debates involves the 
question of whether the plaintiff should receive the award in addition to compensation or 
actual damages, or if the purposes of punitive damages would be better served with 
alternate forms of distribution such as split recovery awards, where the award is shared 
with the state. It is this aspect of the punitive damages discourse I focus on in this thesis.
Chapter Two begins with presenting two theories of justice I chose to apply to civil 
law procedures: corrective justice and procedural justice. Civil law seeks to achieve 
justice through compensatory damages and punitive damages. Compensatory damages 
correct civil law wrongs through restitution and follow corrective justice principles. 
Punitive damages are applied to wrongs that deem further punishment. The justice of 
punishment is discussed in Chapter Three. Since my focus involves the justice behind 
the distribution of the punitive damages award, after it has been determined necessary; in 
order to determine if the plaintiffs receipt of the punitive damages award properly serves 
justice, I present John Rawls’s procedural justice theory of “justice as fairness.” I argue 
that the plaintiff receiving the award ensures justice because the plaintiff in a civil law 
suit is, in a procedural sense, the “least advantaged.” According to the second justice 
principle for “justice as fairness,” inequalities in society should be arranged so that they 
benefit the “least advantaged” participant. After determining how the plaintiff is the least 
advantaged participant, I conclude that the damages should continue to be received by the
XU
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plaintiff. But the theories of justice are not the only justification for this process.
Punitive damages serve many purposes, all of which should be justified. So I examine 
the purposes of punitive damages.
The punishment theories of retribution and deterrence are most often referred to for 
the justification of awarding punitive d a m ag es .T h e  evaluation of justified punishment 
through these theories is presented in Chapter Three. I also review whether or not 
punishment for retribution and deterrence justifies the plaintiff receiving the award. I 
conclude that retribution and deterrence do not require plaintiff receipt. But retribution 
and deterrence are not the only punishment aspects encompassed by punitive damages. 
Punitive damages have also historically served the punishment purpose of vengeance 
satisfaction. And punitive damages have served a means to punish elite groups or 
corporate entities. Although retribution and deterrence do not provide specific reason for 
the plaintiff to receive the award, vengeance satisfaction and the punishment of corporate 
entities do provide reason. But the purposes of punitive damages do not cease at 
punishment.
History also reveals that initial purposes for punitive damages included the restoration 
of personal honor and the repair of insult for the plaintiff. Chapter Four investigates
Duff, "Theories of Criminal Law", 6. Punitive damages are mainly “intended to 
punish or burden the defendant.” See also Ellis Jr., “Symposium: Punitive Damages: 
Article: Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages,” 2. There are “at least 
seven purposes for imposing punitive damages [that] can be gleaned from judicial 
opinions and the writings of commentators: (1) punishing the defendant; (2) deterring the 
defendant from repeating the offense; (3) deterring others from committing an offense;
(4) preserving the peace; (5) inducing private law enforcement; (6) compensating the 
victims for otherwise uncompensable losses; and (7) paying the plaintifFs attorneys’ 
fees.”
X lll
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these purposes to demonstrate how they developed, and how they also justify the plaintiff 
receiving the award.
Thus, these purposes -vengeance, honor, insult, and punishing corporations -  serve to 
support a further purpose for punitive damages, incentive to private attorneys general. 
Chapter Five addresses why incentive to the plaintiff is significant to civil law. First, the 
system is complex, passive, and costly. These characteristics give reason for incentive, 
since the burden to pursue litigation rests solely on the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s duty to 
take on the burden of litigation is referred to as the “private attorney general” ' '  principle 
and is unique to the civil law system. To support the ‘good’ to society which is produced 
by the private attorneys general as they bring civil wrongs to justice, the system of civil 
law provides an incentive, the possibility of receiving punitive damages. Therefore, the 
plaintiff receiving the punitive damages award maintains the system of civil law by 
inducing the plaintiff as a private attorney general.
In conclusion, I recommend the status quo. Summing up the reasons presented in this 
thesis. Chapter Six argues that the plaintiff should continue to receive the punitive 
damages award. This process supports purposes of incentive and justice. The proposed 
reforms for distribution addressed in Chapter Six, split-recovery statutes and societal 
damages, remove or lessen the incentive to the plaintiff and are also premised upon large 
award amounts. Since plaintiff incentive is significant to justice in civil law, and large 
award amounts are rare, the purposes of the status quo outweigh the counter-arguments 
for change.
"  Duff, "Legal Punishment", 3 - 4 .  The incentive is also important to the civil justice 
system because it helps to maintain the private attorney general principle, in which “the 
plaintiff is required to bring the case to court on their own -  with no or little assistance 
from the police.”
xiv
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CHAPTER 1
DISCOURSE ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The discourses that pursue the reformation of punitive damages are eclectic, from the 
legal community to economists, and from the moral philosophy behind the law to issues 
in the business community. This chapter examines the different perspectives on reform: 
(1) that punitive damages are excessive and should be limited or capped; (2) that they 
should be removed from civil law and dealt with through criminal punishments; and (3) 
that the receipt of punitive damages should be split between the plaintiff and the state, or 
that they should be societal damages, which are received and distributed by the state.
Although all the above reform issues are worthy of further discussion and analysis, 
apart from this chapter, the remainder of the thesis will focus on the issue of whom 
should receive the punitive damages. The arguments that the award should be split 
between the state and the plaintiff or that they should be deemed societal damages will be 
introduced in this chapter and addressed further in my final recommendations.
The Discourse on Excessiveness 
Development of the Concern 
The issue of limiting or regulating punitive damage awards is not recent. The 
development and intensification of concern for reform of punitive damages manifest in 
1967 by Judge Henry Friendly of the Second Circuit in the case of Roginsky v.
1
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Richardson-Merrell, Inc. ' Judge Friendly anticipated potential dangers in modem mass 
tort litigation when he denied the awarding of punitive damages due to violations of due 
process.^
Concerns expressed in this case were that repetitive* punitive awards for a single 
manufactured product, which was viewed as a single course of conduct, could subject a 
defendant to liability that had never been considered prior to mass tort litigation. 
Moreover, the cumulation of a nationally calculated punishment was not in proportion to 
the similar maximum penalties authorized by the criminal law, and exceeded any level of 
existing civil sanction that could be thought necessary to serve punishment or deterrence.
' Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 378 F.2d 832; 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 6863. 
Summary “Although other theories of liability for compensatory damages had been 
advanced in the complaint, plaintiff withdrew all except negligence and fraud upon the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Defendant moved for a directed verdict on all 
claims for injury by cataract as unsupported by sufficient proof of causation and on the 
fraud and punitive damage claims as unsupported by the evidence; the motions were 
denied. The judge instructed the jury it must first determine the issue of causation; if it 
found for the plaintiff on that, it should then pass upon the other issues, which he 
explained in a charge to which defendant took no exception. He helpfully submitted six 
separate questions: (1) causation, (2) negligence, (3) fraud upon the FDA, (4) amount of 
compensatory damages, (5) liability for exemplary damages, and (6) the amount thereof. 
The jury gave affirmative answers to all the questions relating to liability and fixed 
compensatory damages at $17,500 and punitive damages at $100,000, which the judge 
later declined to eliminate or reduce, 254 F. Supp. 430 (1966).”
* Ibid. “On appeal defendant contends that its motions for directed verdicts should 
have been granted; it argues also that evidence erroneously admitted, much of it in 
support of what it considers the unsubstantiated fraud count, could have prejudiced the 
jury's determination of the issues of negligence and of conduct warranting the award of 
punitive damages. It also raises other objections to the receipt of evidence and complains 
that the award of punitive damages, "unless restricted to fixed and measurable amounts," 
violates due process. We affirm the award of compensatory damages but find that the 
evidence was not sufficient to warrant submission of the punitive damage issue to the 
jury.” Rehearing Denied May 8, 1967.
* Repetitive -  referring to products liability and other mass tort cases, where punitive 
damages may be repetitively invoked against a single course of conduct.
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Judge Friendly also expressed concern that there seemed no strict guidelines for jury 
decision-making, nor mechanisms for effective control of aggregate awards J
This case raised questions regarding the fairness and constitutionality of punitive 
damages, since the requirements for proportionality to compensatory damages and civil 
sanctions were not specifically outlined. There were no specific guidelines for juries to 
follow in determining the amount of punitive damages. With this, national corporations 
were sent back to the drawing board for calculating the risk of liability for a single 
product. Mass tort litigation had escalated and a variety of businesses were held 
nationally responsible for their actions. Areas included asbestos, formaldehyde, DES, 
Agent Orange, and automobiles.* By the late 1980’s large corporations were threatened 
with the possibilities of bankruptcy from mass tort law suits. For instance, “A.H. Robins, 
a pharmaceutical company that manufactured the Daikon Shield, an intrauterine device
 ̂John Calvin Jeffries Jr., “A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive 
Damages,” Virginia Law Review 72:139-158 (1986): 141 - 142.
* Richard A. Seltzer “Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the 
Problems of Fairness, Efficiency, and Control,” Fordham L. Review 52:37 (1983). From 
footnotes, “n5 Approximately 700 lawsuits have been filed against Ford Motor Company 
arising out of an alleged defect in the transmissions of Ford cars and trucks manufactured 
between 1966 and 1980. Sylvester, $ 280M Legal Bill fo r a 'Better Idea"!, Nafl L.J.,
Sept. 27,1982, at 18, col. 2. The Center for Auto Safety has predicted that Ford may 
eventually spend $ 280 million paying claims for damages resulting from this 
transmission defect.” “n7 A.H. Robins, the manufacturer of the Daikon Shield lUD, 
reported that a total of 3,258 lawsuits had been filed against it in connection with the 
Daikon Shield; 1,685 of these had been resolved, most by settlement, several by dismissal 
and only nine by trial, of which seven resulted in judgments for the defendant and two 
resulted in judgments for the plaintiff. Affidavit of R.P. Wolf, Secretary and Assistant 
General Counsel of A.H. Robins Co., In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Daikon Shield" lUD 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 
1982), cert, denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). As of May, 1981, an additional 2,309 claims 
had been brought against Robins, of which 2,003 had been resolved by settlement or 
abandonment.”
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that caused an immense swath of injuries . ..went into bankruptcy in anticipation of a 
flood of product liability verdicts with an increasing punitive component.”®
Reformers continued to argue that punitive damage awards have increased in the last 
few decades. They argued that unconstrained and unprecedented punitive damage 
awards continued to overwhelm the court systems, and that “increases in the size and 
frequency of punitive damages awards brought an associated increase in the amount of 
harm caused by any constitutional defect that infect[s] punitive damages procedures.”  ̂ In 
other words, they argued that i f  the punitive damages procedures were unconstitutional, 
the larger the punitive damages award, the larger the harm caused. The accusation of 
unconstitutionality was based upon claims that excessive and multiple calculations of 
awards violated the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual 
punishment,* as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth amendment’s protection for due process 
of law.^ Excessive awards were seen as ‘unusual punishment’ and multiple calculations 
of awards for a single course of conduct were accused of violating due process. Claiming 
these constitutional violations, reformers felt that punitive damages procedures should be
® Galanter and Luban, “Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism,” 9. 
Also from ENDNOTE 117, “11 juries had awarded $24.8 million in punitive damages and 
more than 5000 Daikon Shield cases remained unresolved” during their bankruptcy 
petition.
* Malcom E. Wheeler, “The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages 
Procedures,” F/rg/ma Law Review 69:269-351 (1983): 271.
* Jeffries, 147.
 ̂Ibid. and also see Wheeler, “The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive 
Damages Procedures,” 272. “violates due process primarily because those procedures 
create an unnecessary and undue risk of an improper verdict on the issue of liability on 
the measure of compensatory damages, on the issue of whether to award punitive 
damages, and on the measure of punitive damages.”
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reviewed above the state jurisdictions with heightened federal judicial scrutiny. They 
argued that plaintiffs, their lawyers, and society in general viewed tort litigation as a 
profitable opportunity and the scales of justice were tipped with excessive multiple fines. 
Reformers solicited caps for punitive damage awards as well as specific instructions for 
juries in calculating awards.'®
But mass tort litigation is just one of the many areas of concern for punitive damages 
reform. Punitive damage awards are awarded in different proportions for various areas of 
civil law' ' when the wrong has been declared warranted of punishment.'^ Several 
landmark cases are often referred to when discussing the development of the issue of 
punitive damages. Each one of these cases set precedence for the issue of excessiveness 
for punitive damages.
'° Wheeler, 272.
"  Tort cases (Automobile, Premises liability. Product liability. Intentional torts. 
Medical malpractice. Professional malpractice. Slander/libel,...), Contract cases (Fraud, 
Seller/Buyer plaintiffs. Mortgage foreclosures. Employment discrimination. Rental/lease, 
Tortious interference. Partnership dispute. Subrogation...), Real property cases. List 
taken from Thomas H. Cohen and Steven K. Smith, “Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in 
Large Counties, 2001,” Bureau o f  Justice Statistics Bulletin, (U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Justice Programs, April 2004, NJC 202803); [on-line] 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gOv/bjs/pubalph2.htm#civil; accessed on 1 July 2004. “Table 7. 
Punitive damage awards in civil trial cases for plaintiff award winners in State courts in 
the Nation’s 75 largest counties, 2001,” 6.
For example, from BMW of North America, Inc., v. Ira Gore, Jr. 701 So. 2d 507; 
1997 Ala. LEXIS 126, under section I. ... “Alabama, by statute, provides notice 
concerning the conduct that will subject one to punitive damages in this state. Ala. Code 
1975, § 6-11-20, expressly set forth defines the acts, as well as the state of mind: ‘(a) 
Punitive damages may not be awarded in any civil action, except civil actions for 
wrongful death pursuant to Sections 6-5-391 and 6-5-410, other than in a tort action 
where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or 
deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the 
plaintiff. ...”
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In 1989, the case of Browning-Ferris Industries o f  Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 
7nc.,'* the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether or not the Eighth Amendment'"' 
is violated by punitive damage awards that are grossly out of proportion to the 
compensatory awards. The Supreme Court held that the excessive fines clause of the 
Eighth Amendment does not apply to civil litigation since it is between private parties. 
The Supreme Court clarified that with ‘private parties’ litigation, the prosecution is not 
initiated by the state government nor does the state have any part in the receipt of the 
damages award.'* The court reasoned that the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines 
clause was designed solely to prevent the government, or the legal authority from 
excessive punishment or fines.
The justification of legal punishment is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, but 
in general, legal punishment needs justification because the community grants the legal
’* Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 
(1989). Also see Bruce J. McKee, “The Implications of BMW v. Gore for Future 
Punitive Damages Litigation: Observations from a Participant,” Alabama Law Review, 
48:175; (Fall 1996), 3 of 41.
U.S. Constitution, Bill of Rights, Amendment VIII: Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
From the Legal Information Institute, [on-line], accessed on 26 April 2005; 
www.law.comell.edu/constitution/constitution.billofrights.html#amendmentviii.
'* McKee, “The Implications of BMW v. Gore for Future Punitive Damages 
Litigation: Observations from a Participant,” 3 of 41. “The 1989 decision in Browning- 
Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., disposed of the Eighth 
Amendment challenge, but left open the due process issues. Browning - Ferris Industries 
(BFI) claimed a $ 6 million punitive damages verdict was excessive in an antitrust case 
where the compensatory damages were about $ 50,000. A 7-2 majority held that the 
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to civil litigation between 
private parties "when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right 
to receive a share of the damages awarded."”
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system full responsibility and authority to punish.'® Community consented authority, 
particularly to harm a citizen, needs justification. It is reasonable to assume that the 
purpose of the Eighth Amendment was to ensure that the authority to punish is not 
abused. The Supreme Court holding that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to 
private litigation implies that civil courts have the responsibility to determine excessive 
or disproportionate fines or punishments and that it is not a federal issue. Since the 
damage amounts are decided by a jury; and the victim, a member of the community, who 
receives the damages, not the legal authority. This rationale reinforces the private law 
aspect of civil litigation, which is an important distinction between civil and criminal 
law.'*
In the early 1990’s, there were two cases that addressed the procedural due process 
issue of punitive damages. In 1991, the case of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. 
Haslip}^ and in 1993, the case of TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. 
Both cases awarded large amounts for punitive damages that were upheld by the Supreme 
Court. This means that the Court did not find the large damages in violation of due 
process. Although in each case dissenting opinions expressed concern for the need of
'® To punish meaning to cause harm to citizens of the community for said wrongs. 
Will be discussed further in Chapter Three.
'* See Introduction, Civil Law for more on the private law reference to civil law. This 
importance will also be addressed in detail and its influence on punitive damages 
procedure in Chapter Five.
'* Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
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more detailed and strict jury instructions and limitations on determining punitive 
damages amounts.^®
Following these cases, advocates for reform of punitive damages lobbied for 
guidelines and limits on punitive damages in order to ensure due process?' Advocates 
emphasized predictability as a requirement for punitive damage procedure in order to 
concur with due p ro cess ,o r  seen as the right to fair notice. In other words, they felt the 
courts should advise some way to measure or predict the amounts of damages that the
McKee, “The Implications of BMW v. Gore for Future Punitive Damages 
Litigation: Observations from a Participant,” 3. “In 1991, the Court finally reached the 
due process issue, at least procedural due process, in the Alabama case of Pacific Mutual 
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip. ... The jury awarded a general verdict of $1.04 million to 
Haslip. The appellate courts, based primarily on plaintiffs' counsel's closing argument, 
were willing to assume that about $200,000 represented compensatory damages (albeit, 
mostly mental anguish rather than out- of-pocket economic loss). The majority held that 
the Due Process Clause does apply to punitive damages procedures but that the Alabama 
general jury charge and Alabama's system of post- trial judicial review met at least the 
minimum requirements of procedural due process. .. .Lastly, the majority opinion 
intimated that a 4:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages was "close to the line."” 
“In 1993, the West Virginia case of TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. 
came before the Court. In that case, a "slander of title" suit, the jury awarded $ 19,000 in 
compensatory damages (for having to defend a frivolous declaratory judgment action 
initiated by TXO) and $ 10 million in punitive damages. ...The Supreme Court plurality 
affirmed the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' holding that the award of punitive 
damages was reasonable. The plurality also explained away the 526:1 ratio by comparing 
the $ 10 million verdict to TXO's potential profit of $5-8 million, had the fraudulent 
scheme succeeded.”
Law.com Dictionary, http://dictionary.law.com/ s.v. ‘due process of law’ a 
fundamental principle of fairness in all legal matters, both civil and criminal, especially 
in the courts. All legal procedures set by statute and court practice, including notice of 
rights, must be followed for each individual so that no prejudicial or unequal treatment 
will result. The universal guarantee of due process is in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, which provides "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law," and is applied to all states by the 14th Amendment. From 
this basic principle flows many legal decisions determining both procedural and 
substantive rights
^  Hogg, “Alabama Adopts ...,” 3. Referring to Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 
U.S. 1 12(1991).
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defendants could face -  other than previous cases as examples. Just as criminal 
defendant punishments were pre-set depending upon the convicted charge, punitive 
damages needed predictability, but had no set scale to follow. The court usually would 
only advise the jury to impose the minimum amount of punitive damages necessary to 
deter the defendant.^^ One prominent proponent of reform is Washington, D.C. lawyer 
Theodore Olson '̂* declared in congressional testimony in 1995:
O ver... three decades in the legal profession, I have seen how changes 
in the civil justice system affect the decisions of those who are sued or 
who are exposed to lawsuits. I have seen the civil justice system become 
more expensive, anomalous, inefficient, arbitrary and unpredictable [due 
to punitive damages]....the frequency and magnitude of punitive damage 
awards are exploding out of control [like] ...an unchecked virus.^^
Shortly after this declaration came a case which set important guidelines for civil 
litigation and punitive damages, and perhaps the most notable case regarding the 
excessiveness of punitive damages. In BMW v. Gore^^ (1997), a single plaintiff was
^  Ibid. Prater, supra note 3, at 1022. referring to Nathan C. Prater, “Punitive Damages 
in Alabama”, 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 1006, 1015-17 (1996).
Olson’s firm represents the Civil Justice Reform Group. See also Theodore Olson, 
Gihson, Dunn & Crutcher, “Some Thoughts on Punitive Damages,” (edited remarks) 
CivilJustice Memo. No. 15 (Washington DC.: Center for Legal Policy at the Manhattan 
Institute, June 1989); [on-line] http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/ cjm_15.htm.; 
accessed on 18 September 2003.
Stephen Daniels, and Joanne Martin, “The Incidence, Scope, and Purpose of 
Punitive Damages: Article: Punitive Damages, Change, and the Politics of Ideas:
Defining Public Policy Problems”, Wisconsin Law Review 71 (1998) : 10.
BMW of North America, Inc., v. Ira Gore, Jr. 701 So. 2d 507; 1997 Ala. LEXIS 
126. Summary “The facts are set out in their entirety in BMW of North America, Inc. v. 
Gore, 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1994), and we note them here only briefly: Dr. Ira Gore, the 
purchaser of a BMW automobile, sued BMW of North America, Inc. ("BMW"), alleging, 
among other things, that BMW and Bayerische Motoren Werke, A.G., the foreign 
manufacturer of the automobile, had fi-audulently failed to disclose to him that the 
automobile he was purchasing had been repainted after being damaged by acid rain 
during its shipment from Germany. At trial, BMW admitted that the car had been
9
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initially awarded by the jury $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive 
damages. The U.S. Supreme Court decided that the punitive damages amount was 
grossly excessive and violated due process; as a result the award was reduced to $50,000. 
This was the first time the United States Supreme Court had reversed a punitive damages 
judgment on the basis of due process.^^ Punitive damages reform issues addressed by 
this ruling included not only the violation of due process, but also guidelines for 
determining the award amount to ensure the awards were not excessive.
The primary support for the violation of due process was reasoned in two parts. First, 
the state could not legitimately impose the interest of the nation or neighboring states on 
the defendant, since the original punitive damages amount was calculated upon nation 
wide instances of the disclosure violation. The implications of this affected not only 
punitive damages and civil litigation,^® but also how companies do business at each end 
of the nation. State regulations for businesses vary. When the initial punitive damages 
judgment against BMW was made ($4 million), BMW adjusted their national policy to 
accommodate the minimum regulation for one state, regardless of what the other states 
required. BMW’s policy adjustment can be interpreted as punishment deterring further 
similar harm. But the Court struck down the award, and its rationale protects businesses
damaged and that BMW had a nationwide policy not to advise its dealers of predelivery 
damage to new cars when the cost of repair did not exceed three percent (3%) of the car's 
suggested retail price.”
McKee, 4.
^  McKee, From the Introduction; “The publicity this case received has revived 
public debate about whether Alabama's juries are "out of control." However, this opinion 
has far more than a mere parochial impact on Alabama's judicial system. The May 20, 
1996, decision marks the first time a majority of the Supreme Court has found a verdict 
amount to be too high. Thus, the BMW decision is of great national importance to all 
civil litigators and their clients.”
10
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who have varying policies for varying states. As much as the states have the right to 
different regulations, they are not in-tum allowed to punish a company for the ‘good’ of 
the nation, based upon their particular regulation.
The second primary support for the violation of due process was that the defendant 
did not receive adequate notice of the magnitude of the possible sanction of its failure to 
disclose.^^
The public policy behind the court’s due process analysis was as follows: (a) that 
there were no aggravating factors associated with reprehensible conduct, for if there were 
then the defendant could refer to the reprehensible conduct sanctions for fair notice; (b) 
that no consumers, nor competitors were threatened with potential harm that threatened 
the health or safety of others, the only harm found was economic; and (c) that the 
punitive damages award was substantially greater than the possible statutory fine of the 
state for similar misconduct, the maximum civil penalty authorized by the Alabama 
Legislature for violation of its Deceptive Trade Practices Act is $2,000.®*'
The U.S. Supreme Court implied that punitive damages law was analogous to 
criminal law. Just as criminal sanctions are required to be known, or can be known if the 
public so chooses to find out -  for instance the penalty for murder, theft, or rape -  so too 
must punitive damages be known with the above three distinctions. The knowledge of 
penalty is an important factor in the justification of legal punishment. In order to justly 
punish a member of the community that has committed a crime, it is assumed that the
BMW of North America, Inc., v. Ira Gore, Jr. 517 U.S. 559; 116 S. Ct. 1589; 134 
L. Ed. 2d 809. (1996) U.S. LEXIS 3390. See Syllabus of the case.
Ibid. See p. 25 of 45, under the section Sanctions for Comparable Misconduct, Ala. 
Code §8-19-11(b) (1993).
11
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guilty criminal is a rational (mature and participating) member of the community that is 
aware of its laws as well as its penalties.®'
So, for the sake of fairness and due process, civil litigation was given guidelines to 
follow for punitive damages procedure; that the state can only punish for what is in the 
interest of the particular state and its constituents, and that adequate and fair notice 
should follow those three guidelines.
Most importantly addressed in the BMV v. Gore case was the dollar amount of the 
punitive damages award, and how the U.S. Supreme Court came to determine its 
excessiveness. The Court outlined three indicators of excessiveness. First, the award 
was deemed excessive because there were no aggravating factors that evidenced a high 
degree of reprehensibility on the part of the defendant.®® Secondly, the ratio between 
compensatory and punitive damages was clearly outside of the acceptable range.®® And 
thirdly, the punitive damages award amount was also largely disproportionate to the
®' Further detail of this justification is discussed in Chapter Three in regards to the 
justification of punishment in general. But for this point, it is important to note the 
implications of this decision.
®® BMW of North America, Inc., v. Ira Gore, Jr. 517 U.S. 559; 116 S. Ct. 1589; 134 
L. Ed. 2d 809. (1996) U.S. LEXIS 3390. page 9 of 45 point (c). Indicates the harm was 
purely economic, there was no indifference to, or reckless disregard for the health and 
safety of others, there was no patter of tortuous conduct, no evidence of bad faith, no 
unlawful conduct, no false statements, affirmative misconduct, or concealment of 
evidence of improper motive.
®® Ibid. point (d). $2 million dollars was 500 times the amount of the plaintiffs actual 
harm. The Court does express that there are no set mathematical multipliers that should 
apply to the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages; but that in this case, the 
ration was clearly too high.
12
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comparable civil or criminal sanctions for similar conduct. Furthermore, there was no 
indication of why a more modest amount would not have been sufficient.®''
The second and third indicators of excessiveness clarified hy the Court regulates 
punitive damages awards by requiring that it be in proportion to the compensatory 
damages as well as the comparable state civil and criminal sanctions. Although there are 
no specific ratios for proportion, the above three factors (amount of harm, amount of 
compensatory damages, and the amount of existing similar sanctions), when taken into 
consideration together, govern calculation of a reasonable and proportionate punitive 
damages award.
The first indicator of excessiveness requires the presence of aggravating factors in the 
harm. More importantly, it also requires the jury take these factors into account when 
determining the award amount. This means that analogous to criminal law, that there are 
gradients to punishment that fit the crime -  meaning a murder punishment will receive 
longer incarceration or a more severe penalty than theft -  so too must punitive damages 
amounts be proportionate to the weight of the harm.®® The calculation dollar amounts 
that are appropriate to noneconomic harm or loss is a difficult task. In BMW’s case, 
since there was no evidence of grossly aggravated reprehensihility, the award of $4 
million dollars was excessive. Juries have been criticized to take only into account the
®'* Ibid. point (e).
®® BMW of North America, Inc., v. Ira Gore, Jr. 517 U.S. 559; 116 S. Ct. 1589; 134 
L. Ed. 2d 809. (1996) U.S. LEXIS 3390. page 6 of 45. See LEdHN15, “The principle that 
exemplary, or punitive, damages imposed on a defendant should reflect the enormity of 
the defendant’s offense reflects the accepted view that some wrongs are more 
blameworthy than others.” That damages must be proportionate implies that there is a 
recognized gradient of harm: violent being more than non-violent, trickery or deceit 
being more than negligence, torts being more than economic injury, repeat misconduct 
being more than individual instance malfeasance. See LEdHN 16,17,18,19.
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economic prosperity of the defendants, and calculate based upon what would deter the 
defendant from repeating their action. So that if the defendant was a large profitable 
international company, the damages award would be justified to be larger than for a 
smaller company. Although the profits and deterring the defendants do need to be taken 
into account, the degree of harm is just as important. So, in determining the amount 
worthy to punish, the amount of harm as well as the amount to deter must be taken into 
account.
Even after BMW v. Gore in 1996, reformers continued to argue that juries are not 
capable of calculating a justified dollar amount for punishment, and this creates erratic 
awards. Reformers argue that the arbitrariness of putting a price on punishment is a 
result of subjective moral judgments. And because people have difficulty translating 
moral wrongs into dollars, this results in punitive awards that are unpredictable and 
arbitrary.®  ̂ Jury instructions continued to consist only of factors that measured the 
gravity of the wrong and the need to deter similar wrongful conduct, reinforcing that the 
purposes of punitive damages are to punish and deter.®® So, advocates continued to argue 
for more judicial review of punitive damages awards.
®̂ Cass Sustein, Daniel Kahneman, and David Schkade, “Assessing Punitive 
Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law),” Chicago Working Paper in 
Law and Economics (2003) : [on-line] www.law.uchicago.edu/Publications/Working/ 
WkngPprs%2026-50/50.sustein.pdf; accessed on 10 December 2004.
®® Samuel David Bowden v. Caldor, INC. et. AL, 350 Md. 4; 710 A.2d 267; 1998 Md. 
LEXIS 407, June 2, 1998. Opinion by Eldridge, J., III. A. “We have stated that the 
‘purpose of punitive damages is ...to punish the defendant for egregiously bad conduct 
toward the plaintiff, [and] also to deter the defendant and others contemplating similar 
behaviour.’” Owens-Coming v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 537-538, 682 A.2d 1143, 1161 
(1996). B. “n9 [referring to] Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15, 
111 S. Ct. 1032, 1042, 113 L. Ed. 2d, 18 (1991), the Supreme Court observed: ‘Under 
the traditional common-law approach, the amount of the punitive awards is initially 
determined by a jury instmcted to consider the gravity of the wrong and the need to deter
14
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At the state level, further judicial review of the jury awards was addressed in the 1998 
Maryland case of Bowden v. Caldor, Inc.^^ The Maryland Court of Appeals issued nine 
guidelines to be followed by the trial judge, if a judgment is sent back for review, in order 
to determine if a punitive award is excessive. Although these guidelines did not 
specifically apply to jury instruction, they did expand the judicial review of the award 
amount upon appeal.
These nine guidelines included the three indicators of excessiveness explicated in 
BMW V. Gore: (1) that the award must be proportionate to the harm; (2) that the award 
must he proportionate to civil and criminal sanctions; as well as (3) comparable to the 
compensatory award; and added: (4) that the award should not be disproportionate to the 
defendant’s ability to pay, in that the award must not bankrupt or impoverish a defendant; 
(5) that the deterrence value of the amount awarded by the jury is relevant; (6) that the 
award can be compared with other final punitive damages awards for similar harms in the 
jurisdiction; (7) that the defendant’s past punitive damages awards can be considered in 
mitigation of post-verdict proceedings; (8) if the harm was a result of a single occurrence 
or episode, then the punitive damages award cannot be multiplied or compounded, if  the 
compensatory damages were based upon separate torts; and (9) that reasonable plaintiff 
costs and expenses resulting from the defendant’s malicious and tortuous conduct, 
including expenses of litigation not covered by the compensatory award can be 
considered in the judicial review of an award of punitive damages.®^
similar wrongful conduct. The jury’s determination is then reviewed by trial and 
appellate courts to ensure that is reasonable.’”
®® Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 350 Md. 4; 710 A.2d 267; 1998 Md. LEXIS 407
39 Ibid. Opinion by Eldridge, J., III. B. (1) -  (9).
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Although these guidelines are not rigid rules, they offer examples of how states can 
propose principles that can be followed to ensure justice. These guidelines encompass 
the main purposes of punitive damages, to punish and deter. The principles emphasize 
the consideration of proportionality to harm as well as a moderate amount to deter. The 
principles also clarify aspects that should be considered in regards to the defendant’s 
wealth, similar past awards paid by the defendant, whether it was a single or multiple 
episode(s) of the harm, and plaintiffs costs. At this juncture in the discourse, these 
guidelines encompass most concerns of reformers (due process, excessiveness, and 
guidelines for award amount) and consider both the defendant and the plaintiff. But, case 
law precedence is not the only influence in the reform of punitive damages.
Although BMW  v. Gore can be seen as a great stepping stone for punitive damages 
reform, special interest groups"" continue to lobby. Special interest groups have played a 
large role ensuring state and federal political policy agendas continue to include punitive 
damages reform. The progression of the punitive damages excessiveness issue continues 
today.
For instance, the 2004 Keep Our Doctors in Nevada"* (KODIN) initiative argued that 
physicians were leaving Nevada due to the increase of medical malpractice insurance
"" Such as: American Tort Reform Association (www.atra.org, argue for limits on 
punitive damages). Civil Justice Reform Group, Health Coalition on Liability and Access 
(HCLA) (www.hcla.org, argue that “damages should be limited to $250,000, or twice the 
compensatory damages (the total of economic plus noneconomic losses), whichever is 
greater.” See HCLA’s Issue Briefing 2003, accessed via on-line on April 18, 2005; The 
National Chamber Litigation Center, and also see Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, No 
Mercy: How Conservative Think Tanks and Foundations Changed America’s Social 
Agenda, (Philadelphia : Temple University Press, 1996), 96-108.
"* Nevada Secretary of State Dean Heller, Elections Division website. Ballot Question 
#3 Keep Our Doctors in Nevada, State elections held on October 26, 2004. [on-line] 
http://sos.state.nv.us/nvelection/2004_bq/bq3.htm, accessed January 11, 2005.
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rates. KODIN felt the current legislation did not provide enough protection for doctors 
and their insurers from large jury verdicts, and thus the cost of liability insurance was 
double that of doctors in other large cities. Since this was forcing doctors to leave the 
state, in turn the patients would suffer with a limited availability o f doctors to choose 
from. The proposal was passed and limited the amount of recoverable noneconomic 
damages to $350,000 per action, with no exceptions."® This is just one of several 
instances in which interest groups have been effective in reforming punitive damages 
procedures. Once proposal was passed, advocates from the opposition to the issue 
attributed the passing of the bill to the large advertising budget for the campaign."® 
Although the success or failure of political campaigns based upon the advertising budget 
is an issue all in itself, this example shows that punitive damages continue to be a 
political hot item that is not left to the courts. “Interest groups wanting fundamental 
changes in the civil justice system have been successful in strategically representing
"® Ibid. From explanation of Ballot Question #3 “If passed, the proposal would limit 
the fees an attorney could charge a person seeking damages against a negligent provider 
of health care in a medical malpractice action. ... The law currently provides that a 
person seeking damages in a medical malpractice action is limited to recovering 
$350,000 in noneconomic damages from each defendant, with two exceptions. 
Noneconomic damages is money paid to the injured person to compensate for pain, 
suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, and disfigurement, while economic 
damages is money paid to compensate for the injured person's medical treatment, care or 
custody, loss of earning and loss of earning capacity. The two current exceptions to the 
$350,000 cap on noneconomic damages allow an injured person to receive more than 
$350,000 if: (1) the wrongdoer committed gross malpractice, or (2) exceptional 
circumstances justify an award in excess of the cap. The proposal, if passed, would 
remove the two statutory exceptions to the existing $350,000 cap, and limit the recovery 
of noneconomic damages to $350,000 per action.”
"® Paul Harasim, “Ballot Initiatives: Doctors outspend lawyers,” Las Vegas Review 
Journal, 29 October 2004. “Trial lawyer Jim Corckett said the poll results show ‘how 
powerful a message can be if it’s advertised enough.’ .. .Campaign contribution and 
expense reports filed ... with the secretary of state’s office show that from Jan. 1 through 
October 21, Keep Our Doctors in Nevada spend $3.3 million to influence voters.”
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punitive damages as a compelling policy problem requiring governmental action.”"" 
Punitive damages reforms, whether initiated by interest groups, or from other sources 
have been and continue to be implemented.
Data from general jurisdiction courts in 16 States for which 
information was available indicate that tort filings rose 43% between 1975 
and 1998. Most of this increase occurred between 1975 and 1986. To deal 
with this increase, most States enacted some sort of tort reform to 
discourage litigation."®
Reforms that were enacted included “placing caps on the amount of punitive damages 
that can be awarded, requiring clear and convincing evidence to establish punitive 
damage liability, and making punitive damages proportional to the type of offense 
alleged.”""
Caps, or limitations on punitive damages, were a strongly supported reform in the 
1980’s to combat excessiveness."® Caps on damages may have limited amounts, but they
"" Daniels, and Martin, in Conclusion of “The Incidence, Scope, and Purpose of 
Punitive Damages;...,” 14 of 24.
"® Marika F. X. Litras, Sidra Lea Gifford, Carol J. DeFrances, BJS Statisticians,
David B. Rottman, Neil LaFountain, Brian J. Ostrom, “Civil Justice Survey of State 
Courts, 1996: Tort Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 1996,” Bureau o f  Justice 
Statistics Bulletin, (U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, August 2000, 
NJC 179769); [on-line] http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ttvlc96.htm; accessed on 1 
July 2004, in Tort Reform in States, 10.
"" Ibid. According to the Tort Reform Record taken in 1999, 30 states had made some 
type of punitive damages reform from 1986 -  1999.
"® States that enacted legislation that limited punitive damages in the 1980’s include: 
Colorado: Punitive award may not exceed compensatory damages. (1986); Georgia: 
$250,000, limit does not apply to product liability cases. (1987); Kansas: Limits punitive 
award at lesser of defendant's annual gross income or $5,000,000. (1988); Nevada: Limits 
punitive damages to $300,000 in cases in which compensatory damages are less than 
$100,000 and to three times compensatory damages in cases of $100,000 or more Note: 
product liability, insurance bad faith, discrimination, toxic torts, and defamation cases are 
excluded.) (1989); Virginia: $350,000 limit on punitive damages. (1987). From © 2002, 
The American Tort Reform Association, [on-line] accessed on 26 April 2005;
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did not lower the amount of lawsuits. One empirieal study investigated the patterns of 
financial jury verdicts and the effects, if any, that caps"® have on punitive damages. 
Studies found that the presence or absence of caps has no statistically significant effect on 
whether or not the suits went to trial or were settled,"" yet they still affected the amounts 
of punitive awards.
I do not agree that the perceived problem of excessive awards should be addressed 
vrith caps or multiplying standards. This would suggest that the courts had the ability to 
limit the price of the harm. This is opposed to the BMW v. Gore guidelines that advise 
the award should be proportionate to the harm. If particular harms are deemed extremely 
malicious with grave aggravated intent to harm, then a proportionate large amount of 
damages is applicahly fair. Caps and multiplying standards that are placed prior to 
specific knowledge of harm and calculated prior to trial, limit the possibility of an 
unprecedented or unimaginable harm. Since juries must now take into account the three 
guidelines provided by BMW v. Gore, the reprehensibility to the harm, the proportionality 
to the compensatory damages, and the proportionality to the existing state statutes; 
excessive caps should be proportionate to the harm and do not require limits. Caps, like
http://www.atra.org/show/7343; “States With Punitive Damage Limits” As of June 30, 
2001. See website for complete list.
"® A set limit on the amount of punitive damages that can be awarded, a maximum 
amount that can be charged.
"" Thomas A.Eaton, D. B. Mustard, and S. M. Talarico. “The Effect of Seeking 
Punitive Damages on the Processing of Tort Claims.” University o f  Georgi. (Aug. 2004). 
[on-line] www.terry.uga.edu/~dmustard/torts.pdf; accessed Fall 2004. 23. “Tort suits 
with uncapped punitive damage claims were more likely to be disposed by trial as 
compared to suits with capped punitive damage claims. Furthermore, tort suits with 
uncapped punitive damage claims were less likely to be disposed by settlement than suits 
with capped punitive damage claims.”
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those enacted in the recent Nevada election, limit the amount of recoverable 
noneconomic loss to the plaintiff, with no exceptions.
Furthermore, with the predictability of caps, businesses have, and will continue to 
calculate harm as a business loss. For example, in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,®" the 
jury awarded $125 million in punitive damages to the injured in the Ford Pinto explosion. 
The figure was calculated after the jury learned “that Ford relied on a study that showed 
that the costs of recalling the Pinto for modification would outweigh the benefits, which 
were estimated at $200,000 per bum death avoided and $67,000 per injury avoided, by 
$100 million.”®' With limited awards, “offenders will be temped to treat the law not as a 
norm demanding compliance but merely as a type of tax on activity such as predatory 
pricing.®® The difference is fundamental. ... ‘Don’t do X’ or ‘Either don’t do X or else 
pay’.. .Only by imposing punitive damages of a different order from compensatory 
damages can a jury convey the message that a norm is categorical, that it demands 
compliance and not cost-benefit analysis.”®®
The possibility of businesses, professionals, or any member of society calculating the 
cost of noneconomic harms into their annual budget spreadsheets is and should be of 
greater concern to the nation than the possibility of large punitive damages awards. If
®" Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal.Rptr. 348, 358 (Ct. App. 1981)
®' Galanter and Luban, “Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism,” 17.
®® Ibid. Predatory pricing refers to when competitive companies drastically lower 
prices in order to steal customers from the competition. Example: citing Browning-Ferris 
Indus. V. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279 (1989).
®® Galanter and Luban, “Poetic Justice,” 15.
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juries calculate unjust awards, they can be, and have been, appealed and remanded if 
necessary.
The pursuit of reform for punitive damages has not ceased. Law review journals 
continue to be filled with articles debating the reform of punitive damages. Interest 
groups continue to lobby for reform on the state and federal level. The National Chamber 
Litigation Center®" is just one example of the special interest groups that continue to 
pursue reform; they have filed approximately 20 amicus®® briefs regarding punitive 
damages decisions in the last few years.
As there are two sides to every issue, the next section takes a look at the views that 
argue that punitive damages are not excessive, despite above developments.
Criticisms to the Excessive View
The excessiveness of punitive damages is often attributed to the ‘litigation 
explosion,’®" a development from about the 1970’s in which the nation has experienced
®" See www.uschamber.com, “The National Chamber Litigation Center (NCLC) is a 
membership organization that advocates fair treatment of business in the courts and 
regulatory agencies. NCLC provides litigation support and advocates on legal and 
regulatory issues on behalf of the U.S. Chamber and other organizations to challenge 
anti-business laws.” Viewed website on 4 December 2004. See also the American Tort 
Reform Association (ATRA) at http://www.atra.org/. “ATRA’s mission is to bring 
greater fairness, predictability, and efficiency to the civil justice system through public 
education and legislative reform, and to put an end to lawsuit abuse.” Viewed website on 
26 April 2005. Other organizations listed on the ATRA website include the American 
Justice Partnership, American Tort Reform Foundation, Citizens for a Sound Economy, 
Health Care Liability Alliance (HCLA), Overlawyered.com, The Federalist Society, The 
Rand Institute for Civil Justice, etc.. .specific State Tort Reform Coalition website links 
are also available.
®® Gifis, Law Dictionary, s.v., “Amicus Curiae: one who gives information to the 
court on some matter of law which is in doubt. See 264 F. 276, 279.”
®" See Walter K. Olson, The Litigation Explosion: What Happened When America 
Unleashed the Lawsuit, (New York : Thomas Talley Books-Dutton, 1991).
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an enormous increase in the number of lawsuits due to plaintiffs seeking profit, not 
justice. But in actuality, tort legislation which allowed for punitive damages provisions 
may have been the cause of the increase in litigation, which is a result of changing social 
values. In the past three decades, important legislation has been passed that involved 
punitive damages. One example is the Equal Credit Opportunity Act which was passed 
by Congress in 1974 and went into effect one year later. The Act included in the main 
provisions of the awarding of “punitive damages in individual suits of up to $10,000 and 
$100,000 or one percent of net worth -  whichever is less -  in class action suits.”®® This 
Act was a success for several national women’s groups that addressed the issue of credit 
discrimination against women because of gender and marital status. With acts such as 
these, it is not surprising that the number of punitive damages awards, and cases that 
were able to award them, began to increase.
Despite the emphasis on the increase in the number of punitive damage awards in 
reform literature, empirical studies have shown that punitive damages awards in cases are 
rare. “Fewer than 5% of civil cases filed result in trials; plaintiffs prevail in 
approximately half of the tort cases that go to trial; and punitive damages are awarded in 
only 2-5% of the tort cases in which the plaintiff prevails. Thus, for every 1000 tort 
claims filed, typically only 50 are resolved by trial, only 25 produce trial outcomes 
favorable to the plaintiff, and only 1.25 impose a punitive damage award.”®® According
®® Joyce Gelb and Marian Lief Palley, “Women and Interest Group Politics: A 
Comparative Analysis of Federal Decision Making,” The Journal o f  Politics Vol. 41, No. 
2:362 -  392 (May 1979) : 369.
®® Eaton, Mustard, and Talarico, “The Effect of Seeking Punitive Damages on the 
Processing of Tort Claims;” 2-3. Referring to (Eaton et al., 2000; Smith et al. 1995), 
(DeFrances and Litras, 1999; Eaton et al., 2000; Moller, 1996) “In all tort cases the 
plaintiff prevails 50% of the time. There are significant differences in win rates for
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to the most recent study of “Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, [in] 2001,” 
from the Bureau o f  Justice Statistics Bulletin the total amount of “punitive damages, [for 
the year] estimated at $1.2 billion, were awarded to 6% of plaintiff winners in trials. The 
median punitive damage award was $50,000.”®"
It is also important to note that most punitive damages awards, if  at all large, are 
dependent upon the type of case. Studies show that the majority of punitive damages 
awards as well as the largest amounts are awarded in cases that are not personal. In 2001, 
according to the above study, the largest total amount of punitive damages awards was 
awarded in business to business cases."" Of all the tort trial cases (356) in 2001, 138 
were business cases. And the total amount of punitive damages awarded for the year for 
business cases alone was $854,658,000 out of the total of $1,221,877,000. The median 
for the contract cases was $83,000. Compared to the total awarded for the 217 tort cases 
being $367,149,000 with a median of $25,000. The business case awards are more than 
double that of the entire tort cases put together -  which include automobile, product 
liability, medical malpractice, slander/libel, etc... That punitive damages are most often 
in business contract or securities cases is not a recent development.
different types of tort claims. The plaintiff prevails in fewer than 40% of products 
liability trials (DeFrances and Litras, 1999; Eaton et al. 2000), a type of claim for which 
punitive damages are a major concern., and (DeFrances and Litras, 1999; Lubin, 1998).”
®" Cohen and Smith, “Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001,” 1. 
Under Highlights. Also see page 6, “Punitive damages were awarded in 6% of the 6,487 
trial cases in which the plaintiff won damages. Punitive damages totaled over $1.2 billion 
and accounted for about 28% of the $4.4 billion awarded to plaintiffs overall.”
"" Ibid. See page 6, Table 7. Punitive damage awards in civil trial cases for plaintiff 
award wiimersin State courts in the Nation’s 75 largest counties, 2001.
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In 1997, the RAND Corporation released a study on Punitive Damages in Financial 
Injury Verdicts, finding that “almost half of all punitive awards were made in cases in 
which the damages were financial, rather than personal in nature. These verdicts, which 
we call financial injury verdicts to distinguish them fi’om personal injury verdicts, 
comprise disputes arising from contractual or commercial relationships including, for 
example, disputes arising from insurance or employment contracts or from unfair 
business practices.”"' According to the study, between 1985 and 1994, the types of 
punitive damages awards were mostly in contract disputes (258 of 647), and the largest 
award amounts were found in securities disputes ($30,269,389 as the mean, which is very 
high, in comparison to all the other category means which were below $7,033,676). So, 
from this study, although the mean punitive damages award was overall, $5,344,876; a 
large portion of that mean was weighted from one type of case.
Who are the participants in these cases with such large amounts? Contract cases 
often involve business disputes; businesses comprised a substantial percentage (44%) of 
all contract plaintiffs,"® businesses suing businesses. The question then is, does the 
average consumer need to be overly concerned about the large punitive damages awards? 
Perhaps, since these large awards will have a third party effect on the economy. But
"' Erik Moller, Nicholas M. Pace, Stephen J. Carroll, background to Punitive 
Damages in Financial Injury Verdicts, (Santa Monica: RAND Institute for Civil Justice, 
1997) : 4. emphasis in text, [on-line] http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR889/; 
accessed on 1 September 2003.
"® Thomas H. Cohen and S. K. Smith, “Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large 
Counties, 2001.” Bureau o f Justice Statistics Bulletin. 3. See also to page 4, “For contract 
trials the estimated win rate surpassed 70% in seller plaintiff (77%) and mortgage 
foreclosure (73%) cases and exceeded 60% in buyer plaintiff (62%), rental lease (65%), 
and subrogation (67%) cases. Conversely, plaintiffs prevailed in 44% of employment 
discrimination cases and 46% of partnership disputes.”
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realistically, it is not an explosion of any kind. In fact, with the few exceptions that were 
mentioned in the previous section, punitive damages have not at all been miming the 
country ragged with law suits. Realistically, punitive damages frequency and amount has 
been steady for the past 20 years.
The RAND study also showed that the actual number of punitive damages awards in 
financial injury verdicts has decreased, contrary to what reformers have claimed.
[In] the entire population of financial injury verdicts ... for each of the 
five-year periods 1985-1989 and 1990-1994.... The number of punitive 
awards has decreased between these periods, both in absolute numbers and 
as a percentage of the overall number of verdicts. Punitive damages were 
awarded in about 16 percent of all financial injury verdicts in the 1985- 
1989 period and in about 13 percent o f all financial injury verdicts in the 
1990-1994 period. This change reflects the facts that plaintiffs are 
winning at a slightly lower rate, and given that they have won the case, 
plaintiffs are also being awarded punitive damages at a slightly lower rate 
as well."®
The study also showed that the mean for the amount of the awards in these cases did 
increase between the two periods.
However, the mean award amount increased fi"om $3.4 million to $7.6 
million between these two periods. In addition, punitive damages 
represent a larger portion of all damages awarded, rising from about 44 
percent of all damages awarded in the 1985-1989 period to slightly less 
than 60 percent of all damages awarded in the 1990-1994 period.""
The increase in the amount of the awards over the ten year period could be attributed 
to social factors like inflation. Over a short period of time, businesses have become 
larger, affecting more persons nation wide, are worth more money, and invest more. It is 
also important to mention that the 1991 Civil Rights Act “dramatically changed the
"® Moller, Pace, and Carroll, background to Punitive Damages in Financial Injury 
Verdicts, in Variation in Punitive Damage Awards Over Time, 21.
"" Ibid., 22.
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recovery system by granting a statutory right of compensatory and punitive damages to 
employees who are victims of intentional sexual discrimination.”"® It does follow that 
once a statute is passed allowing for persons to file for punitive damages, which was not 
allowed previously, there will be a coinciding increase in the number of suits and damage 
awards.
In this sense, “we are not faced with an inexorable exponential explosion of cases, but 
rather with a series of local changes, some sudden but most incremental, as particular 
kinds of disputes move in and out of the ambit of courts.”"" Therefore the increase in 
cases and awards can simply be evidence of social change. The court system is not a 
stagnant non-participatory institution. The court system is an active participant in social 
change and policy making, just as are the legislative and executive branches of 
government. “Litigation implies accountability to public standards,” a way for society to 
“correct the [private] market.”"® When seen in this view, the upsurge of litigation is a 
positive indication of a desired democratic decentralized government working on behalf 
of society in order to express the normative views that often change with generations. 
Litigation is a part of political and social change, and therefore should not be carelessly 
viewed as adverse to society.
"® Christy Lynn McQuality, in Introduction of “No Harm, No Foul?: An Argument 
for the Allowance of Punitive Damages Without Compensatory Damages Under 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a,” Washington & Lee Law Review 59:643 (2002) : [*644]. Also in n l “In 
addition to making punitive and compensatory damages available to victims of Title VII 
sex discrimination, the 1991 amendments also provided a jury trial to these victims.”
"" Marc S. Galanter, “The Day After the Litigation Explosion,” Maryland Law 
Review, Inc. 46:3 (Fall 1986) : 21.
"® Ibid.
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Arguments to Reform the Distribution 
Large punitive damage awards have led to arguments stating that the plaintiffs sue not 
to seek justice, but for hopes of a ‘windfall’ gain. The argument against the plaintiff 
receiving the punitive award is that it is an inappropriate way to compensate plaintiffs for 
taking the trouble to sue. Groups seeking reform argue that allowing plaintiffs to keep 
the awards motivates frivolous or unjust lawsuits, since plaintiffs may seek damages in 
hopes of never going to court, but threaten defendants to pay settlement damages. 
Furthermore, they contend that plaintiffs bringing civil suits to court should be seeking 
justice, not windfall gains. When there is the potential for receiving the punitive awards 
in addition to compensatory awards, in some cases in significant amounts, the motive for 
trial becomes morally questionable, for punishment in any form should only be pursued if 
it is deserved."®
Arguments that support plaintiffs receiving punitive damages insist that punitive 
damages assist the plaintiff with legal fees required to pursue litigation, which are not 
covered under compensation. They also argue that contingent fees"" do not encourage 
frivolous litigation.
"® Referring to the punishment theory of retribution, discussed in detail in Chapter 
Three.
"" Gifis, Law Dictionary, s.v. “Attorney’s Fees,” “A contingent fee is a charge made 
by an attorney dependent upon a successful outcome in the case and is often agreed to be 
a percentage of the party’s recovery.. .  often used in negligence cases and other civil 
actions hut it is unethical for an attorney to charge a criminal defendant a fee 
substantially contingent upon the result. ABA DR 2-106(C).”
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In a contingent fee arrangement, a lawyer who takes a case must pay 
the costs of the litigation up front, for the chance of a percentage return of 
an ultimate recovery. It simply makes no economic sense for a contingent 
fee lawyer to bring frivolous litigation because there is only cost and no 
benefit. Besides logic, the evidence shows that contingent fee lawyers 
provide an important function in screening out cases of dubious merit.®"
In response to this, it is argued that:
[0]ffsetting a plaintiffs litigation expenses is not an appropriate 
function of civil litigation. ... If the law doesn’t allow plaintiffs to 
recover certain damages (for instance, attorneys’ fees, or as-yet- 
unthought-of forms of pain and suffering), [then] they shouldn’t be able to 
recover for those damages through the catch-all proxy of punitive 
damages.®’
Those opposed to plaintiffs receiving punitive awards are not in favor of doing away 
with punitive damages. They agree that punitive damages have their justification as 
punishment to the defendant. But, they do feel that the punitive damage awards should 
instead be paid partially or entirely to the state.
It is difficult on principle to understand why, when the sufferer by a 
tort has been fully compensated for his suffering, he should receive 
anything more. And it is equally difficult to understand why, if the 
tortfeasor is to be punished by exemplary damages, they should go to the 
compensated sufferer, and not to the public on whose behalf he is 
punished.®®
In this view, “the public on whose behalf he is punished” refers to the theory that “the 
justice of particular actions [is dependent upon punishment] being authorized by a stable.
®" Daniel J. Capra, “An Accident and a Dream: Problems with the Latest Attack on 
the Civil Justice System,” Pace Law Review 20 339 (Spring 2000) : 35.
®’ Volokh, Alexander. “Punitive Damages and Environmental Law: Rethinking the 
Issues.” Reason Public Policy Institute. Executive Summary. Policy Study No. 213 (Sept. 
1996). 11.
®® Catherine M. Sharkey, in Introduction of “Punitive Damages as Societal Damages,” 
113 Yale Law Journal 347 (Nov 2003) : 50, from [ENDNOTE74] quoting Chief Justice 
Ryan of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 654 
672-73 (1877).
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effective, and to the extent possible, democratic legal institution”®® that represent society 
and punish on behalf of society. This means that a just punishment, to which the 
definition of punitive damages refers, should be an assigned to the responsibility of the 
government. Since punitive damages are said to fulfill the punishment goals of 
retribution and deterrence,®" and society supports punishment only if  it is legally 
authorized,®® it is argued that legal authorization of punishment was developed by society 
not for the sake of morality, but for the sake of politics to maintain social order and 
preserve the peace.®" Moreover it is argued, despite the moral obligations of punishment, 
legal procedures were established for political purposes, to maintain social order, not to 
maintain morality. For anyone in society to punish another, and avoid punishment in 
return, legitimacy of this act in the community needed to he established. Thus society 
developed the legal punishment system to take responsibility for legitimizing 
punishment, developing rules and procedures, and deciding what is punishable and how. 
According to this legal punishment theory, in order for legal punishment by an institution
®® Guyora Binder, “Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?,” Buffalo Criminal Law 
Review 5:321 (2002): 333. Referring that “Kant required that just actions had to 
conform to moral standards,” as well as legitimized government institutions.
®" David G. Owen, “The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages f  Alabama Law 
Review 40:705-739 (Spring 1989). (General statement from overall intent of article.)
®" Binder, “Punishment Theory: . ..” 328. “. . .  vigilante justice is not morally wrong, 
and that legally authorized punishment of the guilty is not morally right. The wrong of 
vigilante justice is a political wrong and the right to punish conferred by law is a political 
right.”
®" Ibid., 322. “The legitimacy of punishment is bound up with the legitimacy of the 
norm it enforces and of the institutions promulgating the norm, imposing the punishment, 
and inflicting it.”
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to be justified?® the crime must not only be an offense against the individual, but also 
against society at large.®® Since punitive damages are only applicable in instances where 
malice and willful misconduct are present, it is argued that the act is found offensive 
enough for justified legal punishment, it is declared a wrong against the plaintiff and as 
well as against society. Since the wrong is also deemed a social harm, reformers argue 
that punitive damage awards should go to the state -  the institution that is responsible for 
the punishment.
This conclusion leads to the argument that there is a “philosophical void between the 
reasons we award punitive damages and how the damages are distributed.”®" According 
to the legal justification of punishment (for the sake of society as a whole), it is 
philosophically correct that the damages assessed for the purpose of punishment should 
go to the state, not the plaintiff. Reforms arguing damages should be received by the 
state are split-recovery statutes, which are currently practiced in eight states,®" and the 
most recently proposed introduction of societal damages.®’
®® Binder, “Punishment Theory:...,” 333. “While Kant required that just actions had 
to conform to moral standards, he required more: he also held that the justice of particular 
actions depends on their being authorized by stable, effective, and , to the extent possible, 
democratic legal institutions.”
®® Ibid., 328. The question of justifying institutionalized punishment is not a 
question of morality “but of legitimacy.” Since punishment is for the society, not just for 
the individual, it is legitimized through the institution.
®" Sharkey, “Punitive Damages as Societal Damages,” 12, *381. [Cited at note 53] 
Quoting the court in regards to Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 781 
N.E.2d 121 (Ohio 2002) see her endnote 108.
®" Sharkey, 11, *374.
*’ Ibid.
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These reforms use a “central concept. . .  that societal, as opposed to individual, 
interests may be vindicated by punitive damages.”®® Split-recovery procedure varies 
from state to state. The basic process has a portion of the punitive damages award 
distributed to a state general fund, or some type of state managed compensation fund for 
specific victims. The proportions vary between states.®® The goals of split-recovery 
statutes are (1) “to discourage plaintiffs from bringing [frivolous] punitive damages 
claims by decreasing the amount of their recovery,®" (2) to eliminate the “windfall gains’ 
to the plaintiff,®® and (3) as a revenue raising measure for the state.®"
Compensatory Societal Damages®® proposes that in “pattern or practice”®® torts,®" 
since a “defendant’s conduct toward the plaintiff is part of a pattern of similar repeated
®® Ibid., [endnote72]*373 From endnote72: “Current law recognizes that punitive 
damages may serve the societal objective of deterring similar conduct by the defendant. 
. to ‘punish ... and deter . . . ’, [dual purpose] focus solely on vindicating society’s 
interests”.
®® Volokh, see Table 5: States that divert part of punitive damages awards to public 
purposes, 41-42.
®" Sharkey, 11. “The Illinois split-recovery statute [ ] was enacted specifically to 
discourage punitive damages,”
®® Ibid. “a plaintiff is a fortuitous beneficiary of a punitive damages award simply 
because there is no one else to receive it. [endnote 85].”
®" Ibid. also see endnote86, endnote87, endnote88.
®® Ibid., 15. Part III A New Category of Compensatory Societal Damages.
®® Ibid. Repeated conduct that likewise affects multiple parties, as opposed to single 
tortuous acts by defendants that harm multiple victims.
®" Gifis, Law Dictionary, s.v. “mrt” : a wrong; a private or civil wrong or injury 
resulting from a breach of a legal duty that exists by virtue of society’s expectations 
regarding interpersonal conduct, rather than by contract or other private relationship. 26 
N.E. 2d 254, 259.
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conduct, a higher punitive damages award is permissible.”"" The punitive damages -  
since calculated based upon the repeated conduct -  should be held by the state in order 
for the other harmed plaintiffs, who did not directly participate in the specific legal case, 
to collect after judgment.
Those against the plaintiff receiving the award view the main purpose of punitive 
damages as punishment which is provided by the state in order to balance societal harm. 
Those who support the plaintiffs receiving the award view punitive damages’ main 
purpose as assisting in the civil litigation process by enforcing the motive and means for 
plaintiffs to bring cases to court. In order to determine the most appropriate distribution 
purpose of punitive damages, this thesis reviews first, the justice theories that should be 
applied to punitive damages procedure; second, the legal punishment theories that 
punitive damages fulfill; and thirdly, the historical and immanent"’ purposes of punitive 
damages.
"" Sharkey, 15. refer also to her endnote 149. 
"’ inherent
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CHAPTER 2
SERVING JUSTICE 
Justice first assumes that equality is inherent in basic human worth,' for in order to 
conclude that there should he fairness, you must assume that equality is inherent or 
agreed upon. The laws that govern society aim to ensure equality and thus uphold 
justice. The aims of these laws and whether they actually achieve justice are two distinct 
discourses. The former is often referred to as ‘formal justice’ and the latter as ‘material 
justice.’  ̂ So when discussing the justice of procedures and rules, it is referred to as the 
formal justice aspect. Justice in law is positive or an action-requiring virtue -  “righting 
wrongs through punishment, ensuring compensation for victims, or in some other way
' Campbell, Justice, 246. “ ...the distinctive discourse of justice presupposes the ideal 
of basic human equality, what I call the ‘prior equality’ of equal human worth, 
complemented by the practical recognition of differential deserts on the part of 
responsible agents, so that justified inequalities are based on unequal worthiness.”
 ̂Ibid., 26. [First to consider is] “ .. .the principle of formal justice, since it involves 
the application of whatever criteria of distribution are being used in a consistent manner, 
irrespective of the content or substantive merits of the criteria in question. The 
justification of the criteria, as distinct from their accurate implementation, is then 
regarded as a matter of substantive or material justice to be determined by the exercise of 
further moral judgment.” See also John Rawls, Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition, 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), §38 Rule of Law p. 
206. “I have already noted that the conception of formal justice, the regular and impartial 
administration of public rules, becomes the rule of law when applied to the legal system.” 
See also Whitney North Seymour Jr., “The American Legal System,” Why Justice Fails, 
(New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1973), 6. Seymour points out the 
distinction between procedure and substance. “If there is any flaw in our implementation 
of these key concepts [referring to trial by jury and cross examination processes], it is our 
tendency to rely more on procedure than on substance.”
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responding appropriately to the perpetration of injustice.”  ̂ As discussed in the 
Introduction, Civil Law responds or addresses wrongs through compensatory and punitive 
damages policies. In this chapter, I will focus on the formal justice aspects of 
compensatory and punitive damages. The theories I chose to discuss these aspects are 
corrective justice and procedural justice.
First, I will discuss corrective justice, according to Aristotle, and how it applies to 
compensatory damages. Compensatory damages and corrective justice principles focus 
on restoring balance to the assumed equilibrium that existed between both parties prior to 
the private transactions. An unequal or wrongful transaction is one that requires 
correction through compensatory damages. If the wrongful transaction is deemed worthy 
of punishment by the courts, then punitive damages are applied. The justice of punitive 
damages as ‘punishment’ will be discussed in the next chapter. In order to determine 
justification for the policy of whether or not the plaintiff should receive the damages, or if 
the damages should go to the state, I will discuss procedural justice, according to John 
Rawls. Procedural justice focuses on determining correct procedures that would ensure 
justice in society. And as I will show, according to Rawls’s procedural justice principles, 
the plaintiff should continue to receive the punitive damages award in order to ensure 
justice.
Ibid., 3.
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Correction
Victims to any crime carry the burden of loss until the legal system can shift that 
burden. In the case of civil law, the burden is shifted from the victim to the wrong-doer 
through monetary payment. The ‘shift’ is based upon the principles of corrective justice.
Aristotle recognized justice as the regulating factor in good human relations.'' When 
relations or transactions are not equal, they are deemed unjust.^ With different types of 
relations and transactions, different types of injustice are entailed. Aristotle distinguishes 
the justice or injustice of human relations that deal with honor, possessions, safety, and 
success; and those justices or injustices that are caused by a man’s desire for profit.^ This 
type of justice or injustice has two parts, one ensuring equal distribution of citizenship in 
the community and the other rectifying private transactions;^ the second type of justice or 
injustice falls under the discourse of civil law.
 ̂Martin Ostwald, (transi), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, (Prentice Hall, Upper 
Saddle River, New Jersey, 1999). Book V. 1130a. “ ...justice alone of all the virtues is 
thought to be the good of another, because it is a relation to our fellow men in that it does 
what is of advantage to others, either to a ruler or to a fellow member of society.” Future 
references as NE  1130a.
 ̂NE 1130a.20 -  25. “ .. .unjust in the wider sense of ‘contrary to the law.”
® NE 1130b. 1-5. In Book V. 2. Partial justice: just action as distribution and as 
rectification “The capacity of both is revealed in our relations with others, but while the 
sphere of the former is everything that is the concern of a morally good man, the latter 
deals with honor, material goods, security, or whatever single term we can find to express 
all these collectively, and its motive is the pleasure that comes from profit.”
 ̂NE 1130b.30. “One form of partial justice and of what is just in this sense is found 
in the distribution of honors, of material goods, or of anything else that can be divided 
among those who have a share in the political system. For in these matters it is possible 
for a man to have a share equal or unequal to that of his neighbor. A second kind of just 
action in the partial sense has a rectifying function in private transactions, and it is 
divided into two parts: ...” (continued below)
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Aristotle further recognized two aspects to private transactions, those that are 
voluntary and those that are involuntary.^ In civil cases of voluntary transactions, like 
contracts, property agreements, or employment, the parties are assumed to enter into the 
original transaction willingly, each with their personal expectations of desired outcome to 
the agreement. Civil law also has forms of involuntary transactions -  accidental harms -  
known as torts.
When a transaction has been determined to be unjust, rectification (correction) is 
based upon the principles of corrective justice. Correction first views the participants of 
these actions as equal. But just transactions can be based upon proportional equality.
That is, even if the participants are not actually (physically or socially) on equal standing 
prior to the transaction, given the voluntary nature, in the transaction they are treated as 
equals. Thus the transaction itself is in proportion.^ The transaction is deemed unjust 
when it violates the proportion.
Since the intent of the voluntary transaction between private parties assumes that they 
both agree to the transaction, rectification or corrective justice, is concerned only with the
* NE 1131a.2 -  8. (continued from above) "...(a) voluntary and (b) involuntary 
transactions, (a) Voluntary transactions are, for example, sale, purchase, lending at 
interest, giving security, lending without interest, depositing in trust, and letting for hire. 
They are called voluntary because the initiative in these transactions is voluntary, (b) 
Some involuntary transactions are clandestine, e.g., theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, 
enticement of slaves, assassination, and bearing false witness;...”
 ̂NE 1131b.32 - 1132a.l-2. “Now the just in transactions is also something equal 
(and the unjust something unequal), but <it is something equal> which corresponds not to 
a geometrical but to an arithmetical proportion.” See footnote 24 on Ostwedd page 120 -  
121. “An ‘arithmetical proportion’ is for us not a proportion at all but a series in an 
arithmetical progression. In it the first term is larger than the second by the same amount 
by which the third term is larger than the fourth: a -  b = c -  d. It is ‘something equal’ 
because in such proportions the sum of the means is equal to the sum of the extremes: a + 
d = b + c.
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injustice or violation of proportion in the transaction. It is this ill-proportion which 
corrective justice aims to restore. “The only difference the law considers is that [which] 
brought about the damage” in the transaction, and not the moral implications of the 
wrong or the character of the participants (such as the malice and intent on which 
punitive damages are based). It is for this reason that corrective justice is applicable to 
civil law and compensatory damages."
Corrective justice rules are concerned with ensuring or restoring the appropriate terms 
and conditions for persons to conduct fair private transactions. Corrective justice rules 
are less concerned with offering guidance regarding “the actual [moral] duties [we have 
as citizens] to avoid or prevent harm ... to one another.”'^ The injustice focused on in the 
rules of corrective justice is that which was created hy the transaction, and it is for the 
judge to restore equilibrium. The correction is made by imposing the loss or burden on 
the guilty by taking away any gain made by the defendant from the transaction and 
transferring this gain back to the plaintiff. This is achieved with the payment of
"’V£1132a.3-4.
"  See Ostwald footnote 24, p. 121, quoting Ross, Ethica Nicomachea (Oxford, 1925) 
“The problem of ‘rectificatory justice’ has nothing to do with punishment proper but is 
only that of rectifying a wrong that has been done, by awarding damages; i.e., rectifactory 
justice is that of the civil, not that of the criminal courts. The parties are treated as equal 
(since a law court is not a court of morals), and the wrongful act is reckoned as having 
brought equal gain to the wrongdoer and loss of his victim; it brings A to the position A + 
C, and B to the position B -  C. The judge’s task is to find the arithmetical mean between 
these, and this he does by transferring C from A to B ....”
Coleman, "Theories of Tort Law", 14. Corrective justice is concerned with the 
appropriate “ .. .conditions under which it is fair to impose duties to avoid or prevent 
untoward consequences, [and it] offers little guidance regarding the actual duties to avoid 
or prevent harm that we owe to one another.”
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compensatory damages which include pecuniary damages, non-pecuniary damages, and 
hedonic losses," to balance the wrong.
In this sense, corrective justice simply focuses on restoring balance once a wrong has 
already been done. But, when taking into account what should have been or should not 
have been done, or what could have been done to prevent the wrong, these are 
considerations the civil legal system assesses to justify punishment, or the application of 
punitive damages, not for compensation. This is what separates compensatory and 
corrective justice from punitive damages and punishment in civil law.
Procedural Justice
Punitive damages are added when the wrong is deserving of punishment, and takes 
obligations to society into account." After a guilty judgment, if punitive damages are 
determined necessary, then the question (for this thesis) is, who shall receive this award 
in order to serve justice properly? This question is not a matter of rectification, as 
explicated above. Nor is it strictly a matter of punishment, for once the award is ordered, 
punishment is served (either way -  to the plaintiff or to the state). Therefore, receipt of 
the damages requires a process, a procedure, a policy. So, in order to determine whether 
the plaintiff should receive the punitive damages award or if the award should go to the 
state, I now investigate the theory of procedural justice.
"  Volokh, 8. “compensatory damages include pecuniary damages - which is out-of- 
pocket expenses, or loss of wages; non-pecuniary damages - nonmonetary losses like 
pain and suffering; and hedonic losses - for the lost pleasure of life.”
"  Justifications of the Punishment aspect further discussed in Chapter Three.
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Procedural justice theories, specifically in regards to legal system," attempt to 
determine the just process for criticizing, reforming, and creating the rules of law so they 
would properly serve justice. The emphasis in procedural justice is the fair and accurate 
method for devising rules of law." For procedural justice, fair and accurate application 
of correct rules should ensure just results." John Rawls’s theory o f ‘justice as fairness,’ is 
“a theory of just procedures, so that whatever results from these processes is itself just.”"  
According to Rawls, the main purpose of a legal system is to coerce rational persons 
in the community to maintain order through public rules. The legal system and its rules 
“regulate ... conduct and provide the framework for social cooperation.”"  In order to 
maintain order, Rawls emphasizes that the rules of law must have the citizen’s liberty as a 
priority and a sense of regularity. Thus, the maxims that the rules of law are derived 
from include the priorities of liberty and regularity in order to ensure social cooperation.
"  John Rawls, Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition, §10 Institutions and Formal 
Justice, 47-48, “Now by an institution I shall understand a public system of rules which 
defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities and the 
like. These rules specify certain forms of action as permissible, others as forbidden; and 
they provide for certain penalties and defenses, and so on, when violations occur. As 
examples of institutions, or more generally social practices, we may think of games and 
rituals, trials and parliaments, markets and systems of property.” See also 51, “Formal 
justice in the case of legal institutions is simply an aspect of the rule of law which 
supports and secures legitimate expectations.”
"  Ibid., 207-210.
"  Ibid., §38 Rule of Law p. 206-207. “One kind of unjust action is the failure of 
judges and others in authority to apply the appropriate rule or to interpret it correctly. ... 
The regular and impartial, and in this sense fair, administration of law we may call 
‘justice as regularity.’ This is a more suggestive phrase than ‘formal justice.’”
"  John Rawls, “A Liberal Theory of Justice,” in the introduction by Pojman, L.(ed), 
Ethical Theory Classical and Contemporary Readings, (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1989), 
577-589.
19 Rawls, Theory o f  Justice: Revised Edition, 207-208.
39
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
These maxims include (1) that “ought implies can.” °̂ This means that every rule of law 
inherently includes the ability to be achieved by rational persons.^' (2) That “similar 
cases [are] treated similarly.”^̂  This ensures that society can be assured that arbitrary 
changes will not he made given similar circumstances - this adds to predictability in 
rules; (3) that “there is no offense without the law.”^̂  This implies that the rules be 
known and have been “expressly promulgated, meanings clearly defined, that statutes be 
general both in statement and intent and not be used as a way of harming particular 
individuals . . . And (4) that rules of law define the notion of natural justice. This 
means that the rules of law “intend to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.... 
The precepts of natural justice are to insure that the legal order will be impartially and 
regularly maintained.”^̂  Impartiality is mandatory in order to determine whether any 
decision or rule would be considered just, or if any action would serve justice.^^
Ibid., 208.
Campbell, 120-121. Defining a rational participant. “ ... in the original position, 
where the parties are confined to those with the capacity to take part in society and who 
must, therefore, have the minimum requirements of moral agency: that is, they must 
inter alia, have the capacity to have, and effectively pursue a conception of their own 
good.”
^  Rawls, Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition, 208-209.
Ibid., 209
"  Ibid.
"  Ibid., 209-210.
^  Ibid., 51. “For it is supposed that institutions are reasonably just, then it is of great 
importance that the authorities should be impartial and not influenced by personal, 
monetary, or other irrelevant considerations in their handling of particular cases.”
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Procedural justice embraces and hopes to achieve impartiality through emphasis on 
correct procedure.
Correct Procedure
Rawls’s political theory of justice uses a hypothetical contractual procedure to 
understand the role of justice in society. The initial analysis of a hypothetical state of 
society allows political philosophy to depict what the social and political rules and the 
system of government ought to be and how these rules could then sustain particular 
policies.^^
Rawls’s approach crucially depends on the characterization of the imagined state of 
nature, which includes the qualities of the participants. His imagined state of nature 
begins with participants hypothetically entering into a contract^^ which establishes the 
foundations of a legal system. Entering into this contract would assist persons to achieve 
personal goals" in community life, as opposed to living without the benefits of political
Campbell, 94. “hnagining and thinking through the implications of a hypothetical 
state of nature is a way of getting to know the content of the social and political rules and 
the system of government that ought to be created and sustained in the here and now.”
"R aw ls, Theory o f  Justice: Revised Edition, 1 0 -  11, “...we are not to think of the 
original contract as one to enter a particular society or to set up a particular form of 
government. Rather, the guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic 
structure of society are the object of the original agreement. They are principles that free 
rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial 
position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association.” See also 
Rawls, “A Liberal Theory of Justice,” 577 -  578. Rawls’s Social contract theory 
“corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of social contract. The 
original position is not, or course, thought of as an actual historical state of affairs, much 
less as a primitive condition of culture. It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation 
characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice.”
"  It is assumed that persons would desire assistance from the community and a 
system to achieve desires and life goals. See also Campbell, 92. The Social Contract is 
an agreement between potential citizens about the terms on which they are to enter into 
either social or political relationships. It posits a situation -  “state of nature” -  in which
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arrangements. By entering into a contract, citizens consent to and allow the operation of 
social and/or political organizations which enforce social order. Since the entrance into 
the contract is considered a fair^^ situation for all rational persons, Rawls argues that it is 
“possible to base political obligation on ... the premise that citizens have an obligation to 
obey just laws,” since they agreed to enter into the contractual agreement with others in 
order to receive the benefits of a politically organized society.
Once this mutual obligation is established, next Rawls explicates a process which 
produces a hypothetical deliberative state in which the rules of law can be judged, 
reformed, or established. This begins with “the original position.”
The Original Position 
This hypothetical contractarian method begins with a hypothetical state for decision­
making, the “original position.” The strategy of using the original position hopes to 
ensure impartiality by insisting that “all causes of bias and partiality are excluded from 
[deliberation], thus achieving an impartial and fair outcome.”^̂  This hypothetical state 
requires three things: (1) that the participant has the capacity to take part in society -  
meaning they can contribute to the free market, and have the minimum requirements of
persons who have no existing political (and perhaps social) rights or obligations reach 
(usually unanimous) agreement about the basis on which to establish a social and/or 
political system in which they do have recognized rights and obligations.
Campbell, 95. ‘Fair’ because one can choose not to enter into the contract, 
“ ...freedom is a matter of autonomy (uncoerced and informed choice) and equality has to 
do with equal capacity to bargain on the basis of equal procedural rights and equal claims 
on the outcome.
Ibid.
Ibid., 98
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moral agency/^ in order to deliberate in regards to principles of justice; (2) the 
participant must be (hypothetically) free and equal, in order to achieve fairness; and (3) 
the participants deliberate under a “veil of ignorance.”
Free, means un-coerced and not under any prior obligations or constraints. No hidden 
agendas, no party affiliations, no causes to pursue, purely free for decision making and 
deliberation in the hypothetical contract. This freedom is not only from oneself, but also 
from other participants. During deliberation, participants are viewed as independent and 
autonomous sources.
Rawls argues that this freedom will ensure that participants will deliberate with 
“mutual disinterest” in regards to the claims for the benefits of social cooperation.^'' So, 
in pursuit of their disinterested claims, “the parties are free to propose and argue for the 
principles of justice that they believe would be of greatest benefit to themselves; and it is 
assumed that they, as rational persons, will agree only to the best bargain they can obtain 
in return for the benefits of social cooperation.”^̂  This is what Rawls calls possessing 
“rational autonomy” -  “the rationality of the intelligent and prudent person, the capacity
Campbell, 120-121. Defining a rational participant, “ .. . in  the original position, 
where the parties are confined to those with the capacity to take part in society and who 
must, therefore, have the minimum requirements of moral agency; that is, they must 
inter alia, have the capacity to have, and effectively pursue a conception of their own 
good.”
Ibid., 101. “Rawls defines that the parties are egoists since they do not seek to 
harm anyone else, but says they are mutually disinterested in that they care only about 
their own welfare, taken in isolation. They have normal human desires although they feel 
no envy, and are not interested in benefiting or harming others for its own sake.”
"  Ibid.
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to discover and follow the most effective means to a chosen end.”^̂  So the rationally 
autonomous participants in the hypothetical contract will ensure that decisions, rules, and 
laws are fair and just, not only for their “mutually disinterested” selves, but for all 
persons in society. The “mutual disinterest,” since it is coercion-free, forces one to apply 
to the self what in a disinterested, unbiased, and impartial way is applicable to the whole.
In addition to freedom, there must he equality. Since the basis of any discourse in 
justice begins with the assumption of equality,^^ the hypothetical contract ensures 
equality is prefaced when deciding the rules of law. In order to debate just rules of law in 
the original position, persons must have equality in procedural rights, equal access to 
important sources of valid claims on societal resources in relation to basic social 
institutions, and equal worth which is “symmetrical with respect to one another.” *̂
The achievement of hypothetical equality for deliberation is possible because we are 
rational agents: we have the ability to imagine, understand, and apply hypothetical
Campbell, 101. “People in the original position possess what Rawls calls ‘rational 
autonomy’, a property he equates with the notion of rationality found in Kant’s 
hypothetical imperative or in neoclassical economics,...” For reference to Kant, see 
James W. Ellington, (transi.), Immanuel Kant: Grounding for the Metaphysics o f Morals 
with On a Supposed Right to Lie Because o f Philanthropic Concerns, 3" ed. (Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc., Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1981). Third Section: Transition 
From a Metaphysics of Morals to a Critique of Pure Practical Reason, The Concept o f  
Freedom Is the Key for an Explanation o f  the Autonomy o f the Will, 447 (marginal 
number), page 49. “What else then can freedom of the will be but autonomy, i.e., the 
property that the will has of being a law to itself? The proposition that the will is in every 
action a law to itself expresses, however, nothing but the principle of acting according to 
no other maxim than that which can at the same time have itself as a universal law for its 
object. Now this is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the 
principle of morality. Thus free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the 
same.”
37 Supra footnote 1.
Campbell, 101.
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equality. Thus the nature of respect for and understanding of equality is rooted in the 
equality of persons as moral agents.^^
Now that the conditions of the particular participants in the original position are 
determined, justice as fairness further clarifies the process with the ‘veil of ignorance.’ In 
order for the original position to determine just procedures leading to fair decisions, or 
rules of law, the persons in the original position (free and equal) must imagine 
themselves under a ‘veil of ignorance.’ The veil ensures theoretical impartiality in the 
original position. This veil is a hypothetical state in which one does not know one’s 
status in society in regards to material possessions, occupation, or status. The veil also 
makes deliberation void of gender, age, intelligence, strength, or talent. Rawls argues 
that the original position, with a veil of ignorance, would “ensure that no one is 
advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance 
or the contingency of social circumstances.”'"'
For example, in everyday personal or social conversation, when asking whether or not 
an individual approves or disapproves of, for instance, the increase or decrease of taxes, 
their response is usually supported by their personal position in society, how the rise or 
lowering of taxes would affect them personally. It is not unjust to prefer to support a 
political law, a political party, or choose a side of a political issue based upon the benefits 
and burdens of your person. But when placed in the position of reforming, creating, or
Campbell, 102. Referring to Kantian constructivism. Constructivists contend the 
“principles of justice are generated from the ideal of the moral person through the model 
of the original position.” Persons in the original position create/construct principles of 
justice, and “the constructing parties are equal.”
^  Rawls, “A Liberal Theory of Justice,” 578. The contingencies of social 
circumstances are detailed in regards to determining the least advantaged group.
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criticizing the rules of law in order for them to be determined for society -  everyone 
would prefer that the persons in deliberation are not only considering themselves, but the 
justice that is to be served to society as a whole or what is right in itself, with no bias or 
personal preference. This is why Rawls argues that the veil of ignorance “remove[s] all 
the possibilit[ies] of unfairness in the decision to be made, by rendering each [person] 
entirely ignorant of any particular fact ahout themselves which might lead them ... to 
favor themselves at the expense of those with different qualities.”'"
Furthermore, parties under the veil of ignorance are “ex hypothesi, ignorant of the 
content of their [personal] sense of justice.”"̂  This means that they have no bias or 
preference to determining what is just in society (such as religious beliefs or ethical 
theories). This ignorance is essential for the logical independence of the contract method 
since “the motivation of the parties is the furtherance of their own [independent ignorant] 
interests, [and] all that they know is that they are creatures who will have a sense of 
justice in actual society.”"̂  So the sense of justice that they do possess, and will refer to, 
is that of the basic human equal worth. Thus, the veil of ignorance will result in a 
“procedural fairness based on the strategy of ensuring that all causes of bias and partiality 
are excluded from the original position, thus achieving an impartial and fair outcome.”'"' 
These characteristics of the original position -  free, equal, and ignorant to their own 
social positions, or status -  are monumental to procedural justice in establishing
Campbell, 102. 
Ibid.
Ibid., 102-103. 
Ibid., 98.
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impartiality in order to deliberate upon which principles should guide the criticism of the 
rules of law. Thus the principles chosen to guide the rules of law would be the result of a 
purely just procedure since persons determining them are free, equal, and ignorant; and in 
turn the principles would guide deliberation to justice.
Rawls hoped that “the principles [of justice] would be chosen [in the original position 
and] match our considered convictions of justice or extend them in an acceptable way.”''̂  
Furthermore, since the original position would ensure impartiality, it would also 
determine “limitations on argument[s]”‘'  ̂during deliberation. Disagreements regarding 
justice could be limited, accepted, rejected, and directed by the fairly chosep principles of 
justice.
Determined Principles of Justice 
For Rawls, the original position procedure results in two principles of justice. The 
principles of justice are broad in the sense that they could be applied with specific 
délibération to all rules of law, or questionable situations that require regulation -  they 
assist us in deciding what the rules ought to specify. These principles should be used to 
regulate, reform, or criticize the basic institutions of society, which in turn will determine 
the distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.
The first principle states that: “Each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty
Campbell, 98.
Ibid.
Rawls, “A Liberal Theory of Justice,” 578. These principles are to be used to guide 
and “regulate all subsequent criticism and reform of institutions.”
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for all.”''* It implies that rational participants in society will value, and therefore desire, 
equality of basic liberties."^ These hasic liberties are “primary goods,” as defined by 
Rawls; “rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth,...[as well as] 
self respect.” "̂ These “primary goods” can he governed by institutions, and are required 
by any person in order to pursue any conception of the good^' in their life. Once the 
primary goods are constituted, in the original position, the next question is “how these 
goods are to be distributed;”^̂  in other words what are justified distributive procedures?
Although the first principle requires equality in liberties, Rawls recognizes that there 
are inherent inequalities in basic liberties which develop within society. For, although 
everyone should be equal, not everyone is in fact equal. Advantages and disadvantages 
in society occur for reasons that include natural abilities or talents, or privileges, honor.
'* Ihid. 578. See also Rawls, A Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition, 266.
"  Ihid., 588-589. “The argument for the two principles of justice does not assume that 
the parties have particular ends, but only that they desire certain primary goods.. . .  The 
preference for primary goods is derived, then, from only the most general assumptions 
about rationality and the conditions of human life.”
Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice: Revised Edition, 54. “ ...For simplicity, assume that the 
chief primary goods at the disposition of society are rights, liberties, and opportunities, 
and income and wealth. (Later on in Part Three the primary good of self-respect has a 
central place.)” See also Rawls, “A Liberal Theory of Justice,” 583. Also see Campbell, 
104, “ ‘the social bases o f self-respect’, ... conditions necessary for individuals to 
maintain a feeling of their worth as moral agents.”
Ihid., 54. “ .. .primary goods, that is, things that every rational man is presumed to 
want. These goods normally have a use whatever a person’s rational plan of life.” See 
also Campbell, 104. “conception of the good in a well ordered society which respects the 
individual’s moral powers to follow out in his life a conception of the good and an ideal 
of justice.”
Campbell, 105.
Rawls, “A Liberal Theory of Justice,” 587.
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and wealth that are inherited from birth or gained through certain advantaged 
circumstances. There are leaders and there are followers. Some choose to lead, and 
some choose to follow. Not everyone can be the president at the same time, and not 
everyone wants to be president, and so forth. In recognizing the inherent inequalities that 
develop in society, the second principle entails the necessity to turn attention from 
assuming that ‘all persons are created equal’ to inherent social goods that one may try to 
exploit as a result of circumstance. So, the second principle of justice must address what 
to do in the event that there are inequalities, in order to ensure that liberty and equality 
are maintained.
Thus, the second principle states: “Social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, 
consistent with the just savings [or the difference] principle, and (b) attached to offices 
and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”^'
The Least Advantaged and the Difference Principle
Rawls defines the “least advantaged” group as those “whose family and class origins 
are more disadvantaged than others, whose natural endowments (as realized) permit them 
to fare less well, and whose fortune and luck in the course of life turn out to be less 
happy, all within the normal range ... and with the relevant measures based on social 
primary goods.”^̂  In the event of unequal distributions of primary goods, (which refers
Rawls, A Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition, 266. See also Rawls, “A Liberal 
Theory of Justice,” 587.
Ibid., 83 - 84. “I shall assume that everyone has physical needs and psychological 
capacities within the normal range, so that the questions of health care and mental 
capacity do not arise. ... The first problem of justice concerns the relations among those 
who in the everyday course of things are full and active participants in society and 
directly or indirectly associated together over the whole span of their life. Thus, the
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to the excess of basic liberties which have already been maximized to the highest point of 
equal distribution, or to the fact that some persons or group of persons have some 
advantage over the other in terms of access to these goods) the second principle states 
that these excess goods should be distributed so that they have the effect of maximizing 
the lot of the least advantaged group. If in a situation, certain individuals have superior
talents, and gain higher benefits than others, Rawls feels they do not have any intrinsic 
sole right to these benefits arising from personal merit.®Thus if they receive an excess 
of goods, they are obligated to distribute these goods, unless as the “difference principle” 
states, their receiving or keeping these goods would benefit the least advantaged.
According to the “difference principle”, also referred to as the “just savings 
principle”:
Assuming the framework of institutions required by equal liberty and 
fair equality of opportunity, the higher expectations of those better situated 
are just if  and only if they work as part of a scheme which improves the 
expectations of the least advantaged members of society. The intuitive 
idea is that the social order is not to establish and secure the more 
attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage 
of those less fortunate. ... The difference principle is a strongly egalitarian 
conception in the sense that unless there is a distribution that makes both 
persons better off (limiting ourselves to the two-person case for 
simplicity), an equal distribution is to be preferred.®*
difference principle is to apply to citizens engaged in social cooperation; if the principle 
fails for this case, it would seem to fail in general.” Rawls also notes that there are three 
main kinds of contingencies, possibilities, or unforeseen unequal situations that will 
affect persons in society in which the least advantaged status is based upon: fam ily and 
class origins, natural endowments, and fortune and luck in the course of life.
56 Campbell, 106.
®’ Ibid., 107.
58 Rawls, yf Theory o f Justice: Revised Edition, 65-66.
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For example, if a student has shown to be talented in the medical field, the 
government may offer that person a scholarship for school. This advantage is not to 
‘secure the prospects of the better o ff’ But, if the loan required the student to give back 
to society in partial compensation for his loan, by practicing medicine upon graduation 
for a certain period at a free clinic, or as lawyers are required to provide a certain amount 
of pro bono cases, the federal scholarship becomes an advantage that benefits the least 
advantaged as well. The difference principle assumes that rational persons would not 
permit inequalities in positions where they might not be able to compete on equal terms,®® 
so the second principle of justice ensures that inequalities should be arranged to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged.
Another illustration of the second principle of justice and the difference principle 
given by Rawls is a hypothetical situation of limiting free trade.
For example, persons engaged in a particular industry often find that 
free trade is contrary to their interests. Perhaps the industry cannot remain 
prosperous without tariffs or other restrictions. But if free trade is 
desirable from the point of view of equal citizens or of the least 
advantaged, it is justified even though more specific interests temporarily 
suffer. For we are to agree in advance to the principles of justice and their 
consistent application from the standpoint of certain positions.^®
Thus when faced with inequalities inherent in society, and for the purpose of 
distribution and justice, the priority of benefit is that of the least advantaged, not the 
majority of participants or specific interests.
®® Campbell, 107.
60 Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice: Revised Edition, 85.
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Application of the Principles -  Reflective Equilibrium 
The process for “justice as fairness” -  the original position, the veil of ignorance, and 
the two principles of justice -  can be used to analyze present day justice issues, whether it 
be the criticism, reform, or creation of political policies. The advantage of the 
hypothetical procedure is that it can be used at any time by rational persons in pursuit of 
justice. The original position is a state of deliberation, and a part of the process of 
decision making that establishes guidelines and principles to follow in order to maintain 
justice. Rawls stated:
At any time we can enter into the original position,... simply by 
following a certain procedure, by arguing for principles of justice in 
accordance with these restrictions.^'
The use of the original position when in deliberation as to whether or not a policy 
serves justice as fairness, Rawls refers to “reflective equilibrium.” Once the principles of 
justice are decided, we can apply them to our particular policies and convictions of 
justice to see if they match or extend them in an acceptable way.^^ Using the principles 
of justice as a guide to goodness and right, we can determine whether or not reforms are 
necessary. Procedural justice asserts that with correct deliberation guided by the 
principles of justice and the original position, justice as fairness can be achieved.^®
Rawls, Theory o f  Justice: Revised Edition, 17.
^  Ibid. [The reflective equilibrium is used] “...to see if the principles which would 
be chosen match our considered convictions of justice or extend them in an acceptable 
way. We can note whether applying these principles would lead us to make the same 
judgments about the basic structure of society which we now make intuitively and in 
which we have the greatest confidence; or whether, in cases where our present judgments 
are in doubt and given with hesitation, these principles offer a resolution which we can 
affirm on reflection.”
Ibid. 18. “We can either modify the account o f the initial situation or we can revise 
our existing judgments, for even the judgments we take provisionally as fixed points are
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For in the deliberation of a policy, even if we can only determine what we ought to 
do, or how the process or procedure should he, we are closer to achieving justice than not 
carefully reflecting upon the policies at all, or waiting for some end result to justify or not 
justify its existence. So despite the hypothetical nature of ‘justice as fairness,’ this theory 
appeals to normative views because it focuses on the procedure for establishing standards 
for determining justice in society.
So, for the sake of this thesis, we will use a reflective equilibrium and apply it to the 
distribution policy of punitive damages. Reformers argue that since punitive damages are 
calculated for multiple harms,^' the punitive damages award should not be given solely to 
the plaintiff. Reformers argue that this is process does not serve justice and provides a 
‘windfall’ gain to the plaintiff. Reformers feel that the punitive damages should go to the 
state, in order to beheld for and benefit, those for whom the award was calculated, not 
just the plaintiff who took the time, effort, and opportunity to sue. In order to apply 
‘justice as fairness’ to the policy in question -  whether or not punitive damages should 
continue to be received by the plaintiff, or if the purposes of justice and punitive damages 
would be better off served if received by the state, or split between the plaintiff and the
liable to revision. By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the 
contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and conforming them to 
principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that 
both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered 
judgments duly pruned and adjusted. This state of affairs I refer to as reflective 
equilihrium.”
^  Sharkey, 15. Section III A New Category o f Compensatory Societal Damages, “The 
concept of societal damages is particularly relevant to widespread harm torts. These tots 
comprise two categories; (1) single tortuous acts by defendants that harm multiple 
victims; and (2) ‘pattern or practice’ torts, which consist of repeated conduct that likewise 
affects multiple parties. If a defendant’s conduct toward the plaintiff is part of a pattern 
of similar repeated conduct, a higher punitive damages award may be permissible.”
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State -  one must first ask: How do compensatory and punitive damages fulfill the two 
principles o f justice?
Given the first principle of justice, that of equal distribution o f liberties or primary 
goods, the purpose of the processes of the civil court system is to correct the imbalance of 
liberties that may result from private transactions. Although compensatory and punitive 
damages are liberties or primary goods, they are not ‘public g o o d s , f o r  primary goods 
in private transactions are private goods. The primary responsibility and concern of 
societal institutions is the distribution of public goods;^^ Societal institutions become 
concerned with private goods only when private entities seek the assistance of the 
institution to settle injustices or imbalances of private transactions.
Although the actual goods distributed as compensatory damages or punitive damages 
are not public goods, the assistance provided by societal institutions in correcting 
injustices in private transactions is a public good. Thus, access to the civil law system 
should be equal and fair to all citizens. Assuming that access to the civil law system is 
equal, the policies that regulate distribution, policies for compensatory and punitive 
damages, should aim to ensure equality to the participants in the civil law arena.
Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice: Revised Edition, 235. .. .public good has two 
characteristic features, indivisibility and publicness. That is there are many individuals, a 
public so to speak, who want more or less if this is good, but if they are to enjoy it at all 
must each enjoy the same amount. The quantity produced cannot be divided up as 
private goods can and purchased by individuals according to their preferences for more 
and less. There are various kinds of public goods depending upon their degree of 
indivisibility and the size of relevant public. ... A standard example is the defense of the 
nation against (unjustified) foreign attack.”
^  Ibid., 236. “It follows that arranging for and financing public goods must be taken 
over by the state and some binding rule requiring payment must be enforced.”
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That punitive damages go to the plaintiff is supported by the second principle of 
justice; the principle that inequalities are to be arranged to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged or in accordance with the difference principle. The inequalities in private 
transactions are the goods that are being sued for by the plaintiff as punitive damages. If 
we contemplate pure compensation (compensatory damages only), if a guilty verdict is 
decided, the goods are distributed to the plaintiff. But compensatory damages, unlike 
punitive damages, are not inequalities. The civil law system and compensatory damages 
are merely correcting the inequalities created during private transactions. Thus, 
compensatory damages are not concerned with ‘inequality’ as it is referred to in the 
second principle; for the second principle addresses inequalities that are a result of an 
excess of advantages for some person or group, which is produced from a just situation. 
Thus, in terms of the second principle of justice, an unjust transaction occurs only when 
an inequality of excess, not rightly deserved, is created; but correction and compensatory 
damages re-distribute and settle inequality for the sake of restoration.
Punitive damages, on the contrary, serve as punishment -  further damages for further 
harm caused. It can be argued that this may be just a problem of semantics. For the harm 
weighed for punitive damages, although not nominal, is also an inequality resulting from 
an unjust action, so they are no different or not ‘in excess’ (just as compensatory damages 
are not.) For punitive damages punish or correct for harm that is not monetary. The only 
difference is the term and application, but in theory, they seem similar. But since the 
civil law and the public discourse clearly make the distinction between the two, as 
discussed in Chapter One, we will proceed on the premise that punitive damages do not 
represent in any way simple compensation or correction.
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If we view punitive damages as an inequality which is an ‘excess liberty’ or in this 
case ‘further damages’ which are to be distributed, then according to the second principle 
the inequality -  which I will define as the defendant having to pay further damages and 
the plaintiff receiving additional damages beyond compensation -  should be distributed 
and is allowed as long as it is to the benefit of the least advantaged group. Since the 
plaintiff, in the situation of the civil law suit is “the least advantaged group,” distribution 
of punitive damages should be to the plaintiff.
To explain: if we refer back to the definition of “the least advantaged” group: those 
“whose family and class origins are more disadvantaged than others, whose natural 
endowments (as realized) permit them to fare less well, and whose fortune and luck in the 
course of life turn out to be less happy, all within the normal range ... and with the 
relevant measures based on social primary goods,”^̂  how is the plaintiff the least 
advantaged? The three contingencies which we can weigh to determine the least 
advantaged are family and class origins, natural endowments, and fortune and luck in the 
course of life. Given the plaintiff and the defendant, it is entirely possible that the family 
and class origin and natural endowments of each could be equal or weigh more to the 
plaintiff. But since the civil law arena, as stated earlier, does not take into account family
Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice: Revised Edition, 83 - 84. “I shall assume that everyone 
has physical needs and psychological capacities within the normal range, so that the 
questions of health care and mental capacity do not arise. ... The first problem of justice 
concerns the relations among those who in the everyday course of things are full and 
active participants in society and directly or indirectly associated together over the whole 
span of their life. Thus, the difference principle is to apply to citizens engaged in social 
cooperation; if the principle fails for this case, it would seem to fail in general.” Rawls 
also notes that there are three main kinds of contingencies, possibilities, or unforeseen 
unequal situations that will affect persons in society in which the least advantaged status 
is based upon: family and class origins, natural endowments, and fortune and luck in the 
course of life.
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and class, or natural endowments when deciding compensatory damages, they should not 
be weighed into the distribution for punitive damages. In civil law, the personal positions 
of the participants do not and should not weigh into the decision of guilt in private 
transactions. In this way, the civil law arena applies its veil of ignorance, thus so will I. 
But, I do argue that the last contingency can apply -  one’s fortune and luck in the course 
of life. For given the situation -  the private transaction -  we can conclude that the 
plaintiff did not fair luckily in this private transaction in the course of his/her life, since 
we are assuming a guilty verdict has heen established. If any of the three contingencies 
of the least advantaged are to apply at this point, given that the defendant is guilty, the 
plaintiff is the least advantaged in the situation since the plaintiff is judged a victim of a 
wrong that has been deemed worthy for punitive damages. Thus, the punitive damages 
should he received by the plaintiff according to the second principle of justice.
Arguments against distribution to the plaintiff would argue that the least advantaged 
in this situation would be society, especially if the harm was one that required mass 
litigation or caused the defendant to change policies that applied to the whole of the 
nation or state in which the wrong was committed. And so the damages should go to the 
state, which would in turn serve society as a whole.
The problem with this view is that it is conditioned on the premise that the harm was 
a mass litigation and punishment did (as an end result) affect society, this is a special 
circumstance. But reform of punitive damages policy should not be changed for specific 
occasional conditions. Even if societal damages are desirable from the point of view 
which requires attention to certain situations, the proposed reform is based upon specific 
conditions and interests. But, keeping in tune with the original position and the veil of
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ignorance, policies and rules of law, in order to sustain justice, policies and rules should 
not be made on the premise of specific interests. Given the possibility that I could be one 
of the least advantaged, the plaintiff in a law suit, my mutual disinterest®* in the benefits 
to society as a whole or to specific groups would lead me to conclude that I should 
receive the punitive damages, and that they should not be held for others who did not 
pursue legal suit. Since I was judged the victim in a wrong-doing and went through the 
long process of civil court, the benefit, if  any that initially would come from the 
judgment, such as punitive damages, should be awarded to me, the plaintiff. This is not a 
purely selfish decision, but it is mutually disinterested.®^ For as addressed in the next 
chapter, purposes of punitive damages that include punishment do benefit society through 
deterrence, both specific and general.
Thus I will briefly conclude that through my deliberation, for the punitive damages 
policy, the plaintiff is the least advantaged and should continue to receive the award. The 
following chapters discuss further the purposes of punitive damages -  punishment, honor, 
insult, and plaintiff incentive -  and how these purposes contribute to why the plaintiff 
should receive the damages. For, although procedural justice can direct us in the further 
deliberation of this issue, it is not the sole guide to correct policy.
®* Campbell, 101. [Mutually disinterested refers to those in the original position, 
where in pursuit of their disinterested claims,] “the parties are free to propose and argue 
for the principles of justice that they believe would be of greatest benefit to themselves; 
and it is assumed that they, as rational persons, will agree only to the best bargain they 
can obtain in return for the benefits of social cooperation.”
®̂ Independent, not coerced by special interests, be the special interest of society or 
any group, but only the interest of a participant in the pursuit of justice, as one in the 
original position.
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Criticisms to Rawls
Critics argue that the circumstances to sustain the original position -  free, equal, and 
ignorant -  are not possible. Although our minds can be creative enough to imagine 
hypothetical situations, it is not likely that persons could communicate, let alone 
deliberate without personal convictions influencing decisions. Criticism that the 
hypothetical situation is not easy to achieve, is not surprising, since it is an ideal situation. 
But it is that very superlative situation that hopes to create ideal principles. It may be 
difficult, but I would not say that it is impossible. If idyllic justice principles are what we 
are striving for, then a perfect process is the best way to achieve this.
“The principal weakness of Rawls’s [hypothetical contractual] approach is the 
uncertainty which surrounds the original position and its outcome.”’® Since average 
utility offers everyone the best chance of the best life, it is assumed that persons in the 
original position would rationally choose average utility. Critics argue that it “seems 
desperately ad hoc for Rawls to rule this out by insisting on the unrealistic proviso that 
rational individuals would not be prepared to take the risks involved in such a strategy 
and [yet] to not know the probabilities involved.”’* But it is this very choice which 
Rawls relies upon in order to accept his hypothetical contractarianism over a principle of 
universal beneficence as the basis for social choice. Since it cannot be certain that these 
rational agents would make this choice, then his justification is weak.
The uncertainty is also evident in “that the basic liberties must be given priority by 
purely self-regarding individuals with a sound knowledge of human nature, for actual
’® Campbell, 109. 
’* Ibid.
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people are prepared to forgo political rights for economic gains well beyond the point of 
economic subsistence.””  In response to this criticism I argue that it is important to re­
emphasize that it is not an actual situation, but an ideal situation. It is true that actual 
people may not make these choices. But under the veil of ignorance, Rawls argues, they 
would. Again, Rawls’s goal in developing his theory “was to gain general acceptance for 
this as a method of political reflection in a liberal society.”’  ̂ It may also be argued that 
depending upon the nature of the culture and society, be it not a liberal one, the principles 
may be different, even under the veil of ignorance. But Rawls’s theory is attractive for it 
“promises to provide a means whereby citizens of liberal societies, with their emphasis 
on individual autonomy and commitment to toleration of individual and group 
differences, can reach working agreements as to the basic normative structure of 
society.””  Thus it is this type of society in which Rawls premises the conclusion that 
basic liberties will be given priority by purely self-regarding individuals. As noted, 
earlier, participants are mutually disinterested, independent and autonomous sources of 
claims on the benefits of social cooperation.
“Controversy has also attached to the exclusive emphasis which the difference 
principle puts on the situation of the worst-off-group. It is argued more weight would 
attach, for instance, to those whose position is only marginally better than this one class 
of persons.”’® If a society’s main objective was economic efficiency, this criticism could
”  Ibid.
Ibid
74 Ibid., 109. 
’® Ibid., 110.
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be warranted. For the worst-off-group would most often be the least economically 
efficient.
Economic efficiency in criminal or civil law is best described by Richard A. Posner.’® 
Posner’s theory justifies legal punishment, in criminal and civil law, in that it promotes 
efficiency. He argues that the main reason for law in a capitalist society is to prevent 
people from “bypassing the system of voluntary, compensated exchange -  the ‘market,’ 
explicit or implicit -  in situations where, because transaction costs are low, the market is 
a more efficient method for allocating resources than forced exchange.””  Since a 
punishment (criminal or civil), according to Posner, deters persons from bypassing fair 
exchange through the market, punishment is therefore justified in that it promotes 
efficiency. Posner also argues that due to economic deterrence, it is also efficient to 
punish according to an offender’s wealth. Also in this sense, imprisonment is designed 
primarily for the non-affluent, who would not be deterred by economic sanctions, since 
they have little economically to lose, whereas the affluent, in contrast, may be deterred by 
monetary fines, compensatory and punitive damages.’* With this view, the worst-off 
group would be considered to be the non-affluent, and since monetary threats are not 
effective on them, neither would it make sense, in criticism to Rawls’s principles, to
’® See Richard A. Posner, “An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law”, 85 Colum. L. 
193, (October 1985) and/or Ric 
(New York: Aspen Publishers, 2003).
Rev. 1 hard A. Posner, Economic Analysis o f  Law, 6* ed.
77 Posner, “An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law,” 1195 : 2.
’* Benard E. Harcourt, “Joel Feinberg on Crime and Punishment: Exploring the 
Relationship Between The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law and The Expressive 
Function of Punishment,” 146 Buffalo Criminal Law Review Vol.5:145-172 (2001) : 152.
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ensure that in distribution of basic liberties, they are distributed to the worst-off s benefit, 
for they are the most inefficient in society.
Posner’s economic efficiency of the law can most efficiently be applied when 
determining fines, amounts of damages, and lengths of incarcerations. Posner may be 
most effective in addressing the excessiveness issue of punitive damages. His view of 
the end for punishment is efficiency and general deterrence. But, when determining 
whether or not a procedure serves justice, namely, whether or not the plaintiff should 
receive the punitive damages, regardless of the amount, I argue that procedural justice is 
most appropriate to measure justice.
So in the liberal society to which Rawls refers, he is assuming that individualism 
would outweigh economic efficiency. And as addressed earlier, the second principle 
assumes that there are divisions in society. The second principle addresses the 
distribution of social and economic advantages in order to distinguish “among primary 
social goods that one should try to exploit. It suggests, [and recognizes, an inherent and] 
important division in the social system.”’  ̂ The choice of the difference principle is a 
reaction to the assumption that individualism would lead to exploitation at times, and it is 
a reflection of the view that economic efficiency is the more important consideration.
Although the idealistic nature of Rawls’s argument is the biggest criticism, I argue it 
is that which makes it suitable to criticize existing laws. “It is hard to reject the view that 
there is some objectivity and universality in the [hypothetical contractarian] method in so 
far as it incorporates and institutionalizes the role of impartiality in the moral debate and
”  Harcourt, “Joel Feinberg on Crime and Punishment: Exploring the Relationship 
Between The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law and The Expressive Function of 
Punishment,” 152.
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political decision-making.”*® Impartiality is key to any decision that would be considered 
just and any action that would serve justice. Since procedural justice embraces 
impartiality, it is suitable in measuring the procedures of justice.
*® Ibid.
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CHAPTER 3
PUNISHMENT IN PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
As stated in Chapter One, the major purpose of punitive damages is to serve 
punishment, specifically for retribution and deterrence.* The first section of this chapter 
will address how punitive damages are defined as punishment in civil law. The next 
section describes legal punishment and its justification. The following sections will first 
define the punishment theories of retribution, deterrence, and a punishment goal which is 
not commonly referred to in the justification of punitive damages -  vengeance 
satisfaction.’ Each section of the punishment theories will examine their benefits and
* David G. Owen, “The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages,” general overview 
of article. See also BMW of North America, Inc. v. Ira Gore, Jr. 517 U.S. 559; 116 S. Ct. 
1589; 134 L. Ed. 2d 809; U.S. LEXIS 3390 (1996). Syllabus (a) [refers to punitive award 
that should be “... in relation to the State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful 
conduct and deterring its repetition, cf. TXO, 509 U.S. at 456.” See also Bowden v. 
Caldor 350 Md. 4; 710 A.2d 267; Md. LEXIS 407 (1998). Opinion by Eldridge, J., I. 
“One of the purposes of punitive damages is to punish the wrongs of the defendant.” See 
also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 ,19, 113 L. Ed. 2d 1, 111 S. Ct. 1032 
(1991) “Punitive damages are imposed for purposes of retribution and deterrence.” See 
also National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Model Punitive 
Damages Act Final Draft 1996 accessed [on-line] at
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mpda/finaldft.htm on 27 April 2005, Section 1. Definitions 
“"Punitive damages" means an award of money made to a claimant solely to punish or 
deter.” See also Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, “Historical Continuity of Punitive 
Damage Awards; Reforming the Tort Reformers,” The American University Law 
Review, 42, 1269,1284-97 (Summer 1993) : 13 of 64. section 2. Punishment and 
Deterrence “The punishment and deterrence functions are the most frequently cited 
rationales for the remedy of punitive damages.”
’ Vengeance satisfaction is referred to as a Utilitarian aim of punishment. Vengeance 
satisfaction is seen as a good or increase of happiness as a result of punishment. This is
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detriments to the justification of legal punishment and in conclusion, I evaluate how these 
theories justify punitive damages as punishment and more specifically, if they in any way 
reinforce whether or not the plaintiff should receive the award.
Civil Remedies
In our legal system, there are different types of legal punishment, -  criminal, civil, 
economic, administrative, etc. In the civil law arena, wrongs are brought to justice 
through compensatory damages.® It is important to distinguish that compensatory 
damages are not seen as analogous to punishment,"* for they are measured as direct equal 
compensation for losses. Punitive damages are “civil style”® punishment which is
different from retribution. Retribution argues that vengeance represents equality and 
punishment is deserved, not because it has any positive results. Thus vengeance 
satisfaction will be addressed as separately from retribution.
® See pages ix, supra, in the Introduction, Civil Law section.
"* Galanter and Luban, “Poetic Justice: ...,” 5. See also State Farm v. Campbell 583 
U.S. 408; 123 S. Ct. 1513; 155 L. Ed. 2d 585; 2003 U.S. LEXIS 2713. Opinion by 
Kennedy, II [***LEdHR2A] [2A] “We recognized in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. 
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 149 L. Ed. 2d 674, 121 S. Ct. 1678 (2001), 
that in our judicial system compensatory and punitive damages, although usually awarded 
at the same time by the same decisionmaker, serve different purposes. Id ,  at 432. 
Compensatory damages "are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has 
suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct." Ibid. (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 903, pp. 453-454 (1979)). By contrast, punitive damages serve a 
broader function; they are aimed at deterrence and retribution. Cooper Industries, supra 
at 432; see also Gore, supra at 568 ("Punitive damages may properly be imposed to 
further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its 
repetition")” See also National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
Model Punitive Damages Act Final Draft 1996 accessed [on-line] at 
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mpda/finaldft.htm on 27 April 2005, Section 1. Definitions 
“"Compensatory damages" means an award of money, including a nominal amount, 
made to compensate a claimant for a legally recognized injury. The term does not include 
punitive damages.”
® Galanter and Luban, “Poetic Justice: ...,” 2.
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imposed in addition to compensation. Unlike criminal fines or incapacitation, punitive 
damages are an infliction of further® harm on the wrongdoing party, in addition to 
compensatory damages, in the form of monetary payment. Punishment in the form of 
monetary payment is distinct fi-om a civil fine, which has a set amount for a particular 
violation. The amount of punitive damages is determined by a jury or judge, on a case by 
case basis.’ As explained in Chapter One, punitive damages should by common law be 
proportionate to the additional harm that is not covered by compensatory damages, as 
well as serve as punishment and with intent to deter.
If punitive damages are defined as punishment served with the defendant paying 
goods or money to the plaintiff to serve purposes other than direct compensation, the 
development of the doctrine of punitive damages can be traced back to Babylonian and 
ancient Hindu traditions, the Bible, and Roman Law.* In England, punitive damages 
originated in a dispute between the Secretary of State’s agents and a publisher named 
Wilkes. The dispute was due to an unlawful search and seizure in the case of Wilkes v. 
Wood? The plaintiff demanded that the jury award more than trivial fines to ensure that
® Further, because it is in addition to compensatory damages.
’ Any general guidelines that exist for determining this amount were discussed in 
Chapter One.
* Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, “Historical Continuity of Punitive Damage 
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers,” The American University Law Review, 42, 
1269, 1284-97 (Summer 1993) : 5. “The doctrine of punitive damages has an ancient 
lineage. The Babylonian Hammurabi Code, Hindu Code of Manu, and the Bible all 
contain precursors to the modem remedy of punitive damages. The Roman law of 
multiple damages blended compensation with punishment.”
 ̂Wilkes V. Wood, 98 Eng.Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763). In Wilkes v. Wood, John Wilkes, 
the publisher of The North Briton, sued a member of Parliament for trespassing. Wilkes 
V. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 489-99 (K.B. 1763). This case was cited as the beginning of 
punitive damages in Eighteenth-century English cases in the following references.
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unlawful search and seizures would not be taken lightly by officials and never happen 
again. The Chief Justice agreed and upheld that a jury had it in their power to give 
damages for more than the injury received and that “damages are designed not only to 
satisfy the injured person, but also to punish the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding 
for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself.”*® Thus the 
purposes of victim vindictive satisfaction, retribution (to punish), deterrence, and social 
expression of norms were established for punitive damages. This case set precedence for 
the punishment purposes of pimitive damages. It also infers “that the punitive and 
deterrent purposes of damage awards could be separated fi"om their compensatory 
function.” '*
Punitive damages as punishment serves two unique purposes for civil law. First, 
punitive damages provide moral evaluation of civil wrongs. Specific conditions for the 
levy of punitive damages vary from state to state. Most state laws require that in order 
for punitive damages to be awarded, their “imposition ... [must be] based upon reckless
Thomas J. Collin, ed.. Punitive Damages and Business Torts: A Practitioner’s Handbook, 
(Chicago: ABA Publishing, 1998), 7. See also Ellis, “Symposium: Punitive Damages: 
Article: Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages,” 6. Also cited in 
Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, “Historical Continuity of Punitive Damage 
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers,” 5 and detail of the case in n95.
*® Ellis, “Symposium: Punitive Damages: Article: Fairness and Efficiency in the Law 
of Punitive Damages,” 6. “In Wilkes v. Wood, Lord Chief Justice Pratt announced his 
view that: [A] jury have it in their power to give damages for more than the injury 
received.” Also see Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, “Historical Continuity of 
Punitive Damage Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers,” n96. “In Wilkes, the 
publisher of The North Briton asked for "large and exemplary damages" in his suit 
because actual damages would not punish or deter this type of misconduct. Wilkes, 98 
Eng. Rep. at 490. The jury awarded him 1000 poimds.”
** Ellis, “Symposium: Punitive Damages: Article: Fairness and Efficiency in the Law 
of Punitive Damages,” 6.
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or grossly negligent conduct;... the requirement o f ‘public harm’; ... and [damages are 
subject to] federal appellate ‘reprehensibility’ review.”*’ So, even if a defendant is found 
guilty of harm which deems compensation, further harm must be evident in order for 
punitive damages to be awarded. Because of this, punitive damages takes civil law 
compensation further -  this is why it is deemed punishment. Punitive damages, since 
they are additional to compensation, introduce into the civil law wrong the evaluation of 
intangible losses of victim as well as the intent of the defendant when assessing the 
damages,*® compensatory damages do not take these into account.
*’ Galanter and Luban, “Poetic Justice: ...,” 7. “federal appellate ‘reprehensibility’ 
review considers, as factors relevant to determining the constitutionality of the size of 
punitive damages in a given case, whether the defendant’s conduct ‘evince[s] an 
indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others’ or ‘involved 
repeated actions.” See also Kolstad v. American Dental Association, (98-208) 527 U.S. 
526 (1999) 139 F. 3d 958. In Syllabus section 1. “ ... An employer’s conduct need not be 
independently “egregious” to satisfy §198la ’s requirements for a punitive damages 
award, although evidence of egregious behavior may provide a valuable means by which 
an employee can show the “malice” or “reckless indifference” needed to qualify for such 
an award.” See also For example, from BMW of North America, Inc., v. Ira Gore, Jr.
701 So. 2d 507; 1997 Ala. LEXIS 126, under section I. ... “Alabama, by statute, provides 
notice concerning the conduct that will subject one to punitive damages in this state. Ala. 
Code 1975, § 6-11-20, expressly set forth defines the acts, as well as the state of mind:
‘(a) Punitive damages may not be awarded in any civil action, except civil actions for 
wrongful death pursuant to Sections 6-5-391 and 6-5-410, other than in a tort action 
where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or 
deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the 
plaintiff. ...”
*® Ibid., 6. See also Kolstad v. American Dental Association, “Section 198la ’s two- 
tiered structure-it limits compensatory and punitive awards to cases of “intentional 
discrimination,” §1981a(a)(l), and further qualifies the availability of punitive awards to 
instances of “malice” or “reckless indifference”-suggests a congressional intent to 
impose two standards o f liability, one for establishing a right to compensatory damages 
and another, higher standard that a plaintiff must satisfy to qualify for a punitive award. 
The terms “malice” and “reckless indifference” ultimately focus on the actor’s state of 
m ind,... Intent determines which remedies are open to a plaintiff here as well. This focus 
on the employer’s state of mind does give effect to the statute’s two-tiered structure. The 
terms “malice” and “reckless indifference” pertain not to the employer’s awareness that it 
is engaging in discrimination, but to its knowledge that it may be acting in violation of
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Second, to this moral evaluation of wrong-doings, punitive damages provide society 
with a particular method to serve punishment to groups, corporations, and otherwise 
nonindividual entities through hindrance of economic activity. “[PJunitive damages 
serve a vital function for which neither criminal punishment nor administrative controls 
can substitute;”’"* the ability to threaten private groups, corporations, and organizations 
“control over their subjects -  be they members, customers, clients, or employees. The 
ability to sanction flourishing economic actors is the major strength of punitive 
damages.”’® Thus punitive damages subsist as unique type of legal punishment, not only 
because of the restitution characteristics, or punishment through monetary payment, but 
also as a method to punish groups, corporations, and organizations in order to hold them 
accountable for their contracts, transactions, products, and policies.
Punishing Corporations 
Since Wilkes v. Woods in 1763, similar cases in England continued to set precedence 
and expand the purposes of awarding punitive (at that time also called compensatory, 
exemplary, or vindictive) damages. Each case substantiated and expanded the purposes 
of punitive damages. In addition to the purposes of punishment, deterrence, and the
federal law, see, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 37, n. 6,41, 50. ...Although there is 
some support for respondent’s assertion that the common law punitive awards tradition 
includes an “egregious misconduct” requirement, eligibility for such awards most often is 
characterized in terms of a defendant’s evil motive or intent. Egregious or outrageous acts 
may serve as evidence supporting an inference of such evil motive, but §198la  does not 
limit plaintiffs to this form of evidence or require a showing of egregious or outrageous 
discrimination independent of the employer’s state of mind. Pp. 5— 11” See also supra 
FN3.
’"* Galanter and Luban, 13.
’® Ibid. Detail discussion of the unique characteristic of punitive damages to punish 
corporations and the like will be addressed in following chapters.
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demonstration of social detestation, judges and juries awarded punitive damages in order 
to penalize the powerful elites who were usually above the law.*® Courts commonly 
awarded punitive damages against those who oppressed the physically weak and socially 
powerless.*’ In some cases, the awarding of punitive damages forewarned that acts of 
oppression would not be overlooked, that the common people deserved protection by the 
law, and that individual rights against the mighty would be preserved.**
By the end of the 1800’s, “punitive damages cases against corporations, courts 
typically held that the corporation was liable only if it either ordered the misconduct or 
condoned it by a refusal to take remedial steps. The standard for corporate punitive 
liability, therefore, was functionally equivalent to that of individuals.” *® The powerful 
elites of the 1700's became the corporate entities of our time.
A corporation is “an association of shareholders (or even a single shareholder) created 
under law and regarded as an ‘artificial person’ by courts.”’® The advantages that came 
with corporations were that a person or persons could have an entity that was “entirely 
separate and distinct from the individuals who compose it.”’* This entity could not die, 
so its assets could be passed down to generations. And the entity had “the capacity as
*® Rustad and Koenig. 5.
*’ Ibid., 6.
** Ibid.
*® Rustad and Koenig, 6. Referring to Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 
147 U.S. 101, 106 (1893). See, e.g., Prentice, 147 U.S. at 116 (discussing corporate 
punitive damages).
’® Gifis, s.v. ‘corporation.’
21 Ibid. quoting 200 N.W. 76, 87. See 17 U.S. 518, 657.
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such legal entity, of taking, holding and conveying property, suing and being sued, and 
exercising such other powers as may be conferred on it by law, just as a natural person 
may.””  What is advantageous to corporations is the limit of liability. “A corporation’s 
liability is normally limited to its assets and the stockholders [and their deemed personal 
assets] are thus protected ... in connection with the affairs of the corporation.”’® So with 
the new ways of doing business, also came some new ways to commit crimes. White- 
collar crimes like fraud, embezzlement, bribes and kickbacks, income tax evasion, and 
business violations evolved.
As businesses and corporations grew, so did the legal regulations that applied to 
them. The law was “a way to control and hold accountable remote and overwhelming 
actors.”’"* For instance, “a special income tax was imposed on personal holding 
companies in 1937 in order to prevent taxpayers from avoiding taxes by placing their 
assets in corporations. Previously, taxpayers would avoid income taxes by placing their 
assets in one or more corporations, thereby splitting their income among several 
taxpayers and taking advantage of the lower marginal tax brackets.”’® Since corporate 
liability was multifaceted in shareholders, managers, employees, acquired corporations, 
brother-sister corporations, controlled, de facto, private, professional, member, and public 
corporations, etc.... and their influence on society and the market grew; punitive damages 
became an important tool to guard against these powerful interests, since responsibility
”  Ibid.
’® Ibid. referring to Henn & Alexander, Law of Corporations 694 (3'̂ ® ed. 1983). 
’"* Galanter, “The Day After the Litigation Explosion,” 5.
’® Gifts, s.v. personal holding company, I.R.C. §§541 et seq.
71
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
could not always be traced back to an individual. Juries saw punitive damages as the 
only way to punish a corporate entity, not only because “[cjorporate entities cannot be 
sent to jail in any realistic sense,”’® but also because affecting their profits appeared to be 
the most effective way to influence their behavior.
[T]he use of punitive damages can be viewed as a partial offset to 
weak administrative controls. For example, in Wisconsin a truck driver 
injured in an accident caused by smoke from a forest fire ignited by a 
railroad received a $500,000 punitive award. Because fines were minimal 
[prior to this,] railroads had ignored the state Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR) rules requiring them to fix faulty exhaust systems and 
clear brush from tracks. After the punitive award, the ‘railroads got the 
message ... and railroad caused fires dropped from 339 in 1980 to 102 in 
1986.’ A DNR fire specialist said, ‘The punitive damage award showed 
the railroads that there was a need to do what we had been trying to get 
them to do -  clean up portions of their right-of-way and begin a 
locomotive exhaust maintenance program.””
Punitive damage awards facilitated the individual consumer, families, the smaller 
business owner, and even other corporations, in protecting their rights against 
conglomerates. In 2001, “in 83% of all [civil] trial cases, the plaintiff was an individual. 
Businesses were plaintiffs in 16% of all trials, government agencies, 1% and hospitals, 
0.3%. .. .Defendants in all trials were primarily divided between individuals (47%) and 
businesses (42%).”’*
’® Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 41.
”  Galanter and Luban, 13. Quoting Cary Segall, “Bill Would Ease Punitive 
Damages,” Wisconsin State Journal, Nov. 29, 1987, at 12.
’* CivilJustice Survey o f State Courts 2001, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, 
April 2004 NCJ 202803, 3. [on-line] http://www.ojp.usdoj.gOv/bjs/pubalph2.htm#civil; 
accessed 12 November 2004.
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Questionable business practices caused many of the nation's most serious economic, 
political, and social evils:”  fraud and embezzlement, bribes and kickbacks, income tax 
evasions, antitrust violations.®® Modernity gave birth to the culture of business ethics: 
questioning and regulating decisions in business transactions. Academic, political, and 
social discussions regarding corporate social responsibility, truth telling, employee rights 
and responsibilities, attracted public attention, possibly because of the amount of money 
that was often involved in these crimes.®* Furthermore, when publicized, “the poor man 
sees the white-collar criminal able to obtain the aid of experienced lawyers who can 
prolong the proceedings, take advantage of every technicality and obtain favored 
treatment from the courts, then the impact of white-collar crime is compounded.”®’ The 
majority of the lay public do not comprehend the complexities of corporate white-collar 
crime, which adds to the fact that they could easily go unnoticed. Punitive damages 
uphold an avenue to justice for victims of corporate crimes. Punitive damages “are
Rustad and Koenig, 6. “By century’s end, most courts generally agreed that 
exemplary damages could be assessed against corporations.” Referring to Seymour D. 
Thompson, Liability of Corporations for Exemplary Damages, 41 Cent. L.J. 308, 308 
(1895).
®® Whitney North Seymour Jr., “The Professional Criminal: Organized Crime and 
White-Collar Crime,” Why Justice Fails, (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 
1973), 71-73.
®* CivilJustice Survey o f  State Courts 2001, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, 
April 2004 NCJ 202803,4. During 2001 plaintiff winners in civil trials were awarded an 
estimated $4.4 billion in compensatory and punitive damages in the Nation’s 75 largest 
counties. Contract cases [Subrogation, Partnership disputes. Tortious interference. 
Rental/lease, Employment disputes. Mortgage foreclosures, Buyer/Seller plaintiff. Fraud 
] garnered higher median awards ($45,000) compared to tort ($27,000) cases.
®’ Seymour Jr., 74.
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perhaps the most important instrument in the legal repertoire for pronouncing moral 
disapproval of economically formidable offenders.”®®
General Justification o f  Legal Punishment 
Punishment requires justification. Why? A thorough examination of the definition of 
punishment will illustrate. Punishment in general is defined as the deliberate infliction of 
harm upon someone, or the withdrawal of some good from them, in response to a 
committed offense.®"* According to this definition, punishment is an act which is 
dependent upon, since it is a reaction to, a first act. This first act is specifically an 
offense, which is a violation of moral, social, or other accepted standards.®® So, the 
committer of the first act, which we also refer to as a crime, is the punished. From this, 
the definition of punishment assumes the punished is guilty.®® Thus, for the purposes of 
this paper, when referring to punishment and the punished, the establishment of guilt will 
be assumed.®’
Who then is responsible for inflicting the second act, the punishment? Our society
®® Galanter and Luban, 14.
®"* Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary o f  Philosophy, s.v. “punishment,” 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) : 310.
®® Encarta World English Dictionary [North American Edition] Microsoft 
Corporation, s.v. “offense,” On-line: http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_/offense.html 
(Bloomsbury Publishing Pic., 2005) accessed on April 15,2005.
®® Ibid. s.v. “guilt,” “awareness of wrongdoing: an awareness of having done wrong 
or committed a crime, accompanied by feelings of shame and regret, feelings of guilt; 
fact of wrongdoing: the fact of having committed a crime or done wrong an admission of 
guilt; responsibility for wrongdoing: the responsibility for committing a crime or doing 
wrong; legal culpability: the responsibility, as determined by a court or other legal 
authority, for committing an offense that carries a legal penalty.”
37 Thus punishment of the innocent will not be specifically addressed.
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has placed the responsibility of punishment on the legal system. Society developed the 
legal punishment system to take responsibility for legitimizing punishment, developing 
rules and procedures, and deciding what is punishable and how. Thus we can assume 
that each member of society has consented to and understands this authority. This 
assumption of consent is based upon the view that membership in society is voluntary 
and that members are rational, or are able to decide upon this consent.
“A rational being is someone who is capable of reasoning about his conduct and who 
freely decides what he will do, on the basis of his own conception of what is best. 
Because he has the capacity he has the responsibility for his actions.”®* Due to this 
rational ability, every member of the community that has this ability agrees to be 
governed by the community’s social contract, since they have rationally chosen to live in 
the community. This is demonstrated in Thomas Hobbes’ idea of a social contract:
To escape the state of nature, then, people must agree to the 
establishment of rules to govern their relations with one another, and they 
must agree to the establishment of an agency -  the state -  with the power 
necessary to enforce those rules. According to Hobbes, such an agreement 
actually exists, and it makes social living possible. This agreement, to 
which every citizen is a party, is called the social contracC^^
But consent alone is not justification of an authoritative practice. Since punishment 
involves the infliction of harm or the deprivation of good, legal punishment requires 
ethical justification."*® In order for anyone in society to punish another, and avoid
®* James Rachels, “Kant and Respect for Persons,” The Elements o f  Moral 
Philosophy, 4**’ ed. (New York: McGrawHill, 2003), 138. See also Igor Primoratz, 
Justifying Legal Punishment, (New Jersey: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1989) 
“Punishment as Retribution: Hegel,” 72, 76.
®® Rachels, “The Idea of a Social Contract,” The Elements o f  Moral Philosophy, 144.
"*® Blackburn, s.v. “punishment”. Ethical referring to that it need to be justified as a 
good thing. See also Igor Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment, (New Jersey:
75
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
punishment in return, legitimacy and justification of this act in the community needs to 
be established in order to ensure that it is good -  has utility which is beneficial to citizens. 
It is this justification that ethical theories of punishment address. The different theories 
of punishment"*' which address the moral justification of legal punishment can be 
classified into two main groups: “utilitarian or retributive theories.”"*’ These theories 
attempt to morally justify pimishment by resolving the problem of how harm to a citizen 
can be socially approved.
What set these two theories apart are their particular views of the rational member of 
society."*® Retributivists argue that since individuals are rational, their best choices are 
made through rational deliberation. Assuming that persons do deliberate rationally when 
making choices, criminals choose to commit an offense, and thus can be held responsible 
for its consequences. So for retributivists, punishment is justified because it is deserved. 
The Utilitarians argue that since individuals are rational, they can choose to commit or 
not commit an offense. But from the utilitarian perspective, these rational choices are 
ruled by a person’s preference for pleasure over pain. The choices that one makes are
Humanities Press International, Inc., 1989), 1. Because legal punishment is deliberately 
inflicted on an “ojfender by a human agency which is authorized by the legal order 
whose laws the offender has violated.”
"** Different theories include: Retribution, Reparation, Reformation, Deterrence, 
Incapacitation or Prevention, (from Blackburn, s.v. “punishment”).
"*’ Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment, 9. See also page 11 : Utilitarian theories: 
Deterrence, Reformation or Rehabilitation, Educative. Also page 19 which classifies 
Disablement or Incapacitation, Material Compensation or Restitution, and Vindictive 
Satisfaction under Utilitarian theories. Retribution does not specify sub-categories of 
punishment theories. Thus, if it is not retribution, it is some type of utilitarian theory, or 
neither. But the most popularly discussed, are listed under utilitarian, or as retribution.
"*® Although presenting a general overview here, detail on the view of rational persons 
for each theory will be reiterated in the sections following.
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those which bring the most pleasure and the least amount of pain. Thus the justification 
of punishment should be based upon influencing this choice.
In order to imderstand and criticize these theories, I first identify their purpose or aim, 
and the application of this purpose or aim for punishment in general. I classify the 
purposes of legal punishment by asking two questions: why we punish, and then how we 
punish?"*"* I do not argue that any one theory of punishment is better than or more just 
than the other, but that each plays a part in morally justifying punishment by determining 
particular criteria for moral justification. The two objectives (retribution and social 
utility) are important to the justification of punishment, and they are both needed to 
completely justify punishment. I argue that these theories alone do not completely 
answer both questions, but they can be used together to morally justify punishment. I 
argue that these theories, although seemingly philosophically competitive, should be 
viewed as complementary."*®
"*"* Only after answering the question of why we punish can the questions of how we 
should punish and what is just punishment be analyzed or discussed. In other words, we 
must first define and justify the purpose of legal punishment before we can justify its aim 
or consequences. This is a distinction that I concluded when studying the differences 
between retribution and the utilitarian theories of punishment.
"*® I found support for this view of punishment theories also in H.L.A. Hart, 
Punishment and Responsibility, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) : 3. “ ...what is needed 
is not a simple admission that instead of a single value or aim (Deterrence, Retribution, 
Reform or an other) a plurality of different values and aims should be given as a 
conjunctive answer to some single (emphasis in text) questions concerning the 
justification of punishment. What is needed is the realization that different principles 
(each of which may in a sense be called a ‘justification’) are relevant at different points in 
any morally acceptable account of punishment.”
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The Retributive Theory o f  Punishment
The punishment theory of retribution asserts that legal punishment serves justice 
because it is deserved. “This means that it is justified because it is retribution -  it is an 
evil the offender has deserved by his offense, an evil by which the state or society,... 
pays him back for what he has done.”"*® The basic principles of retribution which support 
this justification are as follows: (1) that a person may be punished if and only if he has 
voluntarily done something wrong; (2) that the punishment must be proportionate to the 
wickedness or heinousness of the offense; and (3) that the justification for punishing 
persons is desert, the return of suffering for moral injury voluntarily committed, thus it is 
itself just or morally good."*’
Voluntary Principle
The first principle of retribution requires that the wrong-doing was voluntary or out of 
one’s free will. This voluntary principle is derived from the premises that the rational 
member of society is (1) free and equal, (2) has knowledge of the act’s consequences, and 
thus chose to commit the offense.
Retributivists see the individual as ‘truly’ free when he subjects his urges, desires, 
and interests to the rule of ethical principles that were established by the community.
With reason, he knows what he ‘ought’ to do, or what ‘ought’ to be done if he was guilty. 
He would conclude that he should be punished for the harm against others."** And
"*® Primoratz, 12.
"*’ H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) : 
231. Also referred to in Hugo Adam Bedau, “Retribution and the Theory of 
Punishment”, The Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 11, 601-620 (Nov., 1978) : 602.
"** Primoratz, 68.
78
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
retribution embraces equity in society for each individual, and thus one is equally 
deserving of harm as one is deserving of good, depending upon one’s acts.
Retributivists also assume that wrongdoers are aware of the laws and the 
consequences for breaking them. Since the general will of the community is expressed in 
laws,"*® to break these laws is to go against the general will of the community of which 
you are a member. “It is obvious, for example, that we could not live together very well 
if we did not accept rules prohibiting murder, assault, theft, lying, breaking a promise, 
and the like. These rules are justified simply by showing that they are necessary if we are 
to cooperate for our mutual benefit.”®® Every member of society implicitly agrees to 
obey the law -  obey and live freely. When one disobeys the law, one agrees to 
punishment. So breaking the laws of which one is aware is performed out of free will -  
free from influence or coercion, and so one is willing to accept the deserving 
consequences of one’s actions.
[Rjational beings are responsible for their behavior and so they are 
accountable for what they do. We may feel gratitude when they behave 
well and resentment when they behave badly. Reward and punishment - .
. .  are the natural expressions of this gratitude and resentment. Thus in 
punishing people, we are holding them responsible for their actions in a 
way in which we can not hold mere animals responsible.. . .  We are 
responding to them . . .  as people who have freely chosen their evil 
deeds.®’
Rachels, in Chapter 11, “The Idea of a Social Contract,” 150. “The Social Contract 
Theory of Morals is . . .  the ideal that morality consists in the set o f  rules governing how 
people are to treat one another that rational people will agree to accept, for their mutual 
benefit, on the condition that others follow those rules as well. . . .  The key idea is that 
morally binding rules are the ones that are necessary for social living. ”
®® Rachels, in Chapter 11, “The Idea of a Social Contract,” 150.
®’ Rachels, in Chapter 10, “Kant and Respect for Persons,” sect. 10.3 Kant’s 
Retributivism, 139. [The Kantian view is only one, others do not presuppose ‘free will,’ 
such as Artistotle and Hume.]
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Since the responsibility to obey laws comes with freedom, blameworthiness and 
desert -  as a result of knowledge of these laws -  are seen as morally justified reasons for 
punishment.
Proportion Principle
According to the second retribution principle, the guilty should not be punished more 
or less than he/she deserves, but only to the extent that he/she deserves. This implies that 
punishment must be proportional to the harm caused.
Punishment is an action of taking away from the wrongdoer, be it in the form of 
monetary possessions or harming in the form of incapacitation. This is serving harm with 
equal harm. This perspective of punishment is criticized because if causing harm is seen 
as ‘bad,’ then the infliction of more harm or the increase in the amount of harm being 
caused in society through punishment is ‘worse.’ This criticism follows the sayings ‘turn 
the other cheek’ and embraces the values of forgiveness and beneficence.
But to retributivists, serving punishment is seen as a second and different type of 
harm than the first. For sanctioned punishment is a harm that is a consequence of, or a 
reaction to, the first harm -  the wrong. As a reaction to the first harm, a harm against 
harm, even if it increases the overall amoimt of harm being caused, is just because it is 
deserved (the third principle) and it is necessary because it treats the criminal as a fi"ee 
and equal member of society.®’
®’ Primoratz, 69.
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Desert Principle
The retributivist view opposes the common convictions®® that we ought to ‘turn the 
other cheek,’ or ‘not render evil for evil.’ Retributivists argue that “man ought to be bad 
towards badness, to take ill the evil done to him, to harm those that harm him. As a man 
has done, so it should be requited to him; he has deserved it by his act.”®"* Retribution is 
in this way an act of reciprocity, punishment is something that the person on whom it is 
inflicted has deserved; therefore it is morally justified, and legitimate.®®
Since the wrong-doer, according to the first principle, is rational, free, and equal; 
when one harms another in a community, one is infringing on the rights and respect of 
the harmed as an equally free person. Wrongdoers are violating the victim’s entitlements 
by diminishing her value as an equally free member of society.®® Therefore, desert is a 
result of the “moral injury as damage to the realization of a victim’s value, or damage to 
acknowledgement of the victim’s value, accomplished through behavior whose meaning 
is such that the victim is diminished in value.”®’ So to ensure equality and respect for all 
rationally choosing persons, not only must we punish to restore respect to the harmed, but
®® Primoratz, 70. Primoratz notes that “This standpoint is opposed to Socrates’ 
convictions that ‘we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to any one, whatever evil 
we may have suffered from him’, [Plato, Crito, 49c (Jowett).] as well as to Plato’s view 
that ‘it is never right to harm anyone at any time,’ [Plato, The Republic, 335e (D. Lee).]”
®"* Primoratz, 70, Note 13, quoting G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ilber die 
Rechtsphilosophie, 1818-1831, ed. K.-H. llting (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1973- 
74), vol. l ,p . 274; 3, p. 319.
®® Ibid.
®® Jean Hampton, “Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of 
Retribution,” UCLA Law Review, 39:1659 (August, 1992.) : 11 of 28.
®’ Hampton, “Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs:...,” 11 -1 2 .
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we must also punish to ensure respect for the harmer. We respect their choice to commit 
a crime as a choice they willingly made, and thus respect and respond to that choice with 
punishment.
Retribution is a justification for punishment that views the punished as ‘ends in 
themselves.’®* And the reason and justification for punishment is that of desert, hased on 
the premise that the person has broken the law or social contract,®® thus one is deserving 
of punishment. One is not being punished for a consequentialist reason -  for the 
restoration or betterment of the self (the perpetrator) or the betterment of society.
Instead, one is being punished based upon what one has done and what one deserves. In 
a sense, the theory is backward-looking,®® in that it looks back on one’s obligations to 
society as a member of society and judgment is based upon what has been done, not what 
can be done in the future.
Since wrongs are voluntary and punishment is proportionate to the wrong, it follows 
that “penal desert constitutes not just a necessary, but a sufficient reason for 
punishment.”®’ This means that punishment is justified because it is a deserved response 
-  the return of suffering for moral injury. “Punishment in the form of retribution thus
®* Rachels, 138. Referring to Kant “we could describe punishing someone as 
“respecting him as a person” or as “treating him as an end-in-himself.” ” “for Kant, 
treating someone as an “end-in-himself’ means treating him as a rational being."
®® Rachels, 144. Referring to Thomas Hobbes’ idea of a social contract.
®® Primoratz, 12. See also Dorsey D. Ellis Jr., “Symposium: Punitive Damages: 
Article: Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages.” Southern California 
Law Review 56 (November 1982). 3. “Retribution is backward-looking (ex-post) and 
provides a complete reason for imposing a detriment.”
®’ Duff, "Legal Punishment", 8. If we punish, then it is deserved. If it is deserved, 
then we punish.
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implies desert, which in turn requires that the person being punished must, by a fair 
procedure, be found to have chosen to commit an act that has been authoritatively 
declared wrongful.
Benefits and Detriments of Retribution 
Retribution morally justifies (1) how the individual as well as the community as a 
whole is the harmed party, such that when a wrong occurs the value of the victim and the 
community is diminished; (2) why punishment is due only to those who fi-eely choose to 
perform unjust acts, since everyone is a rational, free, and equal member of the 
community; and (3) why imposing degrading through punishment does not demean them, 
but respects them as a person and the harm imposed equals the moral injury they have 
caused to others.^^ It is consistent with maintaining and treating all members in society 
who meet the qualifications as rational, free, and equal persons, and in turn justifies the 
existence of the system of punishment.
The theory of retribution focuses on answering the question of why we punish. It 
ethically justifies the act of punishing by deeming it deserved. But justifying punishment 
goes further. How do we determine what type of punishment is just? It is here that the 
theory of retribution falls short.
Retribution calls for punishment proportionate to the harm caused; this is not a 
normatively applied answer. Measuring harm, from stealing $5 to a loss of a life, is not 
that simple. Retribution, particularly in the case of punitive damages, fails to specifically
Ellis Jr., “Symposium: Punitive Damages: Article: Fairness and Efficiency in the 
Law of Punitive Damages,” 3.
Gerard V. Bradley, “Retribution and the Secondary Aims of Punishment”, The 
American Journal o f  Jurisprudence, 44 -  105, (The University of Notre Dame, 1999). 
[Supports how retribution considers and benefits the community as a whole.]
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guide us in how severely to punish. Although retribution boasts the principle of 
proportionality, this is easier said than done. For instance, how is society to measure 
noneconomic and heinous wrongs for punitive damages, for “heinousness cannot be 
assigned a straightforward dollar value.” '̂̂  How are we to determine the amount of unfair 
advantage gained by a civil wrong if nominal damages have already been calculated 
through compensatory damages?
The theory of retribution alone gives no guidelines for such determinations. It also 
misrepresents what it is about crime that makes it deserving of punishment; what makes 
murder, or rape, or theft, or assault a criminal wrong, deserving of punishment, is surely 
the wrongful harm that it does to the individual victim -  not the supposed unfair 
advantage that the criminal takes over all those who obey the law.^^ The wrongful harms 
can at least be compared to the existing state statutes, but the unfair advantage is vague 
and hard to detail. Advantages the defendant may possess may include their economic 
worth, status in society, etc. -  possessions that existed prior to the wrong. How are those 
to factor or not factor into the weight of the harm?^^
The problem of measuring harm was recently addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court
^  Galant and Luban, 17. 
Ibid.
Chapter One discusses the nine judicial guidelines that were established by Bowden 
V. Caldor, Inc., 350 Md. 4; 710 A.2d 267; 1998 Md. LEXIS 407. These guidelines were 
established to be used upon appeal of a large punitive damages award, to evaluate if an 
award was excessive. Included in these guidelines were the any of the punitive damages 
awards the defendant had already paid in regards to the harm, and the defendant’s 
economic standing -  to ensure the award would not cause bankruptcy,
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in the case of BMW v. Gore^^ The guidelines by the Court advise that punitive damages 
amounts must be in proportion to the compensatory damages and the existing similar 
state statutes. The Court does not give a set ratio, but does say it must be in proportion 
and not out of proportion. The Court also states that the aggravating factors of the wrong 
must be taken into consideration and recognizes a gradient o f wrongs, but there is no 
specific dollar amount assigned to these wrongs, except for what is already set forth in 
the state statutes.
Despite this detriment, the theory of retribution fiilfills the primary aim of 
punishment, for society must first justify the means before the ends, why to punish before 
it can punish. When the courts advise, “Punitive damages serve retribution and 
deterrence” -  retribution is synonymous to punishment and deterrence refers to 
prevention. Retribution represents the act of disapproval society expresses to wrongs 
committed in the community and its principles justify the act and remain apart fi'om the 
consequences of the act. “When a punishment is deserved, when it is a retribution and 
execution of justice, it is thereby morally justified; it is irrelevant whether, at the same 
time, it does or does not have those consequences in which utilitarians claim to have 
found its moral justification;”^̂  such as deterrence. But the secondary purpose or end 
goal of punishment, determining how or the amount of punishment, is better served by 
other theories of punishment such as deterrence, a Utilitarian view of punishment.
See Chapter One referring to BMW of North America, Inc., v. Ira Gore, Jr. 517 
U.S. 559; 116 S. Ct. 1589; 134 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1996). The U.S. Supreme Court guidelines 
advised that punitive damages must be proportionate to compensatory damages and 
similar state statutes.
Primoratz, 12.
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The Utilitarian Theory o f  Punishment 
Utility represents “that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, 
advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness ... or ... to prevent the happening of mischief, 
pain, evil or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered.”^̂  Utilitarian theories 
(moral, legal, and political) are based on the principle of utility, “that principle which 
approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it 
appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in 
question ... to promote or to oppose that happiness.”’*’ The principle of utility relies upon 
the human rational choice, and argues that this choice is subject to governance by pain 
and pleasure.
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
m a s t e r s , a n d  pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we 
ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand 
the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and 
effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do and in all 
we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our 
subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. ... The principle 
o f utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of 
that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands 
of reason and of law.”
Since our choices are governed by subjection to pleasure and pain, utilitarian theories 
conclude that the measure of pleasure and pain is the determinate for what is right or 
wrong, just or unjust. The Utilitarian view holds the basic tenet that an action is morally 
good if it brings the greatest amount of good or happiness to the most persons affected by
^  Jeremy Bentham, “An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,” in 
Philosophic Classics Volume IV: Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Forrest E. Baird 
and Walter Kaufmann (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1997), 6.
’* Ibid.
”  Bentham, “An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,” 5.
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that action and its consequences.
Utilitarian views in general attempt to justify how the state should punish, with aims 
of deterrence, rehabilitation, or education.”  To Utilitarians, crime is viewed as a social 
problem that disrupts the peace and harmony in the community. Therefore a 
governmental system is established to deal with any harm to social harmony. If crime is 
a problem, then punishment is a means to resolve that problem. The need to deal with 
crime, or any type of behavior that is detrimental to the good of society, is resolved by 
establishing an institution that serves punishment to and for the community. Punishment 
is a means for handling the problem of crime and controlling behaviors that may harm the 
community or its individual members.
The utilitarian view ethically justifies punishment by requiring the imposition of harm 
to result in the greatest amount of happiness or good for the person being punished, the 
victim, and/or society. In this sense, the Utilitarian justification for punishment is based 
upon the consequences or outcomes of the punishment. “The evil inflicted on the person 
punished is morally justified because punishment has consequences which are good and 
to such a degree [the consequences] outweigh both [the evil inflicted] and the good 
consequences of any alternative reaction to law-breaking behavior.”’^
The main positive consequences of the Utilitarian view of punishment include (1) the 
prevention of harm, through deterrence and rehabilitation, and (2) the satisfaction to the 
harmed or victim, through compensation or vindictive satisfaction.”  Since deterrence is
”  Primoratz, 11. Distinguishes three varieties of the utilitarian view of punishment, 
‘deterrence, reformation, educative.”
”  Ibid., 10.
”  Ibid., 19.
87
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
referred to in the legal system as a justification of punitive damages,’  ̂I will first address 
the Utilitarian theory of deterrence.
Deterrence
According to the Utilitarian theory, punishment is morally justified by deterrence in 
two ways: specific deterrence and general deterrence. Specific or particular deterrence 
refers to prevention of the wrong by “influencing the behavior of the actual offender, so 
as to get her to desist from repeating her misdeed.”’  ̂ General deterrence as punishment 
serves to prevent others in the community fi'om committing the same offense by setting 
an example of unwanted punishment (displeasure) as a result. Therefore, punishment for 
deterrence serves two good consequences -  to discourage, or attempt to prevent future 
wrongs, by the initial wrongdoer as well as by others in the community.
Benefits and Detriments of Deterrence 
Unlike the retributive theory, the Utilitarian view is forward looking. If the 
justification of the act of punishment is dependent upon its consequences, then it is only 
after punishment, that one can then see if it was justified by its result. This can be seen as 
using the punishment as a “means to an end.” ”
75 Supra, Civil Remedies. See also Sharkey, 6. Punitive damages in legal doctrine 
has been stated to serve retribution and deterrence. Other utilitarian theories of 
punishment such as rehabilitation or restorative justice are not specifically cited as 
purposes for punitive damages.
76 Primoratz, 19.
”  Rachels, 136. Since the purpose of punishing the criminal is in pursuit of a 
particular end, it is separate or different fiom the criminaTs current state.
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Therefore, the Utilitarian justification of the purpose of punishment does not first 
justify the act prior to the action, regardless of whether or not the punishment actually 
deters. Since the Utilitarian view focuses on the end or consequence to justify 
punishment, and if the main purpose of punishment is the intent to deter, deterrence can 
be achieved regardless of whether or not the accused is guilty. Oddly enough, therefore, 
under the Utilitarian theory, the punishment of even an innocent person could be justified 
with the intent only to deter.’®
Retributivists argue that deterrence as a sole purpose removes punishment from the 
sphere of justice. They argue that whether or not a punishment is deserved is the only 
question that concerns justice. Whether or not it deters, may be a question asked, but it is 
not one of justice, but rather one of social fact.
The Humanitarian theory [Utilitarian] removes from Punishment the 
concept of Desert. But the concept of desert is the only connecting link 
between punishment and justice. It is only as deserved or undeserved that 
a sentence can be just or unjust [serving justice as opposed to morally 
justified]. I do not here contend that the question ‘Is it deserved?’ is the 
only one we can reasonably ask about punishment. We may very properly 
ask whether it is likely to deter others and to reform the criminal. But 
neither of these two last questions is a question about justice.. . .  Thus 
when we cease to consider what the criminal deserves and consider only 
what will cure him or deter others, we have tacitly removed him from the 
sphere of justice altogether; instead of a person, a subject of rights, we 
now have a mere object, a patient, a “case.”
The deterrence theory is challenged in two aspects: (1) whether punishment is
morally and legally justified if it deters, and (2) whether punishment is still justified if it
does not deter. Deterrence predicates that all crime is “pathological,” or what can be
’® C.S. Lewis, “The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment.” in Reason and 
Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems o f  Philosophy. 7* ed. ed. Joel 
Feinberg, (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1989). 450.
Lewis; 448.
89
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
interpreted as a bad decision, and that this bad decision can be modified by weighing the 
consequences. In order for a deterrent to affect human actions, the person must consider 
or reflect upon his act before performing it. There is a wide range of thought that is 
possible prior to actions being performed, fi'om little planning, such as a spontaneous 
offense, or with systematic planning, such as a premeditated offense. It can be argued 
that many wrongs are committed in the ‘heat of passion’ or with very little rational 
consideration for the consequences. Wrongs without thought cannot be deterred by 
punishment, for there is no opportunity to consider the consequences. Wrongs committed 
with thought are not necessarily deterred by punishment because the risks have been 
considered and the appropriate adjustments have been made to account for them. 
Therefore, it can be argued that punishment does not always deter.
Despite the criticisms, the existence of an institution of punishment must exert some 
control over wrongs to society as opposed to its nonexistence. For instance in the case of 
BMW V. Gore, after the initial judgment for the punitive damages award of $4 million, 
BMW immediately changed its nationwide policy to include full disclosure of all repairs 
made to its cars prior to sale.®’ So in this case, the large punitive damages award 
succeeded in instilling immediate deterrence for the defendant. Of course this situation 
raises the question of whether or not a smaller initial award would have had the same 
result. But previous cases show that it did not:
®° BMW V. Gore, 517 U.S. 559; 116 S. Ct. 1589; 134 L. Ed. 2d 809; 1996 U.S. 
LEXIS 3390. From Summary, “The distributor promptly amended its nationwide policy 
so as to require full disclosure of all repairs. Following the trial court's denial of the 
distributor's motion to set aside the punitive damages award, the distributor appealed.”
®' See Chapter One for case details.
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Just months before Dr. Gore’s case went to trial, the jury in a similar 
lawsuit filed by another Alabama BMW purchaser found that BMW’s 
failure to disclose paint repair constituted fraud. Yates v. BMW o f North 
America, Inc. [This case resulted in an awarding of comparable 
compensatory damages, but the jury for the Yates trial awarded no 
punitive damages.] Before the judgment in this case, BMW changed its 
policy by taking steps to avoid the sale of any refinished vehicles in 
Alabama and two other States. When the $4 million verdict was returned 
in this case, BMW promptly instituted a nationwide policy of full 
disclosure of all repairs, no matter how minor.
Further, there is more to deterrence than the simple attempt at prevention through 
intimidation. Although prevention is fundamental, punishment through deterrence helps 
structure the moral education and habits of society.®® Punishment not only deters through 
the fear or avoidance of a result, it also deters because it strengthens the public moral 
code. Justifying punishment through deterrence sends a message to all members of 
society that society is willing and able to do what it must to establish social order 
according to the agreed upon laws. “The idea that punishment is a concrete expression of 
society’s disapproval of an act helps to form and strengthen the public’s moral code and 
thereby creates conscious and unconscious inhibitions against committing a crime.”®'* In
®® BMW of North America, Inc., v. Ira Gore, Jr. No. 94-896. 517 U.S. 559; 116 S. Ct. 
1589; 134 L. Ed. 2d 809; 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3390. See Opinion by Judge J. Stevens, I., 
text above Footnote 8. As well as see Footnote 8 describing the judgment of Yates v. 
BMW of North America, Inc., 642 So. 2d 937 (Ala. 1993). “In Yates, the plaintiff also 
relied on the 1983 nondisclosure policy, but instead of offering evidence of 983 repairs 
costing more than $300 each, he introduced a bulk exhibit containing 5,856 repair bills to 
show that petitioner had sold over 5,800 new BMW vehicles without disclosing that they 
had been repaired.”
®® Gordon Hawkins, “Punishment and Deterrence: The Educative, Moralizing, and 
Habituative Effects”, in Theories o f  Punishment, ed. Stanley Grupp, (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1971), 164.
®̂* Hawkins, “Punishment and Deterrence:...,”166. (taken from quoting Andenaes, 
Johannes, General Prevention -  Illusion or Reality?, 141, in Theories o f  Punishment, ed. 
Stanley Grupp. 1971)
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this case, deterrence as a goal or aim for punishment not only tries to prevent but also 
socializes citizens through social control. For example:
The Madison Parks Commission,... asked the City Council to remove 
asphalt under playground equipment in city parks. The asphalt, would be 
replaced by softer materials,... Mark Peterson, parks operations analyst 
[said,] ‘It’s a good idea, since (liability lawsuit) settlements are going 
through the roof.’®®
In this sense, punishment as a deterrent gives opportunity to and prevents further 
wrongs, and provides a system to support moral codes in society.®  ̂ Referring back to the 
principle of utility, these are considered good results. Whether or not punishment 
actually does deter, and whether or not punishment does educate and contribute to social 
control, regardless of its hypothetical consequences. Utilitarians argue it is practical and 
justified because it generates good (as opposed to bad) goals or aims for legal 
punishment.
Although the Utilitarian view alone fails to justify legal punishment, retribution 
fulfills the initial justification for punishment -  desert, while the Utilitarian view justifies 
how much to punish -  enough to deter. Deterrence alone is not enough to justify why we 
punish, in place of retribution. Therefore, although deterrence may aim for good results, 
it alone cannot be used to create a system of legal punishment that serves justice in 
society. It may be a benefiting factor, an aim, and a guide to how we punish, but it alone 
should not be used to formulate, structure, regulate, or support the legal system of 
punishment. Nor can Retribution alone govern how we punish. This shows that when
®® Marc S. Galanter, “The Day After the Litigation Explosion,” 18. from Waller, 
“Liability Fear Spurs Park Safety Steps,” Wis. State J., August 28, 1985, at 4, col. 2.
®̂ This is consistent with the purpose of punitive damages as stated in the 
Introduction, preserving the peace.
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criticizing punishment theory and policy, it is important to clarify the two aspects of 
punishment -  why and how -  and to morally justify the why before the how. Retribution 
tells us that if  someone wrongs another, punishment is justified since it is deserved. 
Deterrence tells us to punish with the intent to deter. Both endorse punishment in order 
to uphold the law, enforce social control, and convey social expectations. So these 
theories compliment each other in the moral justification of punishment.
Applying Punishment to Plaintiff’s Receipts
Since punitive damages’ main purpose is to punish justified by the concepts of 
retribution and deterrence, how does punishment apply to the plaintiff receiving the 
award?
Deterrence, alone, does not particularly enforce who should receive punitive 
damages, for the recipient of the award does not necessarily support nor does it 
undermine deterrence. The act of paying the award is the punishment and the deterrent to 
the defendant. And the defendant and society as a whole would be deterred regardless of 
who receives the punitive damages. The defendant is deterred because the punishment 
itself, not because the payment is given to the plaintiff. Society and others in turn are 
deterred by knowledge of punishment for harm, and social deterrence is not changed by 
who the recipient of the damages may be. Although this view may be used to support 
either distribution of the award, the plaintiff or the state, it requires neither in particular. 
There is no distinction. Therefore, I argue that the justification of punitive damages 
specifically being awarded to the plaintiff is not fully supported by deterrence.
The justifications for punishment -  retribution and deterrence -  work together to
support punitive damages policy, which is the awarding of additional damages other than
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compensation -  but they alone do not require that the punitive damages award be 
received by the plaintiff, for retribution justifies punishment be served to the guilty by a 
legal institution based on just deserts, and deterrence determines to what extent, and to 
what aim punishment should be levied. However, both retribution and deterrence 
justifications for punishment can be fulfilled by the state receiving the award.
The function of retribution is to justify the act of punishment, because it is deserved. 
Guilt is established prior to punishment. The victim is relevant to the punishment in 
order to weigh the amount of harm. According to retribution, the amount of punishment 
should equal the harm. The outcome of the punishment, whether it does affect or how it 
affects the victim, is not a factor for justification.
Deterrence principles, on the other hand, assert that the effect justifies punishment, 
and that the aim of deterrence to the punished and the others in society are both essential. 
But deterrence to the punished and society can be achieved with the state receiving the 
punitive damages, therefore it does not require that the award go to the plaintiff.
Therefore, the existence and application of punitive damages policy can be justified 
by the punishment principles of retribution and deterrence. But the procedure of punitive 
damages going to the plaintiff is not justified by punishment theories since the goals of 
retribution and deterrence can be fulfilled by the state receiving the award.
So, are there punishment theories other than retribution and deterrence that can help 
explain who should get the award? Although it is not commonly referred to, vindictive 
satisfaction is a Utilitarian punishment goal, and does contribute to the support of the 
plaintiff receiving the award.
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Vindictive Satisfaction 
If we all appealed to altruism when we have been harmed, perhaps the satisfaction of 
vengeance would not be a justification for punishment. The support for satisfying 
vengeance may not be at the top of the list for moral values, but it is a historically 
supported requirement for governing institutions -  just as there is a need to punish for 
reasons to enforce laws and social control, so there is a need to satisfy vindictiveness for 
those who are victims of those wrongs. Punishment is justified since it contributes to the 
satisfaction of vengeance for the victim. The utilitarian views of punishment justify 
bringing more good than harm, and the satisfaction of vengeance through punishment is 
viewed as a resulting good to the victim and society.®’
This satisfaction is a useful motivator to the individual victim as well as, “to the 
public; indeed, it is necessary. It amplifies social control, which in-tum supports the 
legal punishment system. It is this vindictive satisfaction which sets the tongues of 
witnesses in motion; it is this which animates the accuser and engages him in the public 
service, in spite of the embarrassments, the expenses, the enmities to which it exposes 
him.”®® Vindication of honor is prevalent to “a status-oriented society that typified 
England”®̂ and has carried over to the United States. One of the main reasons the legal 
system is given the authority to punish is to ensure individuals do not take justice and
®’ Primoratz, 21 - 22. The type “of satisfaction attainable by punishment [if any,] is 
vindictive^ Punishment of an offender not only satisfies the victim, but also “all those 
who, for whatever reason, feel indignation at the offense committed and want its 
perpetrator punished.”
®® Ibid. Quoting J. Bentham, Theory o f Legislation, trans. From the French of E. 
Dumont by R. Hildreth, 2d ed. (London: Triibner, 1871), 309.
®̂ Ellis, 6.
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punishment in their own hands -  to avoid a chaotic society, and to maintain order and 
self-control. The courts were obligated to assist in deterring personal dueling or feuding 
which could lead to persons taking punishment into their own hands.^”
The desire for revenge or satisfaction leads to disorder if the victim 
resorts to self-help rather than to the judicial process. Avoidance of the 
social disorder caused by duels, feuds, and the more extreme forms of self- 
help that historians denominated ‘bastard feudalism,’ was a major 
influence in the establishment and maintenance of an effective judicial 
mechanism.^*
The establishment of a legal system to serve punishment legitimizes the act of 
punishment”  and maintains social order by ceasing the need for vigilante justice.
Moreover, vengeance satisfaction to the plaintiff is a fitting justification for 
punishment in civil law. As explained in the Introduction of this thesis, civil law is 
viewed as the private law arena. Viewing vengeance satisfaction as a justification for 
punitive damages, in application and distribution to the plaintiff, affirms the private law 
aspect of civil law. The purpose of satisfying private vengeance for the plaintiff^® was a 
“characteristic of insult cases that makes exemplary [or punitive] damages seem 
appropriate ... [since] they evoke a compelling desire for redress or satisfaction on the
^  Rustad and Koenig. 5., And also see Ellis, 7. Both refer to 2 W. Holdsworth, 
History o f  English Law 416-18 (3d ed. 1923).
”  Ellis, 7.
”  Binder, 328.
”  Rustad and Koenig. 5. “Clarence Morris believed that the remedy [punitive 
damages] functioned as an ‘orderly, legal retaliation ...to be preferred to ...private 
vengeance which will disturb the peace of the community.” Quoting Simon Greenleaf, A 
Treatise on the Law of Evidence 240 (16th ed. 1899) (asserting that punitive damages 
remedy abandons principle of compensation, which is purpose of tort action). 253, at 240 
(arguing that exemplary damages should only be awarded in cases where traditional 
methods of damage assessment are inapplicable).
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part of the victim.””  Awarding punitive damages to the plaintiff satisfied the desire for 
vengeance and in turn assisted in the maintenance of social order. Vengeance satisfaction 
through monetary gain provides an incentive for the plaintiff to bring the crime to legal 
suit instead of dealing with the injustice on their own; since “[cjompensatory damages do 
not always provide sufficient incentive” ®̂ for the average person to bring wrong-doings 
to court.
The American tradition of punitive damages is modeled after English law. In Genay 
V. Norris,^ in 1784, instead of settling a quarrel with a duel of pistols, the defendant 
offered the plaintiff a poisoned drink which caused extreme and excruciating pain. 
Vindictive damages were awarded against the defendant, who was a physician and could 
not plead ignorance from the operation and powerful effects of the poison.^’ Considering 
the plaintiff was initially ready to settle the dispute with a duel, and the added insult of 
trickery by a professional, convinced the jury that the plaintiff was “entitled to very 
exemplary damages.” ®̂ Early American punitive damages cases continued to award 
punitive damages for conduct that reflected willful and wanton indignities, and to protect 
social order.”  Thus, although not commonly referred to in the modem doctrine of
”  Ellis, 7.
”  Rustad and Koenig. 9.
”  Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6 (1784). Cited in Rustad and Koenig. 6.
97 Ibid.
”  Ibid.
”  Rustad and Koenig, 6. Referring to Coryell v. Colbaugh 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791)., 
Bateman v. Goodyear, 12 Conn. 575, 575-77 (1838)., Boston Manufacturing Co. v. Fiske 
3 F. Cas. 957 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (No. 1681).
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justification of punitive damages, vindictive satisfaction is historically supported by civil 
law and one of the original purposes of punitive damages.
Punishment of any type, be it incarceration or monetary fines, can be argued to help 
satisfy the victim and society’s need for vindication, as long as the punishment fits the 
crime. Ideally, the appeal to altruism and the greatest good for the greatest number 
would argue that for the satisfaction of vengeance, punitive damages should be received 
by the state. The victim should be satisfied with the very act of punishing the wrong­
doer, regardless of who receives damages. But appeasement of the victim should be 
specifically addressed by civil law, since civil wrongs are defined as personal wrongs’*’*’ -  
personal to the victim who brings the case to court. So, the payment of punitive damages 
specifically to the victim, instead of the state, for the satisfaction vengeance is fitting for 
civil law procedure.
100 As explained supra, page ix. Introduction, section Civil Law.
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CHAPTER 4
HONOR AND INSULT 
When justifying any act, we most often refer to its purpose or utility. As noted in the 
previous chapter, punitive damages’ first and foremost purpose is punishment. Punitive 
damages punishment goals include deterrence, vindictive satisfaction, and punishment for 
corporate entities. But the goals of punishment do not completely justify why the 
plaintiff should receive the damages. So we turn to the purposes of punitive damages that 
are not a direct result of punishment. This chapter reviews the historical development of 
the purposes of punitive damages, to unveil that the policy also served to restore honor 
and repair insult to the plaintiffs.
The personal nature’ of civil lawsuits results in specific attention to the personal 
insult of the victim. Since the correction of personal effacement by civil wrongs was not 
included in compensatory damages.® So punitive damages were awarded to encompass
’ See Introduction and other chapters where civil law is referred to private law arena 
since the plaintiff is responsible, with the assistance of his/her lawyers, for the pursuit of 
justice in a civil case, as opposed to criminal law where the police and other law 
enforcement agencies are obligated to assist in enforcing the law.
® This does not mean that compensatory damages cannot be awarded for 
noneconomic damages, pain and suffering, and the like... but compensatory damages are 
most often distinct from punitive damages for this reason. The specific application of 
compensatory damages can, and does, vary from state to state; and is dependent upon the 
type of case, the type of harm, and the varying opinions of the state’s or case’s judge and 
jury. Thus for the purposes of this thesis, I will maintain the general definition of 
compensatory damages, which focuses on concrete, economic, nominal harms. In 
contrast, punitive damages are always only awarded when ‘further’ harm is established,
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the satisfaction of insult and vengeance to the plaintiff, and in order to restore his honor 
and self-respect.® Previous to punitive damages awards, insult and honor were 
uncompensable losses.
Insult
Awarding of punitive damages in order to recognize insult as a compensable injury 
developed in the early 1700’s.'* The earliest case cited came from England, Huckle v. 
MoneyP in 1763. Exemplary damages were awarded for the defendant causing the 
plaintiff “feelings of wounded pride and dignity.”  ̂ But considering insult as a reason for
malice, willful intent, or in certain cases of strict liability. But the specific scope of this is 
beyond this thesis. This thesis will focus on procedures after punitive damages awards 
have been deemed necessary, which implies desert and guilt. The main concern of this 
thesis is: after punitive damages have been deemed applicable by judge and jury, 
regardless of the amount (excessiveness issue discussed in Chapter One), who should 
receive the damages?
® John Rawls, “A Liberal Theory of Justice,” in the introduction by Pojman, L.(ed), 
Ethical Theory Classical and Contemporary Readings, 583. “. . .  the chief primary goods 
at the disposition of society are rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and 
wealth. (Later on . . .  the primary good of self respect has a central place.)”
'* Ellis, 6-7.
® Huckle V. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
 ̂See also Rookes Appellant; and Barnard and Others Respondents, [House Of 
Lords.], [1964] AC 1129,21 January 1964, (c)2001 The Incorporated Council of Law 
Reporting for England & Wales. Referring to historical cases to set precedence for the 
purposes of punitive damages.. .“But there are also cases in the books where the awards 
given cannot be explained as compensatory, and I propose therefore to begin by 
examining the authorities in order to see how far and in what sort of cases the exemplary 
principle has been recognised. The history of exemplary damages is briefly and clearly 
stated by Professor Street in Principles of the Law of Damages (1962) at p. 28. They 
originated just 200 years ago. ..In Huckle v. Money the plaintiff was a journeyman printer 
who had been taken into custody in the course of the raid on the North Briton. The issue 
of liability having already been decided the only question was as to damages and the jury 
gave him oe300. A new trial was asked for on the ground that this figure was "most
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damages did not merely repair the plaintiffs hurt feelings. In eases involving intangible 
losses, establishing insult explains the importance given to the consideration of intent and 
motive. Intent to insult increases the aggravation of the harm, and thus gives reason for 
further or increased punitive damages. In Sears v. Lyons^ “the jury was instructed that it 
‘might consider not only the mere pecuniary damage sustained by the plaintiff, but also 
the intention with which the fact had been done, whether for insult or injury.’ ”® The 
consideration of insult adding to injury is also evident in For de v. Skinner,'^ where the 
jury was instructed to note that according to the evidence, the harm included “malicious 
intent imputed of ‘taking down their pride,’ ... [and should be considered] an aggravation 
and ought to increase the damages.”’*’ So in this case, the intent to insult gave the jury 
reason to increase the amount of punitive damages.
Insult in addition to malice, willfulness, and other aggravating factors in the awarding 
of punitive damages continues to be considered today, although not always mentioned in
outrageous." The plaintiff was employed at a weekly wage of one guinea; he had been in 
custody for only about six hours and had been used "very civilly by treating him with 
beefsteaks and beer." It seems improbable that his feelings of wounded pride and dignity 
would have needed much further assuagement; and indeed the Lord Chief Justice said 
nl08 that the personal injury done to him was very small, so that if the "jury had been 
confined by their oath to consider mere personal injury only, perhaps oe20 damages 
would have been thought sufficient..." But they had done right in giving exemplary 
damages. The award was upheld.
’ Sears v. Lyons, 171 Eng. Rep. 658 (K.B. 1818). Cited in Ellis, 7.
® Ellis, 7. Referring to Sears v. Lyons.
 ̂Forde v. Skinner, 172 Eng. Rep. 687 (Horsham Assizes 1830). Cited in Ellis, 7.
’* Ellis, 7. Referring to Forde v. Skirmer.
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the forefront of reasons for punitive damages.” Insult, like vengeance, to the altruistic 
ideal should not be a valued. But the reparation of insult is important, because personal 
insult bruises a person’s honor. And honor was a historically significant personal value, 
and honor continues to be an important personal and social value in our community.
Honor
The importance of personal honor in society is evident in professional, social, and 
family structures. “Honour is the value of a person in his own eyes,’ as well as ‘in the 
eyes of his society.”’® To the individual, honor “is his estimation of his own worth, his 
claim to pride, but it is also the acknowledgement of that claim, his excellence recognized
” See for example Industrial Technologies, Inc., and Richard Hill v. Jacobs Bank; 
Jacobs Bank v. Industrial Technologies, Inc., and Richard Hill 1011966,1012064 
Supreme Court of Alabama 872 So. 2d 819; 2003 Ala. LEXIS 130 (April 25,2003). 
Opinion by Justice Woodall, Section II. Industrial’s Appeal “Indeed, "punitive damages 
are recoverable in a conversion case when the evidence shows legal malice, willfulness, 
insult, or other aggravating circumstances." Schwertfeger v. Moorehouse, 569 So. 2d 
322, 324 (Ala. 1990) [**20] (emphasis added). '"Punitive damages [in an action for 
conversion] are justified when the evidence discloses the conversion to have been 
committed in known violation of law and of owner's rights, with circumstances of insult, 
or contumely, or malice.'" Roberson v. Ammons, 477 So. 2d 957, 961 (Ala. 1985) 
(quoting Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Tisdale, 46 Ala. App. 50, 57, 237 So. 2d 855, 859-60 
(1970)). "The conversion committed in known violation of the law and of plaintiffs' 
rights is itself legal insult, contumely, or malice sufficient to justify an award of punitive 
damages." 477 So. 2d at 961 (emphasis added). Consistent with Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11- 
20(a), a punitive-damages award will not be vacated where the evidence supporting the 
award is "of such quality and weight that a jury of reasonable and fair-minded persons 
could find by clear and convincing evidence," Ex parte Norwood [*827] Hodges Motor 
Co., 680 So. 2d 245, 249 (Ala. 1996), that the conversion was associated with "malice, 
willfulness, insult, or other aggravating circumstances."”
’® Ellis, 6. quoting from Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Honor and Social Status,” in Honor and 
Shame: The Values o f  a Mediterranean Society, J.G. Péristiany éd., (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1966), 21.
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by society, his right to pride.” '® In this sense, honor is not simply an individual emotion, 
but it is also produced by social recognition to acts. If an employee does a good job, they 
are honored with verbal praise, a raise in pay, a certificate, or an award at the annual 
employee party.”  Employee of the month plaques and reserved parking spots are present 
at most places of employment. The world of academia teaches our children about social 
honor with simple lists like the ‘honor roll.’ Ceremonies and celebrations honoring 
graduates, employees of the month, or the bride to be -  by her maid of honor -  surround 
our everyday lives. Honor is not limited to the personal or emotional sphere, but is given 
and taken within society. “[Honor] implies not merely a habitual preference for a given 
mode of conduct, but the entitlement to a certain treatment from society in return.” '® 
These examples of honor are those that are due to the praise of an action. Thus an 
important aspect to honor is the deserved receipt of this recognition. Desert is an 
important aspect of honor. “Deserts is a relative term that refers to external goods; and as 
the greatest external good, we define honor. The degree of desert affects the degree 
of honor. And honor is only of its greatest when it is most deserved.”
13 Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Honor and Social Status,” 21.
Praise of an employee is not only done out of good faith, but can be found in 
company policies and taught in management courses. Praise and honor are important to 
business and correct treatment of employees. This is a reflection of the importance of 
honor and praise in our society.
'® Pitt-Rivers, 22.
1123b. 15-20.
”  NE 1123b.24-26. “A small-minded man falls short both in view of his own deserts 
and in relation to the claims of a high-minded person [who is deserving of honor], while a 
vain man exceeds his own deserts but does not exceed the high-minded.”
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Given the importance and value of honor in our society, it is not surprising that our 
legal institution, which is responsible for punishment (the taking of honor) should also 
have responsibility to take part in maintaining honor in our society. The honoring of 
citizens in the community is not limited to the ceremonial ‘keys to the city’ or awards for 
community service. Praise and honor from the government should, and does, come from 
all branches -  executive, legislative, and judicial.
Government institutions bear the responsibility of sustaining socially agreed rights 
and wrongs.'® When the government punishes, it reflects the social scorn of the wrong­
doing, and takes honor from the guilty and at the same time restores social honor to 
society and the victim. This is why it is important for the government to participate in the 
recognition and distribution of social honor to citizens. Honor is not left to the private 
sector, government participation in recognition of honorable acts is as necessary as the 
government punishing -  it maintains justice.
According to Rawls’s justice as fairness, in order to ensure justice, moral 
considerations such as ensuring equal distribution of social values are incorporated into 
the government policies.'^ Honor is considered a good that is desired, a good social 
value. That is why for situations in which one’s honor is bruised, resolution can be 
gained through “some tribunal, the ‘fount of honour’: public opinion, the monarch, or the 
ordeal of the judicial combat.”®" Another reason the legal system takes into account
'® For instance the law enforcement agencies enforce the laws that are made to ensure 
equality and prevent crime, legislative bodies make laws to ensure equal treatment in the 
work-place, enforce the minimum wage, prevent discrimination, etc....
See Chapter Two, Serving Justice, Procedural Justice.
®" Pitt-Rivers, 23.
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affronts to honor is to discourage citizens to take matters into their own hands which 
would, and did, result in private dueling and feuds, and social unrest. In general, 
promoting social control is a goal of legal punishment. Incorporating insult and honor 
into punishment supports this goal.
Therefore it is historically and communally justified for the legal system to 
incorporate in its policy some type of restoration that represents honor. Punitive damages 
awarded for the purpose of repairing insult are an example of political policy restoring 
honor.
The compensation for non-monetary injuries, unrelated to tangible losses, developed 
“from roughly the first quarter of the seventeenth century through the first quarter of the 
nineteenth century.”®' These injuries included “cases of slander, seduction, assault and 
battery in humiliating circumstances, criminal conversation, malicious prosecution, 
illegal intrusion into private dwellings and seizure of private papers, trespass onto private 
land in an offensive manner, and false imprisonment.”®® Prior to punitive damages these 
claims had no legal monetary value. And these cases entire show one common factor.
®' Ellis, 6.
®® Ellis, see n61 -  n68. Citing n61 See, e.g.. Wood v. Gunston, 82 Eng. Rep. 867 
(Banc. Sup. 1655); Townsend v. Hughes, 86 Eng. Rep. 994 (C.P. 1677). n62 See, e.g., 
Tullidge V. Wade, 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (C.P. 1769). n63 See, e.g., Benson v. Frederick, 97 
Eng. Rep. 1130 (K.B. 1766); Ash v. Ash, 90 Eng. Rep. 526 (K.B. 1701); Grey v. Grant, 
95 Eng. Rep. 794 (C.P. 1764). n64 See, e.g., Duberley v. Gunning, 100 Eng. Rep. 1226 
(K.B. 1792). Butterworth v. Butterworth & Englefield, 1920 P. 126; A. OGUS, THE 
LAW OF DAMAGES 29 n.6 (1973). n65 See, e.g., Hewlett v. Cruchley, 128 Eng. Rep. 
696 (K.B. 1813); Leith v. Pope, 96 Eng. Rep. 777 (C.P. 1780); Chambers v. Robinson, 93 
Eng. Rep. 787 (K.B. 1726). n66 See, e.g., Sharpe v. Brice, 96 Eng. Rep. 557 (C.P. 1774); 
Bruce v. Rawlins, 95 Eng. Rep. 934 (C.P. 1770); Beardmore v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 
790 (C.P. 1764); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763); Wilkes v. Wood, 98 
Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763). n67 See, e.g.. Sears v. Lyons, 171 Eng. Rep. 658 (K.B. 1818); 
Merest v. Harvey, 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C.P. 1814). n68 See, e.g., Fabrigas v. Mostyn, 96 
Eng. Rep. 549 (C.P. 1774).
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“they involved acts that resulted in affronts to the honor of the victims.”®® Therefore the 
legal system incorporated satisfaction of honor into the civil law system; punitive 
damages provides for this purpose.
Moreover, as stated earlier, the satisfaction of honor is greatest when it is most 
deserved, and in a civil law suit, it is most deserved by the plaintiff, if it is at all deserved. 
Also, due to the restoration of honor, punitive damages are, and should continue to be 
awarded to whom rightly deserves them -  the plaintiff. In the instance of offending 
honor, the victim “requires satisfaction if [he] is to return to [his] normal condition.”®'*
The plaintiff is most deserving firstly, because the damages serve as a return of his 
honor after being victimized; and secondly, the plaintiffs endeavor to bring the wrong­
doing to court and the guilty to punishment, not only for him, but also for the good of 
society. These are honorable acts. Often when pursuing a suit, “it is an extremely 
painful process, exposing the claimant to social discreditation and self-doubt.”®® Thus, 
not only is the wrong-doing an injury of honor to the plaintiff, but so is the pursuit of 
seeking justice. These insults are vindicated with a guilty punishment, and the plaintiff is 
honored with praise for a good job, or perhaps if  the judge or jury find worthy, with 
punitive damages. Therefore, the purpose of honor justifies the awarding of punitive
®® Ellis, 6. Also see Rustad and Koenig, 6, n l 19. “damages ...for mental anguish, or 
personal indignity and disgrace.” The Rule of Damages in Actions Ex Delicto, 9 Law 
Rep. 529, 535 (1847).
®'* Pitt-Rivers, 26.
25 Galanter, “The Day After the Litigation Explosion,” 11.
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damages specifically to the plaintiff because after the usually long pursuit, the award is 
deserved.®^
Serving Justice
The purposes of repairing insult and restoring honor enforce that punitive damages 
should be awarded to the plaintiff because it also ensures procedural justice. Procedural 
justice is served in two ways. First, awarding the punitive damages to the plaintiff 
restores self-respect, which is a principle of procedural justice. Self-respect is a basic 
social value which includes honor and respect from society. Since the government 
agencies are responsible for maintaining social values amongst the community, 
government agencies should actively participate in governing self-respect.®’ One way 
that the government can do this is through acknowledging the importance of self-respect 
in its policies and procedures. Since civil law is the private law arena,®® its concern for 
the restoration of the plaintiffs personal self-respect should be maintained in its policies. 
Private wrongs harm self-respect through insult. Punitive damages awarded to the 
plaintiff, instead of the state, restore this personal harm.
Second, procedural justice also states that in the government distribution of benefits 
or burdens, the excess should be distributed to the benefit of least advantaged. Civil law.
®̂ It must be noted that the award must be in proportion to what is deserved, just as in 
punishment for retribution. Punitive damages in excess of desert are not rightly deserved, 
which is why they are usually and justly appealed and struck down. See Chapter 1, 
briefly addressing the excessiveness issue of punitive damages.
®’ See Chapter Two, Serving Justice, Procedural Justice, Determined Principles of 
Justice, p. 48.
®® Disputes amongst private parties: Contracts, torts, etc...
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as described in corrective justice, weighs its participants as equals^^ when calculating 
compensation and the amount of harm caused. So civil law does not first consider the 
plaintiffs or the defendant’s actual economic or social status prior to judgment of guilt. 
So, if a guilty verdict finds that further punitive damages should be awarded, the plaintiff 
is, in the civil law arena, the least advantaged for two reasons. First, the burden pursuing 
justice is on the plaintiff and places them as the disadvantaged, since the passive system 
requires the plaintiff to take on the full initiative to pursue justice. Second, the burden of 
prosecution alone bruises the plaintiffs self-respect in the eyes of society. Add this 
insulting burden to the original injury or harm, and the plaintiff is again the least 
advantaged, regardless of their actual social and economic status.^®
So, since procedural justice principles advise that if there are burdens or benefits that 
are to be distributed, then they should benefit the least advantaged. And since punitive 
damages are an additional burden to the defendant as well as an additional benefit to who 
receives them, they should be received by the plaintiff, because the plaintiff is the least 
advantaged in the civil law procedures. The plaintiff is the least advantaged because of
See Chapter Two, Serving Justice, Correction. The status of the plaintiff and the 
defendant are not considered when calculating the amount of harm for compensation, 
only the harm itself. Participants in civil law are rendered equal before the eyes of the 
law, the only difference is the harm that was caused.
Noted, that it is possible that the plaintiff may be of great wealth and status, and the 
defendant quite the opposite. It cannot be assumed that the plaintiff is always of lower 
status economically and socially. But, for evaluative purposes, and since the civil law 
arena first judges correction as though the plaintiff and defendant are equal, when I refer 
to the least advantaged, in formal procedural terms, the plaintiff in the civil law system is 
the least advantaged or of lesser advantage than the defendant due the claim that they 
have been wronged (a victim) and due to the fact that the burden of proof is on the 
plaintiff. If the system should allow a plaintiff with more power and money to 
unlawfully persecute a defendant only because they have less power or money, that is an 
issue of judicial process prior to the awarding of punitive damages that is not in the scope 
of this paper.
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their injury, their insult to honor, and their burden of proof. All of which also make the 
plaintiff most deserving of the punitive damages award.
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CHAPTER 5
PLAINTIFF INCENTIVE 
Reminisce to the early 1900’s Old West and think about those ‘Wanted’ posters they 
used to post for criminals. According to the Library of Congress* one of the earliest 
‘Wanted’ posters that displayed a photograph was for John Wilkes Booth by the War 
Department in Washington, D.C. dated April 20, 1865, offering a $100,000 reward. At 
the bottom of the poster it stated:
LIBERAL REWARDS will be paid for any information that shall 
conduce to the arrest of either of the above named criminals, or their 
accomplices... .Let the stain of innocent blood be removed from the land 
by the arrest and punishment of the murderers. All good citizens are 
exhorted to aid public justice on this occasion. Every man should consider 
his own conscience charged with this solemn duty, and rest neither night 
nor day until it be accomplished.^
Turning to private citizens to assist in law enforcement is historically supported. As 
stated above, the government requested that every man make it his duty to assist in the 
persecution of wrongs. Today, we may assume that incentives to persecute wrongs in 
society are not warranted, but indeed they are. Even with modem technology and the 
vast law enforcement departments, there are wrongs that are sometimes only witnessed 
by the victims or by-standards. In the Old West, towns were far apart and criminals
' Library of Congress, American Treasures Exhibition website [on-line] at 
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trm075.html accessed on 8 May 2005.
 ̂Ibid. Poster can be viewed on-line as part of the Library of Congress American 
Treasures Exhibition.
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hence the private law aspect.
In addition to this, in this chapter, I argue that the complex and costly civil law 
system gives further reason that plaintiffs should be offered incentive to persecute. 
Ideally we would ask that the only incentive for justice, be justice.^ But realistically, the 
civil law system is complex and costly; and the pursuit for justice can be discouraging. 
The incentive to the plaintiff provided by civil law is also known as promoting ‘private 
attorneys general.’ This incentive, in addition to the other purposes discussed earlier, is 
an important purpose for the awarding of punitive damages. Most importantly, this 
purpose requires that the damages be awarded to the plaintiff, and not to the state.
Awarding punitive damages to the plaintiff not only completes procedural justice, 
satisfies vindictiveness, heals insult, and restores honor; it also advocates ‘private law 
enforcement.’ Also in this chapter I discuss why ‘private law enforcement’ not only 
serves the plaintiffs needs for justice, but also society’s.
 ̂The only reasons that concerned members of society should pursue a case is to right 
wrongs, to punish wrong-doers, for the good of society.
I l l
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could hide in the vast empty plains. Today, although we are closer together, criminals 
can still find some remote places to hide. And, specifically addressing the wrongs of 
civil law, wrong-doers can hide in plain site, since it is only the ‘duty’ or decision of the 
plaintiff which will uncover any injustice.
Plaintiff incentive is necessary in the arena of civil law, more so than with eriminal 
law, sinee civil persecution is reliant upon the plaintiffs decision to litigate. Civil law is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The Complex -  Passive Civil Law System 
The rules and procedures of the legal system are complex. One reason lawyers are 
regarded as professionals, along with doctors and teachers, is that these fields require 
specialized knowledge through specialized education. This specialized knowledge is 
required to participate in the legal system since there are also different laws for different 
states, different resources (other than lawyers) and different ways to access these 
resources. The policies and procedures of the legal system are not common knowledge, 
and the basic architecture creates and limits equal use of the system."* It follows, similar 
to any complex system or process, the more experienced or more familiar one is with the 
puzzle, the more advantaged. The limited equal use of the system usually plaees one 
party at a disadvantage.
This gap of advantage between participants in litigation has been explicated by Mare 
Galanter, in his article “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change.”* Galanter states that partieipants vary but can be generally classified in a 
gradient that has the “one-shotters” (those who have only occasional recourse to the 
courts) at one end and the “repeat players” (those who are engaged in many similar 
litigations over time) at the other. ̂
The repeat-players at one side of the gradient are anticipatory, prepared, and more 
resourced than the others. In addition, since repeat players frequent the system, they are
"* Marc Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speeulations on the Limits of 
Legal Change,” Law and Society Review, Vol. 9:1 (Fall 1974) : 95.
*Ibid.
 ̂Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: ...,” 97.
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able to buy professional legal services more steadily, in larger quantities, in bulk (by 
retainer) and at higher rates, in order to get services of better quality/
Most one-shotter participant claims are either “too large or too small to be managed 
routinely and rationally.”  ̂ They usually have limited resources and must stop to initially 
research the system before they can familiarize themselves with what they require to 
pursue a case.
The differences between the experienced and the inexperienced, along with the 
advantages and disadvantages, can be pointed out with almost every legal system 
(criminal or civil); any governmental transaction (paying taxes, obtaining licenses, 
registering your car), or any private transaction (applying for a loan for a major asset 
purchase, applying to college, arrangements for a wedding). Our society values, seeks, 
and pays for experience. ‘Leave it to the professionals,’ is the common phrase when one 
is faced with a complex system. But, in the pursuit for justice these differences and 
advantages do not result in perhaps a higher tax return or a smooth run wedding 
reception, these differences have the potential to be the key between justice served or 
withheld.
The differenees in these participants are not solely based upon actual social power, 
wealth, or status; but the differences “define a position of advantage in the eonfiguration 
of contending parties and indicates how those with other advantages tend to occupy this 
position of advantage.”^
 ̂Ibid., 114.
* Ibid., 98.
 ̂Ibid., 103.
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How can these differences be resolved, or at least maintained to ensure equal access 
to justice for all participants? Well, the simple answer would be that everyone needs to 
be aggressive in their education of social processes. Before you go to register your car, 
call the Department of Motor Vehicles to find out what documents are required. Before 
you decide to buy a house, get some consultation, ask someone you know who has gone 
through that experience, be informed. And before you enter into a legal transaction, 
make sure you know your rights, the limits, and the laws. Read your contracts carefully, 
and consult a lawyer. As a professor at the local community college, I often advise my 
students to be aggressive in their education -  ask questions! Granted everyone in society 
should be an active participant in transactions that involve their person. But for the 
purpose of analyzing legal procedures, we must ask for more. The difference in position 
of advantage to the participants in civil litigation is an inequality in which the legal 
system could, and should, neutralize through use o f the process. But more often than not, 
the legal system has institutional features that increase the advantageous gap between 
participants.
The civil litigation system is passive in that it must be mobilized by the claimant.***
As we have noted earlier, the burden of pursuit for litigation is on the plaintiff. If the 
plaintiff chose to dismiss the wrong, leave it for someone else, or the next victim to 
pursue, the claim is dropped. The government and law enforcement officials offer no 
assistance to the victim in pursuit of a civil suit.
The institution is also passive in that it does not regularly solicit for civil suits. The 
system is present and available, but does not go out to the world of private transactions
10 Ibid, 119. As stated earlier, the burden of litigation is on the plaintiff.
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looking for, soliciting for, or encouraging victims of wrongs to pursue suit. This 
passivity of the institution also gives advantage to the participant with more information, 
with the greater ability to overcome cost barriers, and procedural requirements.**
Probably one of the main reasons why the institution itself is not adamantly 
encouraging suits, like businesses soliciting customers, is because the system is busy. 
Reported tort cases filed in California and New York for 2002 was over 80,000 for each 
state; Nevada reported over 7,000; and New Jersey over 70,000.*^ According to the 
National Center for State Courts Caseload Highlights^^ in a study of appellate cases 
resolved in 1996 and 1997 from five state supreme courts (Florida, Georgia, Minnesota, 
Ohio, and Virginia), the number of days it took for 90 percent of mandatory appeals cases 
to be resolved ranged from 363 -8 1 8 . The American Bar Association (ABA), Appellate 
Court Performance Standards Commission recommends that state supreme courts should 
resolve 50 percent of mandatory appeals from the dates of their filings within 290 days or 
fewer.*"* And the ABA recommends that 90 percent of mandatory appeals for review
" Ibid.
See Courts Statistics Project, State Court Caseload Statistics, 2003 (National 
Center for State Courts 2004) accessed [on-line]
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Researeh/csp/2003_Files/2003_SCCS.html, 8 May 2005.
Fred Cheesman, Roger A. Hanson, and Brian J. Ostrom; Caseload Highlights: 
Examining the Work o f  State Courts, Caseload and Timelines in State Supreme Courts, 
Vol. 7 No. 2 (National Center for State Courts, December 2001). Accessed [on-line] at 
www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/esp/Highlights/Highlights_Main_Page.html on 8 May 
2005.
*"* Roger A. Hanson, Brian J. Ostrom, and Neal B. Kauder, Caseload Highlights: 
Examining the Work o f  State Courts, Timeliness in Five State Supreme Courts, Vol. 8 No. 
1 (National Center for State Courts, March 2002). Accessed [on-line] at 
www.ncsconline.org/D_Researeh/esp/Highlights/Highlights_Main_Page.html on 8 May 
2005.
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should be resolved within 365 days or fewer.'* According to the National Center for 
State Courts study for cases resolved in 1996 and 1997 in the above mentioned five 
states, the number of days from date of filing to resolution for mandatory appeals cases in 
the 90* percentile (excluding the death penalty) ranged from 318 (Minnesota), to 624 
(Ohio). Although these numbers may seem large, the study concludes that the numbers 
do vary from state to state, and that some courts are more expeditious than others. The 
“popular images of supreme courts taking painfully long periods of time to resolve their 
cases are not supported by the data.”'® Note this study encompassed appeals cases. So 
this does not include the actual time from the initial filing of the case. What this does tell 
us is that courts cases are not resolved immediately. According to the Las Vegas Justice 
Court for Clark County, Nevada; a small claim filing tentative court date is 
approximately 90 to 120 days after the claim is f i l e d . I n  summary, when filing a claim 
in civil court, patience is a virtue. The civil system is passive, not aggressive in assisting 
the plaintiff in pursuing justice.
Now, if the claim is lucky enough to make it through the system (overcoming delays, 
raising costs with delays, restrictive rules, and temptations o f settlement), the passivity of 
the institution continues. The burden to proceed -  the development o f the case, collection 
of evidence, presentation of proof -  are left to the parties, this further defines the 
passivity of the system.
'* Ibid.
16 Ibid. See section ‘Summing Up and Looking Ahead.’
See Las Vegas Justice Court website general information on Small Claim Filing, 
www.co.clark.nv.us/justicecourt_lv/smallclaim.htm, accessed 8 May 2005.
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Furthermore, in the civil law system, the “parties are treated as if they were equally 
endowed with economic resources, investigative opportunities and legal skills.”** Even if 
the participants were of equal resource, the burden of litigation is still on the plaintiff, and 
the burden is not a light one. So for the participant who is the least advantaged (in terms 
of resources, information, funding, and motivation), which is most often the plaintiff, one 
must have more than just a strong will to pursue justice.
Due to arbitration or mediation, out of court negotiations, the lack of ability or 
knowledge as to how to even consult a lawyer, most civil disputes do not even get to 
court. Suitors, lawyers, and the court system are not the only players in litigation. 
“Organizational actors such as large manufacturing corporations, financial institutions, 
[insurance companies], educational and cultural institutions, political parties, etc.,” *̂* are 
in contact with the potential plaintiff before the thought of a legal suit. It has been found:
[There is an] absence of sizable numbers of legal actions in which 
individuals or firms of substantial or large means appear on both sides of 
lawsuits. Such potential suitors can afford, and are likely to make 
extensive use of skilled professional help to channel their affairs so as to 
prevent trouble.... [T]hey are likely to be equipped to make sophisticated 
choices of alternatives to litigation to resolve difficulties through 
bargaining, mediation or arbitration.^*
** Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: ...,” 120.
*̂  Marc S. Galanter, “Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t 
Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society,” 
UCLA Law Review, 31:4 (October 1983): 8. “Miller and Sarat report that about 11% of 
disputants [ . . .  ] took their middle range disputes [between $1,000 and $10,000] to 
court.” Miller & Sarat, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 527 (1980 -  81).
Galanter, “Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know 
(And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society,” UCLA 
Law Review, 31:4 (October 1983): 9.
*̂ Ibid. Referring to Hurst, “The Functions of Courts in the United States,” 1950 -  
1980, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 401,422 (1980-1981).
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The process of litigation is a deterrent not only to single plaintiffs, but also to large 
companies. “For plaintiffs and defendants alike, litigation proves a miserable, disruptive, 
painful experience. Therefore, if even large corporations are deterred from civil court 
complexities, the single citizen must also be deterred. Incentive and the award of 
punitive damages is necessary to compensate the plaintiff for ‘taking the extreme trouble’ 
to sue, as well as to support the private law aspect of civil law.
The complex and passivity of the civil legal system is another reason, in addition to 
insult, harm, and bruised honor, that the plaintiff is the least advantaged as compared to 
the defendant. This supports why, incentive is necessary.
The Costly System
For criminal law, the government carries the burden of costs for prosecution.^* But 
for civil law, the costs of persecution fall entirely upon the plaintiff. The possibility of a 
punitive damages award provides additional incentive for the plaintiff to pursue litigation, 
since additional monetary compensation aids in attorney fees and other costs that may 
accompany a legal suit.
The actual cost of litigation is highly dependent upon the type of injury, whether a 
death is involved, and whether or not the case actually goes to court or is settled.
** Galanter, “The Day After the Litigation Explosion,” 4.
** Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, s.v. ‘Criminal law -  an overview’ 
viewed [on-line] at http://www.law.comell.edu on 9 May 2005. “Criminal law involves 
prosecution by the government of a person for an act that has been elassified as a erime. 
Civil cases, on the other hand, involve individuals and organizations seeking to resolve 
legal disputes. In a criminal case the state, through a proseeutor, initiates the suit, while in 
a civil case the victim brings the suit. Persons convicted of a erime may be incarcerated, 
fined, or both. However, persons found liable in a civil case may only have to give up 
property or pay money, but are not incarcerated.”
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“Empirical research from the Wisconsin Civil Litigation Research Project, reveals that 
...the cost to litigate an average or "typical" civil suit rarely exceeds $10,000.” '̂*
Specifically, only eight percent of the cases studied reported legal fees 
of more than $10,000. Another eight percent reported legal fees ranging 
between $5,001 to $10,000. In thirty eight percent o f the cases, the legal 
fees ranged between $1,001 to $5,000. Most surprisingly, forty six 
percent of the cases studied reported legal fees of only $1,000 or less.^*
So the majority of case costs were less than $5,000. Although it is important to note 
that the cost of litigation varies with the type of harm. The Rand Institute for Civil 
Justice in 1988 found that legal fees for asbestos and air accident cases where the cases 
involved the death of a plaintiff and the stakes are mueh higher, “the average litigation 
expenditure amounted to $72,000 and the defendant’s average costs amounted to 
$49,000.”*®
The question is: how important is the cost of litigation? Is the decision to pursue 
litigation heavily weighed upon the cost? Or will plaintiffs do whatever they can, 
whatever it takes, to pursue justice? The answer to this question is dependent upon the 
type of harm. The more severe the harm, the more one would be motivated to pursue 
justice. But at the same time, the more severe the harm, the more costly the pursuit 
becomes.
*"* David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer & Joel 
B. Grossman, “The Cost of Ordinary Litigation,” UCLA Law Review, 31:72, 80 (1983).
** Than N. Luu, Reducing the Costs o f Civil Litigation, Public Law Research Institute, 
[on-line] http://w3.uchastings.edu/plri/fal95tex/cstslit.html; (UC Hastings College of the 
Law 2004), accessed 20 January 2005, 5.
*® Ibid. referring to James S. Kakalik, Elizabeth M. King, Michael Traynor, Patricia 
A. Ebener, & Larry Picus, Costs and Compensation Paid in Aviation Accident Litigation, 
R-3421-ICJ (Rand Institute for Civil Justice) 1988.
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Since punitive damages can compensate for attorney’s fees, it has the possibility** of 
softening the burden of incurring the costs up fi-ont for the plaintiff. Furthermore, even if 
the plaintiff does not come out successfully, the fact that the possible outcome is there, 
eases the mental pursuit of litigation. Fairness of the procedure gives the participants a 
sense of justice, even if the outcome is not in their favor. This implies that “process is 
important because our notion of fairness includes not only the end result but the sense of 
fair process by which the result occurred.”** According to Robert E. Lane, in 
“Procedural Goods in Democracy: How One is Treated Versus What One Gets,”*̂  people 
often care more about how they are treated than what they get. Because of this, the 
essential moral ingredients in procedural justice are just as important as justice principles 
concerned with outcomes such as distributive and retribution principles.*® In order to 
determine fair procedure, moral ingredients need to be applied. Of these moral 
ingredients, one is self-respect. Lane also refers to Rawls’s view of self-respect as an 
important primary good, and thus should be used as a “prime criterion for assessing 
justice procedures.”*' Self-respect can be gained through self-esteem from small groups.
** I emphasize possibility since the punitive damages award is not guaranteed. Only 
after a defendant is found guilty and compensatory awards are determined, are punitive 
damages considered. So it is possible for one to pursue litigation with no possibility of 
receiving punitive damages, even if they win the case. Also refer to Chapter One 
regarding the discourse of punitive damages, they are rare and only awarded in a small 
percentage of civil cases.
** Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art o f  Political Decision Making, Revised 
Edition. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002), 51.
*® Robert E. Lane, “Procedural Goods in Democracy: How One is Treated Versus 
What One Gets, ” Social Justice Research, Vol. 2 No. 3 (1998) : 177-192.
*® Ibid., 177-178.
*' Ibid., 179.
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personal achievements, and ‘“reflected appraisal,’ judging yourself as you imagine others 
judge you. This means that being treated with respeet affects self-respect.”** This 
judgment includes treatment by authorities such as policemen, employers, or legal 
institutions.
Lane explains that once a person is treated with respect, they are more likely to 
exercise personal control over actions and motives.** It is this control that allows them to 
consider the price of justice (whether or not to bring a ease to court) and dignity in the 
midst of procedures in “which distributive justice and dignity are compensations,”*"* such 
as in civil law. After the unpleasantness of justice procedures, which Lane concludes 
actually result in more pain,** the level of overall satisfaction is factored by adding the 
intrinsic pleasure of procedure: having one’s problems solved, receiving benefits, or 
avoiding burdens, the sense of having been dealt with fairly.*® These pleasures represent 
“a kind of achievement, validating one’s self-respect,”** and at the end are more of a 
relief from the pains of litigation than actual pleasures. Therefore, procedural goods, 
such as punitive damages awarded to the plaintiff, serve justice. Not only because the
** Ibid.
** Ibid. When treated with respect one has the “opportunity to know what one can do, 
opportunity to control by one’s own acts one’s own economic destiny.”
*"* Ibid., 182.
** Ibid., 183-4, in the section “Relief From Procedural Pain,” where he refers to court 
proceedings being taxing, full of painful conflict, time costs and information costs.
*® Ibid.
** Ibid., 183-4,
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plaintiff is at the least advantaged, but also beeause the existenee of the procedure itself, 
provides a sense of fairness, regardless of the outcome.
Reformers** who favor split recovery awards,*® criminal punishment,"*® or societal 
distribution"** disagree. The arguments against plaintiffs receiving the punitive damages 
beg that the award is an inappropriate way of compensating plaintiffs for taking the 
trouble to sue. Reformers who propose alternatives to punitive damages distribution 
argue that allowing plaintiffs to keep punitive damages, motivates frivolous or imjust 
lawsuits, and that plaintiffs bringing civil suits to court should be seeking justice, not 
monetary “windfall gains.”"** Reformers for punitive damages distribution believe that 
the potential for receiving the punitive awards in addition to compensatory awards, in 
some cases significant amounts, promote inappropriate civil litigation.
But as I have shown, the ‘trouble’ to sue is immense and can be overwhelming to 
plaintiffs. And the purpose of a punitive damages award is not solely to compensate for 
attorney’s fees. Its foremost purpose is to punish and deter, it repairs insult and honor to 
the plaintiff, it satisfies vengeance, it provides incentive to the plaintiff for carrying the 
burden of pursuing justice, and lastly, it assists with attorney’s fees and the cost of 
litigation.
** See Chapter One, Arguments to Reform the Distribution.
*® Where the punitive damages amount is shared with the state.
"*® Volokh, 1.
"*' See Sharkey.
"** supra. See Chapter One. The reform proposals for Societal Damages and Split 
Recovery.
122
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The claim that punitive damages encourage frivolous litigation is a discounted claim 
through the oversimplifieation of the issue. Again, punitive damages are rare, as stated in 
Chapter One, only oecur in about 2 - 5  percent of all tort cases. If attorneys or plaintiffs 
are pursuing frivolous cases assuming that punitive damages will be easily awarded, they 
are mistaken. Also, contingency fee lawyers must cover the costs of litigation upfront. 
Thus it simply makes no economic sense for them to bring frivolous litigation because 
there is only cost and no guaranteed benefit."** Another problem with the claim that 
frivolous litigation applies to punitive damages is that it assumes that monetary gain is 
the dominant motivation to pursue justice. Lawyers and plaintiffs many not only be 
seeking monetary gains with frivolous lawsuits, but also social attention or possible 
career moves. So, if one wanted to pursue a frivolous lawsuit, then they would, 
regardless of the possibility of the punitive damages award. The reformation of 
distribution to the plaintiff based solely on prevention of frivolous lawsuits is impetuous. 
Calling attention to frivolous lawsuits is the interest groups’ way of distracting policy 
makers from the real purposes of punitive damages, namely, to punish, to provide 
incentive for, and repair further harm to the plaintiff.
For, even if monetary gain was a dominant factor in litigation pursuit, punitive 
damages going to the plaintiff serve purposes that rise above ethical maintenance of 
greedy lawyers and false plaintiffs. Adjusting the distribution of punitive damages is not 
the solution to preventing frivolous lawsuits, because the risk of losing legitimate
"** Capra, “An Accident and a Dream....,” 35. Although there are statutes such as the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. Chapter 126, SubChapter IV §12205 
that states “the court or agency, in its discretion may allow the prevailing party, ...a  
reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses and costs...”
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lawsuits is too great. Punitive damages awarded to the plaintiff plays too important of a 
part in ensuring legitimate lawsuits make it through the system.
The Private Attorney General Principle 
The purpose of inducing private law enforcement is instituted by the system of civil 
law. Civil law is distinct in that the plaintiff is required to bring the case to court on their 
own -  with no or little assistance from the police. Whether or not to bring a case to court 
is the sole decision of the plaintiff."*"* This is why it is referred to as private law. The civil 
legal system operates only when the process is triggered by parties."** “The punitive 
damage system . . .  is driven exclusively by private litigants and their lawyers.”"*®
Civil law “is a matter of private law in the sense that its goal is to provide 
compensation and satisfaction for the offended, [only] i f  she chooses to pursue the 
case.”"** So it can be concluded that civil law is distinct from criminal law since the 
burden of bringing the wrong-doing to court is on the plaintiff. Given that civil law 
procedures begin vrith this distinction, it can be concluded that the ‘private law’ aspect is 
inherent in the purpose of civil law, and therefore an important purpose that procedures
"*"* Duff, “Legal Punishment, ”4. “Civil law deals in part with wrongs which are non­
private in that they are legally and socially declared as wrongs — with the wrong 
constituted by libel, for instance; but they are still treated as ‘private’ wrongs in the sense 
that it is up to the person who was wronged to seek legal redress. She must decide to 
bring, or not to bring, a civil case against the person who wronged her; and although she 
can appeal to the law to protect her rights, the case is still between her and the 
defendant.”
"** Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead...,” 103.
"*® Volokh, 22. Quoting Theodore Olson of the Civil Justice Reform Group.
"** Duff, "Theories of Criminal Law", 6.
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must support.
In order for plaintiffs to suceeed in extensive civil court cases, the damages, 
compensatory and punitive must go to the plaintiff. If it did not, then the private law 
aspect of civil law would be lost with this procedure, and it is possible that some private 
wrong-doings would not make it to court and the responsible entity or individual would 
be free to repeat harm. The alternatives to not pursuing a case are not attractive: inaction 
is often a response by “claimants who lack information or access, or who decide the gain 
is too low, cost too high;”"** withdrawal from the situation by relocation is a common 
expedient to trouble; resorting to some unofficial control system such as insurance 
agency settlements, mediation or arbitration, ombudsmen, tribunals, etc.; and private 
oppositional remedies that may include gangs and the mafia. Most of these alternative 
resolutions to justice are temporary or do not reach justice at all.
The legal system has its barriers. But once overcome, the system offers the best 
opportunity to justice through adversarialism. Litigation benefits not only the 
participants by ensuring a fair and just trial, a fair and just punishment, but it also benefits 
the community in several ways.
General social deterrence results when wrongs are publicly exposed and punished. 
Citizens or groups in society may change their policies and procedures to comply with 
the result of the trial in order for them to avoid similar repercussions. Also, court trials in 
general influence change in society in a variety of ways. As an agenda-setting forum for
"** Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead ...,” 125.
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political policies/® civil court cases have set precedent regarding influence on product 
safety efforts, and sexual discrimination policies.*® Court decisions provide social 
communication of social moral evaluations of specific actions or conduct. Knowledge of 
court proceedings and decisions invite society to evaluate and possibly adjust their views 
of these actions. The result is that “the law may maintain or intensify existing 
evaluations of conduct.”*' Therefore, litigation is important to society in regards to 
change and communicating social norms as they do change.
Litigation and private attorneys general should be encouraged. The greatest barrier to 
the legal system is the initiation of suit and the motivation to continue, which makes 
incentive through punitive damages vital. The private attorneys general pursue and 
prosecute actors who have committed egregious acts beyond the practical reach of 
criminal law. It is believed appropriate for this reason, to reward these private 
prosecutors for their public service in bringing the wrongdoers to account.**
"*® Lawrence Baum, American Courts: Process and Policy, S®* ed. (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 2001.), 1. Also see Galanter, “The Day After the Litigation 
Explosion,” 20.
*® Galanter, “The Day After the Litigation Explosion,” 18. Listing the beneficial 
effects of litigation.
*' Ibid. 19.
** Thomas J. Collin, Punitive Damages and Business Torts: A Practitioner’s 
Handbook. (Chicago: ABA Publishing, 1998). 14.
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Punitive awards are a common law remedy in which citizens serve as 
prosecutors, bringing wrongdoers to justice. The possibility of being 
awarded punitive damages encourages plaintiffs to act as ‘private 
attorneys general’ and provides incentive for plaintiffs to sue in instances 
where conduct has caused widespread harm. Punitive damages permit the 
litigation of claims that might otherwise be too expensive for an individual 
plaintiff to prosecute, and they serve as ‘bounty’ for the plaintiff. Without 
exemplary damages, a corporation would run the risk if it harmed a large 
number of people, each in a relatively minor way. Punitive damages are 
particularly necessary where there are ‘gaps’ in the criminal law. Private 
attorneys general provide a ‘backup’ remedy in situations where 
government enforcement agencies fail to adequately protect the public.**
Therefore, the plaintiff receiving the award is more than just “windfall gains” or a 
winning of a lottery -  it serves to support the main functions of civil law, viz. private law 
enforcement. Private law enforcement is an important social benefit as well as the initial 
step for all civil law, and therefore should be supported. Punitive damages awarded to 
the plaintiff specifically support private law enforcement by providing incentive. This 
purpose outweighs other concerns to reform distribution of punitive damages awards, and 
so the procedure should remain.
** Rustad and Koenig, 14 of 64.
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CHAPTER 6
RECOMMENDATIONS 
My initial question regarding punitive damages was not of amount, but of the award 
distribution. However, the excessiveness issue, as discussed in Chapter One, could not 
be ignored. With careful research I found that the excessiveness claims derived mostly 
from special interest groups and the media. This is common. Like most political 
policies, the legal court system is utilized as an agenda-setting arena. Special interest 
groups employ the court system, just like the legislatures, to change political policy.
After reviewing the case history o f ‘excessive’ punitive damages awards, 1 also learned 
that the court system has taken measures, through appellate guidelines, to address the 
claims that awards are excessive or violate Constitutional rights. And, since most of the 
larger awards are remitted, appealed, and struck down; 1 became assured that 
excessiveness was not an issue.
But regardless of the amount, what justified the plaintiff receipt? Whether the 
amount is small or large, how are punitive damages justified to be received by the 
plaintiff, if they represent punishment? The punishment theories of retribution and 
deterrence are classic justifications for meting out punishment in order to correct harms 
in society. Punitive damages are appropriately awarded as a method for civil 
punishment. Since civil law through compensatory damages does not always take into 
account further (non-nominal) harms, punitive damages policy allows civil law to punish,
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especially corporations, without having to merge with criminal law. But retribution and 
deterrence as punishment justifications do not require punitive damages to be received by 
the plaintiff. Nor do they rule out punishment justifications for the plaintiffs receipt of 
the damages. As I have discovered, the punishment justification of vengeance 
satisfaction does require the punitive damages be awarded to the plaintiff. Vengeance at 
first glance may not seem to be a virtuous justification for punishment, but it is 
historically supported as a purpose for punitive damages. Although purposes for punitive 
damages have expanded and been updated with time, it is important to validate damages 
through the original purposes or see if the original purposes still apply today; for although 
times change and new generations cause us to shift focus from the original purposes, we 
must remember to first learn from the past, before we can adjust for the future. So, since 
it is the particular plaintiffs vengeance' that punitive damages seek to satisfy, given 
private law; vengeance satisfaction supports the punitive damages be received by the 
plaintiff. For it is through this individual exchange that personal vengeance is satisfied.
Along with the satisfaction of vengeance, the original purposes of repairing insult and 
restoring honor to the plaintiff are historically supported purposes for punitive damages. 
Given the personal nature of all three, they all support that punitive damages should be 
received by the plaintiff. It could be argued that vengeance, insult, and honor could be 
served by the plaintiff not receiving the punitive damages -  for punishment of the wrong-
' This does not discount that some punitive damages are calculated for harm that 
occurred in the state or predicted harm. In this sense, the exeessiveness issue comes into 
play. This view will be addressed in this section regarding societal damages claims.
Most punitive damages are initially calculated according to the further harm caused to the 
plaintiff. And as discussed in Chapter One, calculations that include national or state (as 
opposed to individual) harm, cause eoneems for due process violations and 
excessiveness.
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doer alone should satisfy all three, just as they suffice for criminal law. But, I argue that 
since civil law is labeled ‘private law’ and deals with personal and private transactions, 
the damages should remain so, personal and private to the plaintiff. And sinee the private 
law arena deals with private wrongs, unlike criminal law, then the punishments are 
servingyir^r the plaintiff, and second the community. The private law aspect of civil law 
is inherent and important to the distinction of the system, so that it is equally important as 
a determinant for the policies.
Also inherent in the private law aspect is the justification of the plaintiff receipts 
policy. The main reason why civil law is referred to as private law is because the 
decision and burden to pursue litigation, to accuse of a wrong, and to follow through for 
justice is the sole responsibility of the plaintiff. Plaintiff responsibility for litigation is the 
major characteristic of civil law. And since the plaintiff is procedurally responsible for 
the burden of litigation, the plaintiff becomes procedurally the least advantaged in the 
process. According to the procedural justice principles of John Rawls, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, excess liberties such as punitive damages, should be distributed to benefit 
the least advantaged. Thus the punitive damages should be awarded to the plaintiff 
because they are the least advantaged and to provide an incentive for their seeking relief 
for this burden.
Support for plaintiff incentive or a private attorney general is not only needed due to 
plaintiffs responsibility. For moral obligations, parental for example, do not always 
require incentive. But since the obligation to pursue justice requires that the plaintiff take 
on the civil legal system, it requires incentive because the system is inherently passive, 
complex, eostly, and usually requires expert assistance. In order for the legal system to
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ensure justice, it can either make the pursuit of justice more aeeessible for the private 
attorneys general, or it can provide some kind of assistance and incentive.
Is providing incentive just in itself? Or should we require moral obligation alone to 
manage civil suits? As I have shown in earlier chapters, incentive to pursue justice is 
nothing new. The legal system has offered awards and incentives to citizens for many 
years. Until society is ready to rely on moral obligation alone, incentive is necessary for 
achieving justice in society. Punitive damages being received by the plaintiff serve this 
purpose in civil law.
Referring back to my original question, what justified plaintiff receipt? Initially when 
I began research, I assumed that there were no reasons for this justification. I have 
discovered the justifications exist: vengeance, insult, honor, incentive, and benefiting the 
least advantaged. But are these justifications enough? Shouldn ’t the traditional 
justifications (retribution and deterrence) for punishment alone be enough to determine 
distribution of punitive damages just as they do for criminal punishment? And for with 
criminal punishment, the emphasis of justification lies in community benefits, not the 
plaintiffs. The community benefits since criminals are incapacitated, rehabilitation of 
the criminal is important, and fines, if  any, go to the institution that is responsible for 
serving the punishment. Shouldn’t institutional punishment of any kind benefit first 
societal eoneems? These are the arguments against the plaintiff receiving the award.
Reforms to amend distribution include split-recovery statutes and soeietal damages 
proposals, as introdueed in Chapter One. Both of these reforms utilize a “eentral concept 
. . .  that societal, as opposed to individual, interests may be vindicated by punitive
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damages.”  ̂ But societal interests continue to be served with the punitive damages award 
received by the plaintiff: the maintenance of social order and deterrence. Regardless of 
who receives the award, the wrong-doer is being punished and societal benefits are being 
served. But just as this is not a reason for the plaintiff to receive the award, it is also not 
a reason for the plaintiff to not receive the award. Purposes served when the plaintiff 
does receive the award, as listed above, should receive precedence in civil law. Since 
civil law leaves the burden to seek justice solely to the plaintiff, so for the distribution 
procedures of punitive damages, the individual interests outweigh societal interests of 
split-recovery and societal damages.
Although split-recovery procedure varies from state to state, the basic process 
requires a portion of the punitive damages award distributed to a state general fund, or 
some type of state managed compensation fund for specific victims, and the proportions 
vary between states.^ Listed goals of split-recovery statutes are (1) “to discourage 
plaintiffs from bringing [frivolous] punitive damages claims by decreasing the amount of 
their recovery,"* (2) to eliminate the “windfall gains” to the plaintiff,^ and (3) as a revenue
 ̂Sharkey, [endnote72]*373 From endnote72: “Current law recognizes that punitive 
damages may serve the societal objective of deterring similar conduct by the defendant.. 
. to ‘punish [ ] and deter[ ]’, [dual purpose] focus solely on vindicating society’s 
interests”.
 ̂Volokh, see “Table 5: States that divert part of punitive damages awards to public 
purposes”, pgs. 41-42 of 60. See also The American Tort Reform Association, 
http://www.atra.org/show/7343 © 2002, “States With Punitive Damage Limits, As of 
June 30, 2001.” Listing “Punitive Damages Assigned To State Funds: Alaska (1997); 
Alabama (1995)*; Illinois (1986); Iowa (1986); Missouri (1987); Oregon (1987); U t^  
(1989) *Alabama Supreme Court directed 50% to an Alabama General Fund.''
"* Sharkey, 11. “The Illinois split-recovery statute [ ] was enacted specifically to 
discourage punitive damages,”
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raising measure for the state/
I have argued in Chapter One and in Chapter Five that frivolous lawsuits are not a 
result of punitive damages’ receipt by the plaintiff. The fact that punitive damages assist 
the plaintiff with lawyers’ fees does not necessarily entice frivolous law suits. Lawyers 
still take the risk of losing as well as the burden of costs up front with contingency fees, 
so logic follows that they would he discouraged to take on frivolous suits. Punitive 
damages receipt by the plaintiff provides an incentive that encourages the private 
attorneys general aspect of civil law. Reformers do exaggerate and distort this claim by 
rephrasing it as ‘encouraging frivolous law suits.’ The ‘frivolous law suit’ claim also 
assumes that suits that involve punitive damages are frequent, thus plaintiffs can be 
enticed with them. But as statistics have shown, the awarding of punitive damages is 
rare.’ Taking on the burden of a law suit for the sole hopes of being awarded punitive 
damages is a big risk.
The last two purposes for split-recovery statutes, preventing windfall gains and 
raising revenue for the state, assume that the punitive damages awards are large enough 
to be considered “windfalls” and would be substantial revenue for the state. According to 
the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics summary findings for state
 ̂Ibid, “a plaintiff is a fortuitous beneficiary of a punitive damages award simply 
because there is no one else to receive it. [endnote85].”
 ̂Ibid. also see endnote 86, endnote 87, endnote 88.
’ See Chapter One as well as U. S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
CivilJustice Statistics, “Summary Findings,” http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/civil.htm, 
accessed 12 November 2004. Surveying the 75 largest counties in the United States, from 
a total of 11,908 tort, contract and real property trial cases, of the 8,859 Jury trial cases, 
plaintiffs won in only 4,715 of the cases and of those, 260 cases were awarded punitive 
damages. Of the 2,828 Bench trial cases, plaintiff winners were in 1,849 cases and of 
those, 79 were awarded punitive damages.
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courts civil justice statistics, in 2001 for jury trials, the median total award for the 
plaintiff winner was $37,000. The median punitive damages award for the plaintiff was
$50,000.^ Juries awarded punitive damages in only 6% of civil cases with a plaintiff
10winner.
Now the revenue raising concerns of reformers would like to assume that most 
punitive damages awards are in the millions of dollars. But in reality they are not. And 
as established in Chapter Five, the average case costs approximately $10,000; thus the 
gains provided by punitive damages are hardly windfall to the plaintiff. Since the states 
have many other options for raising revenue, this reason for reform is moot. Therefore, 
the purposes that punitive damages being received by the plaintiff fulfill deserve 
precedence over split-recovery concerns.
Compensatory Societal Damages'* specifically apply to “pattern or practice” '^ torts.' 
It is argued that since a “defendant’s conduct toward the plaintiff is part o f a pattern of 
similar repeated conduct, [and] a higher punitive damages award is permissible.”'"* It is
* Ibid.
 ̂Ibid. Forjudge decisions, the median total award was $28,000 and the median 
punitive damages award was $46,000.
Ibid. Judges awarded punitive damages in only 4% of the civil cases with a 
plaintiff winner.
"  Sharkey, 15. Part III A New Category of Compensatory Societal Damages.
*’ Ibid. Repeated conduct that likewise affects multiple parties, as opposed to single 
tortuous acts by defendants that harm multiple victims.
Gifis, Law Dictionary, s.v. “tort” : a wrong; a private or civil wrong or injury 
resulting from a breach of a legal duty that exists by virtue of society’s expectations 
regarding interpersonal conduct, rather than by contract or other private relationship. 26 
N.E. 2d 254, 259.
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also argued that the punitive damages -  sinee ealculated based upon the repeated conduct 
-  should be held by the state for the other harmed plaintiffs to collect after judgment, 
even though they did not directly participate in the specific legal case.
These assertions are made on the premise that instead of taking advantage of the class 
action lawsuit, in which a lawsuit is brought by a representative member of a large group 
of persons on behalf of all members of the group, and since punitive damages is 
permissible to be calculated based on a pattern of repeat conduct (meaning that others 
have been harmed in the same way), the policy should ease the pursuit of litigation for 
those who do not take the “trouble to sue.”
The legal system is complex and costly, and as I have established, awarding the 
plaintiff for taking the time and effort to sue is a justifiable purpose. Filing and following 
through with a civil suit is not as easy as applying for your driver’s license. Even the 
filing of a small claims case consists of forms, copies, fees, time lines, serving of papers, 
etc... So, if the other plaintiffs wanted to take the time to pursue justice, they should, and 
the statutes of the law need not be changed for this purpose.
Does this mean that justice is only served to those who take the time and have the 
resources to pursue litigation, even though the award may be calculated on other’s harm? 
Due to the passiveness of the system, it does mean this. But, in order justify a change in 
policy, I argue that there must be some consistency in what can be viewed as the 
problem. Multiple calculations of harm is not the standard and varies from state to state, 
case to case, jury to jury. Again, these societal damage reforms are based upon the
Sharkey, 15. refer also to her endnote 149.
Gifis, Law Dictionary, s.v. “class action” : Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 23.
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premise that awards are calculated on multiple harms and that the award includes not 
only compensation, but also punitive damages. But since these conditions are not the 
standard nor are they consistent throughout the nation, I see little justification for 
entertaining reform.
If class action lawsuit statutes need to be reformed in order to better accommodate 
groups filings, then perhaps they are in need of examination.'^ But the policy of punitive 
damages should not be adjusted to suit class action proceedings. The calculation of 
repeat conduct into the amount of punitive damages has been accused of being unjust 
according to Due Process Laws as well as violating Fair and Just Punishment Laws.'’
But, as addressed in Chapter One, these concerns have been addressed with judiciary 
review guidelines. And we must remember that for most of these cases, the large awards 
have been appealed and struck down. Lastly, societal damages reform is also asserted on 
the premise that the awards are large and excessive, and as has been noted, they are 
neither.
In conclusion, punitive damages should he awarded to the plaintiff in order to: (1) 
serve as an incentive in order to maintain private attorneys general, since they directly 
repair insult, satisfy vengeance, and repair honor; and (2) since they mitigate the burden 
of litigation that is solely on the plaintiff. The ease of this burden is necessary because 
the civil law system is inherently passive, complex, and costly. And due to the inherent 
burden in the system, along with the private law aspect, (3) the plaintiff becomes the least 
advantaged in the procedure and awarding punitive damages to the plaintiff serve
Due to the limited scope of this paper, I will not delve too deeply into this issue.
' ’ Jeffries, “A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages,” 147. See 
also details in Chapter One.
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procedural justice principles. These purposes for the plaintiff to receive the award are 
justified, supported by history, and serve society, the individual, and justice.
Reformation considerations to any policy process require a structurally concise 
review of the original purposes of the policy in order to determine which “implicit 
principles ... on the whole make sense of the practice.”** Once these are determined, 
they are used to validate, or invalidate, the procedure. Since our repeated actions, 
practices, or political policies are explained with their established rules, purposes, and 
intentions, “[i]n order to justify -  to make good an argument or show a person or action 
to be just or right, or defend as right or proper, or give adequate grounds for action -  we 
need to appeal to some standard of what is right, proper or just. When we justify an 
action that is part of a practice, to make our case we can often point to rules of the 
practice.” *̂
Thus for the policy in which punitive damages should be received by the plaintiff, I 
have presented these standards. The purposes I have used to justify plaintiff receipt 
complete the practice of civil law and make sense of the practice itself, since it’s purposes 
are inherent in and support the private law arena. Plaintiff receipt validates civil law 
procedure and serves procedural justice. Reforms for punitive damages should not 
conflict with the purposes that serve the system and society, and the awarding of punitive 
damages to the plaintiff does both.
'* Mark Tunick, in the introduction to Punishment: Theory and Practice, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1992.), 13.
Ibid., 8.
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